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Ex parte MANADANAS et al.

08063202 (B.P.A.I. Feb. 18, 1998)
Ex parte MANADANAS et al.

6 Cited authorities

  1. Merck Co., Inc. v. Biocraft Laboratories

    874 F.2d 804 (Fed. Cir. 1989)   Cited 47 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the prior art's disclosure of a multitude of combinations failed to render any particular formulation less obvious

  2. In re Young

    927 F.2d 588 (Fed. Cir. 1991)   Cited 17 times
    Observing that in an obviousness inquiry, courts consider a prior art "reference for what it disclose in relation to the claimed invention."

  3. In re Sovish

    769 F.2d 738 (Fed. Cir. 1985)   Cited 8 times

    Appeal No. 85-781. July 26, 1985. James W. Geriak, Lyon Lyon, of Los Angeles, Cal., argued, for appellants. With him on brief were Roy L. Anderson and William E. Mouzavires, Lyon Lyon, Washington, D.C. Fred W. Sherling, Associate Solicitor, U.S. Patent Trademark Office, Arlington, Va., argued, for appellee. With him on brief were Joseph F. Nakamura, Sol. and Fred E. McKelvey, Deputy Sol., Washington, D.C. Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before RICH, Circuit

  4. Application of Bozek

    416 F.2d 1385 (C.C.P.A. 1969)   Cited 10 times
    Noting that a patent examiner may properly rely on "common knowledge and common sense of the person of ordinary skill in the art" in making conclusions regarding obviousness

  5. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,130 times   479 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  6. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)