Appeal No. 83-675. July 21, 1983. Sheldon W. Witcoff, Chicago, Ill., argued for appellant. With him on the brief was Ronald E. Larson, Chicago, Ill., of counsel. Robert B. Russell, Boston, Mass., argued for appellee. With him on the brief were David A. Tucker, Boston, Mass., and Thomas H. Peebles, III, Nashville, Tenn., of counsel. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and FRIEDMAN and NIES, Circuit Judges. MARKEY, Chief Judge
Patent Appeal No. 6841. November 14, 1962. Barnes, Kisselle, Raisch Choate, Detroit, Mich. (John M. Kisselle and Basil C. Foussianes, Detroit, Mich., of counsel), for appellant. Clarence W. Moore, Washington, D.C. (George C. Roeming, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for the Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, RICH, MARTIN, and SMITH, Judges, and Associate Judge JOSEPH R. JACKSON, Retired. MARTIN, Judge. This is an appeal from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals affirming
Patent Appeal No. 6719. July 25, 1962. J. Hart Evans, Louis C. Smith, Jr., New York City, and Paul A. Rose, Washington D.C., for appellants. Clarence W. Moore, Washington, D.C. (Joseph Schimmel, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for the Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, RICH, MARTIN, and SMITH, Judges, and Judge WILLIAM H. KIRKPATRICK. United States Senior District Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, designated to participate in place of Judge O'CONNELL, pursuant to provisions
(a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622
(a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)