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Ex parte Liveoak et al.

08359562 (B.P.A.I. Mar. 24, 1998)
Ex parte Liveoak et al.

16 Cited authorities

  1. Wied v. Valhi, Inc.

    465 U.S. 1026 (1984)   Cited 260 times
    Stating that "[t]o demand a slavish adherence to the procedural sequence and to require these defendants, in this case, to articulate the words of renewal once the motion had been taken under advisement, would be 'to succumb to a nominalism and a rigid trial scenario as equally at variance as ambush with the spirit of the rules.'"

  2. In re Schreiber

    128 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1997)   Cited 150 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that once the Examiner established a prima facie case of anticipation, the burden of proof was properly shifted to the inventor to rebut the finding of inherency

  3. Labounty Mfg., v. U.S. Intern. Trade Com'n

    958 F.2d 1066 (Fed. Cir. 1992)   Cited 169 times
    Holding that claims for "inequitable conduct," which arise when applicants or their attorneys breach their duty of candor to the patent office, must be proved by challenging party by clear and convincing evidence

  4. Specialty Composites v. Cabot Corp.

    845 F.2d 981 (Fed. Cir. 1988)   Cited 188 times
    Holding that patent's inclusion of examples of "external" plasticizers did not prove that patent claims excluded internal plasticizers

  5. Verdegaal Bros., v. Union Oil Co. of Calif

    814 F.2d 628 (Fed. Cir. 1987)   Cited 138 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding reliance on non-claimed distinction between prior art method and claimed method "inappropriate" and insufficient to save the claim from inherent anticipation

  6. Kalman v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.

    713 F.2d 760 (Fed. Cir. 1983)   Cited 111 times
    In Kalman, this court determined that the district court's fact finding of identity of invention (reached after a four day bench trial) was not clearly erroneous, and that "the stipulation by the parties, coupled with [Kimberly Clark's] failure to counter Kalman's affidavits and evidence submitted in his motion for summary judgment" dictated a finding of infringement.

  7. Hazani v. U.S. Intern. Trade Comm

    126 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1997)   Cited 61 times
    Holding that claim is not product-by-process claim if it "describes the product more by its structure than by the process used to obtain it"

  8. In re Bond

    910 F.2d 831 (Fed. Cir. 1990)   Cited 57 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Finding that, since "structural equivalency ... is a question of fact," where the Board made no finding as to structural equivalency, this Court would "not reach that question in the first instance" and instead vacate and remand

  9. RCA Corp. v. Applied Digital Data Systems, Inc.

    730 F.2d 1440 (Fed. Cir. 1984)   Cited 57 times
    Holding that dependent claim "cannot be anticipated" where the independent claim "is not anticipated"

  10. In re Sneed

    710 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1983)   Cited 21 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Rejecting argument that a prior art reference should not be considered "because it deals with collapsible hose rather than flexible plastic pipe and teaches that rolling 600 feet of 4 inch, noncollapsible hose into a transportable bundle is virtually 'an insurmountable task'" because "it is not necessary that the inventions of the references be physically combinable to render obvious the invention under review."

  11. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,129 times   479 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  12. Section 102 - Conditions for patentability; novelty

    35 U.S.C. § 102   Cited 5,995 times   1001 Legal Analyses
    Prohibiting the grant of a patent to one who "did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented"

  13. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)