Ex Parte Leon

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

May 27, 2016

12746841 (P.T.A.B. May. 27, 2016)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
121746,841 11/10/2010
22511 7590 06/01/2016
OSHA LIANG LLP,
TWO HOUSTON CENTER
909 FANNIN, SUITE 3500
HOUSTON, TX 77010
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Jean Francois Leon
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
17089/053001 2226
EXAMINER
RO,BENTSU
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2837
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/01/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
docketing@oshaliang.com
hathaway@oshaliang.com
escobedo@oshaliang.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JEAN FRAN(:OIS LEON
Appeal2014-006489
Application 12/746,841
Technology Center 2800
Before GEORGE C. BEST, WESLEY B. DERRICK, and JULIA HEANEY,
Administrative Patent Judges.
BEST, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
The Examiner finally rejected claims 1, 2, 5-7, and 9 of Application
12/746,841under35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated and claim 8 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious. Final Act. (March 22, 2013). Appellant 1
seeks reversal of those rejections pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a). We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6.
For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM. Because our decision
relies upon facts and reasoning that differ from the Examiner, we designate
1 Valeo Securite Habitacle is identified as the real party in interest. Appeal
Br. 4.
Appeal2014-006489
Application 12/746,841
our affirmance as constituting NEW GROUNDS OF REJCTION pursuant to
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b).
BACKGROUND
The '841 Application describes a circuit for controlling a plurality of
direct-current motors. Spec. 1. In particular, the '841 Application describes
a circuit for controlling a number of direct-current motors capable of being
controlled independently of one another. Id. at 2.
Claim 1 is representative of the '841 Application's claims and is
reproduced below:
1. A circuit for controlling a number of direct-current motors
capable of being controlled independently of one another,
compnsmg:
for each motor, an H-bridge comprising a first branch and a
second branch, designed for the control of the associated motor,
wherein said second branches of each H-bridge are made by two
switches forming a branch common to all the H-bridges and rated
to receive a current equivalent to a sum of drive currents so that
said motors are controlled simultaneously and independently by
application of command signals associated with the first
branches, and
wherein each switch of the first branches of the H-bridges
receives an associated pulse width modulation (PWM) signal,
wherein the PWM signals are superposed and are received
independently of one another.
Appeal Br. 19 (Claims App.)
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Application 12/746,841
REJECTIONS
On appeal, the Examiner maintains the following rejections:
1. Claims 1, 2, 5-7, and 9 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as
anticipated by Echols. 2 Final Act. 2.
2. Claim 8 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over
Echols. Final Act. 6.
DISCUSSION
Rejection 1. Appellant stipulates that, for purposes of this appeal,
claims 1, 2, 5-7, and 9 stand or fall together. Appeal Br. 7. Thus, we need
only address claim 1. Appellant argues that the rejection of claim 1 should
be reversed because the Examiner applied the legally erroneous standard for
anticipation and that, under the correct standard for anticipation, Echols does
not anticipate claim 1 of the '841 Application. Id. at 7-16.
Appellant argues that the Examiner fails to apply the legal standard
that a claim is anticipated only if each and every element of the claimed
invention is described, either expressly or inherently, in a single prior art
reference. Id. at 7-8. Appellant further argues that the Examiner improperly
shifted burden of demonstrating patentability to Applicant. Id. at 8-11.
The Examiner responds by attempting to distinguish the Federal
Circuit cases relied upon by Appellant. Answer 9-14. In particular, the
Examiner argues that "the legal citing from the court can be used as an
argument only when the legal decision is made based on similar
environment and based on the similar functionality of the device to be
argued." Id. at 9. Based upon this reasoning, the Examiner concludes
2 US 6,583,591 B2, issued June 24, 2003.
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Application 12/746,841
For this application, any court citing that can aid as a
decision-making for the examiner and for the Board must be
related to an infinite number of time sequences of plural motors
sequential control and "PWM + superposed" as defined earlier.
None of the above court citing # 1 ---# 10 has plural motor PWM
control and none of the above citing relates to time sequence
control.
Based on the above-mentioned reasons, all court citing are
faulty arguments and therefore have no face value.
Id. at 13-14 (emphasis added).
Based upon the foregoing, we agree with Appellant that the Examiner
used an incorrect standard for determining whether Echols anticipates claim
1 of the '841 Application. Thus, we cannot affirm the Examiner's rejection.
Our analysis, however, does not end here. Appellant argues that
under the correct legal standard Echols does not anticipate claim 1. Appeal
Br. 11-16. In particular, Appellant argues that Echols does not anticipate
claim 1 for the following reason:
Claim 1, [sic] requires[,] in part, that "each switch of the
first branches of the H-bridges receives an associated pulse width
modulation (PWM) signal, wherein the PWM signals are
superposed and are received independently of one another."
Echols fails to discloses limitation and thus, Echols cannot
support a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 102.
Id. at 12. For the reasons set forth below, we are not persuaded by
Appellant's argument.
To serve as anticipatory prior art, "the reference must disclose each
and every element of the claimed invention, whether it does so explicitly or
inherently." In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
We begin, as we must, by construing the claim language in question.
Oakley, Inc. v. Sunglass Hut Int'!, 316 F.3d 1331, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
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Application 12/746,841
(explaining that anticipation and obviousness require comparison of the
properly construed claims to the available prior art); In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d
1475, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("[T]o properly compare [the prior art] with the
claims at issue, we must construe the term [in dispute] to ascertain its scope
and meaning.").
During prosecution, the PTO gives the language of the proposed
claims "the broadest reasonable meaning of the words in their ordinary
usage as they would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, taking
into account whatever enlightenment by way of definitions or otherwise that
may be afforded by the written description contained in the applicant's
specification." In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054--55 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Appellant argues that Echols does not describe the limitation "wherein
the PWM signals are superposed and are received independently of one
another." Appeal Br. 12. In particular, Appellant argues that Echols does
not show the use of superposed PWM signals. Accordingly, we must
determine the broadest reasonable interpretation of the adjective
"superposed PWM signals."
The '841 Application describes a control circuit for a plurality of
electric motors. Spec. 1. The Application, therefore, falls within the field of
electrical engineering. A person having ordinary skill in the art in the field
of electrical engineering would have understood the term "superposed" in
the phrase "superposed PWM signals" as referring to the superposition
principle, which sets forth that for all linear systems the net response at a
given place and time caused by two or more stimuli is the sum of responses
which would have been caused by each stimulus individually. See
Superposition principle, Wikipedia,
https:// en. wikipedia.org/wiki/Superposition_principle. For electrical circuits
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Appeal2014-006489
Application 12/746,841
in a linear system, the voltage or current at any branch of a circuit having
more than one independent source equals the algebraic sum of the responses
caused by each independent source acting alone, where all other independent
sources are replaced by other internal impedances. See Superposition
theorem, Wikipedia, https ://en. wikipedia. org/wiki/Superposition_theorem;
The Authoritative Dictionary of IEEE Standards Terms 1125 (7th ed. 2000).
Accordingly, we conclude that a person having ordinary skill in the art at the
time of the invention would have understood the term "superposed PWM
signals" to mean that the PWM signal supplied to the switches in the first
branches of the H-bridges is equal to the sum of the PWM signals supplied
to each of the individual switches.
This interpretation is consistent with the '841 Application's
Specification. The Specification has a single instance of the word
superposed: "As illustrated in the timing diagrams of figures 2 to 4, the
PWM signals are superposed and therefore independent of one another and
allow a control of the direction and of the speed of rotation of the two
motors Ml, M2." Spec. 6. Our review of Figures 2 to 4 does not suggest
that the term superposed is given any unusual meaning in the context of the
'841 Application's Specification.
Figures 2 and 3 of Echols show the on-off states of the four motors
described in the specific embodiment detailed in Echols's Specification. As
described in the Specification, Echols includes a controller that sends PWM
signals to the switches in the first branches of the H-bridge shown in
Echols's Figure 1. See col. 3, 11. 24- 56. As shown in Figures 2 and 3, the
particular embodiment described in Echols does not operate two or more of
the motors simultaneously. Thus, the total PWM signal over a time period T
supplied to the switches in the first branches of Echols must equal the sum
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Application 12/746,841
of the PWM signals supplied to each of the individual switches over that
time period. Accordingly, Echols describes the use of a superposed PWM
signal.
Appellant's argument to the contrary is based upon a different
interpretation of the phrase superposed PWM signals. Appellant apparently
interprets the word superposed as requiring simultaneous operation of two or
more motors in the claimed system. In particular, Appellant argues that
Echols does not employ superposed PWM signals because Echols does not
energize two or more motors simultaneously. Appeal Br. 12 ("In other
words, in the system of Echols, each motor is energized only when the
previous motor is de-energized and, thus, Echols describes the system that
does not employ superposed PWM signals as required by claim 1."). This
argument is not persuasive.
Under the correct interpretation of the phrase "superposed PWM
signals," there is no requirement that that the total PWM signal cause two or
more motors to operate simultaneously. Indeed, Appellant's Figure 3 -
which the Specification describes as depicting superposed PWM signals -
shows an instance in which the operation of motors M 1 and M2 does not
occur simultaneously.
Thus, we find that claim 1 is anticipated by Echols. Because
Appellant stipulated that claims 2, 5-7, and 9 stand or fall with claim 1, we
also find that claims 2, 5-7, and 9 are anticipated by Echols. Because this
finding is based upon facts and reasoning that differ from those that form the
basis of the Examiner's rejection, we designate our finding as a new ground
of rejection pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b).
Rejection 2. The Examiner rejected claim 8 as unpatentable over
Echols. Final Act. 6. Appellant argues that this rejection should be reversed
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Application 12/746,841
because "claim 8 includes the same limitation at issue in claim 1, viz. claim
8 requires that 'the PWM signals are superposed and are received
independently of one another.'" Appeal Br. 16. Appellant, therefore, argues
that Echols cannot be used to establish a prima facie case of obviousness
with respect to claim 8 for the same reasons that it does not anticipate claim
1. Id.
For the reasons discussed above, we are not persuaded by Appellant's
arguments with respect to claim 1. Accordingly, we also are not persuaded
by these arguments with respect to claim 8. We, therefore, affirm the
rejection of claim 8 under§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Echols. Because
our affirmance relies upon the logic and reasoning we used to newly reject
claim 1, we designate our affirmance with respect to claim 8 as comprising a
new ground of rejection pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the rejection of claims 1, 2,
5-7, and 9 as anticipated by Echols. We also affirm the rejection of claim 8
as obvious in view of Echols. We designate these affirmances as new
grounds of rejection.
This decision contains new grounds of rejection pursuant to 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(b), which provides that "[a] new ground of rejection pursuant to this
paragraph shall not be considered final for judicial review." Section
41.50(b) also provides that the appellant, WITHIN TWO MONTHS FROM
THE DATE OF THE DECISION, must exercise one of the following two
options with respect to the new ground of rejection to avoid termination of
the appeal as to the rejected claims:
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Application 12/746,841
(1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate
amendment of the claims so rejected or new Evidence relating
to the claims so rejected, or both, and have the matter
reconsidered by the examiner, in which event the proceeding
will be remanded to the examiner. . ..
(2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be
reheard under§ 41.52 by the Board upon the same record ....
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a).
AFFIRMED; NEW GROUNDS OF REJECTION
PURSUANT TO 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b)
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