No. 92-1446. December 11, 1995. Harold C. Wegner, Foley Lardner, of Washington, D.C., argued for appellant. With him on the brief were Herbert I. Cantor and Douglas P. Mueller. Of counsel was Don J. Pelto. Fred E. McKelvey, Solicitor, Office of the Solicitor, of Arlington, Virginia, argued for appellee. Nancy J. Linck, Solicitor, of Arlington, Virginia, Lee E. Barrett, Associate Solicitor, John W. Dewhirst, Associate Solicitor, Albin F. Drost, Deputy Solicitor and Richard E. Schafer, Associate Solicitor
Patent Appeal No. 77-509. October 13, 1977. Richard G. Miller, New York City, attorney of record, for appellants, James C. Arvantes, Arlington, Va., of counsel. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents, Gerald H. Bjorge, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, C.J., RICH, BALDWIN and LANE, JJ., and FORD, J., United States Customs Court. MARKEY, Chief Judge. Appeal from the decision of the Patent and Trademark
Patent Appeal No. 75-551. June 12, 1975. Gerald K. White, Thaddeus A. Zalenski, Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellants. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents; Henry W. Tarring, II, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, LANE and MILLER, Associate Judges. BALDWIN, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals affirming the rejection
Patent Appeal No. 6825. July 18, 1962. Gillette Virgil, Cushman, Darby Cushman, Washington, D.C. (Theodore C. Virgil and Alvin Guttag, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for appellants. Clarence W. Moore, Washington, D.C. (Raymond E. Martin, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for the Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH and SMITH, Judges, and Judge WILLIAM H. KIRKPATRICK. United States Senior District Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, designated to participate in place
(a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)