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Ex Parte Lauder et al

14716402 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jul. 9, 2019)
Ex Parte Lauder et al

11 Cited authorities

  1. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.

    550 U.S. 398 (2007)   Cited 1,547 times   185 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"

  2. United States v. Adams

    383 U.S. 39 (1966)   Cited 479 times   5 Legal Analyses
    Finding that one of ordinary skill in the art would have to ignore long-accepted factors in the field of wet batters to arrive at the claimed invention

  3. In re Jung

    637 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2011)   Cited 24 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding the prima facie case during patent examination “is merely a procedural device that enables an appropriate shift of the burden of production” from the PTO to the patent applicant

  4. Gardner v. TEC Systems, Inc.

    725 F.2d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 1984)   Cited 44 times
    Holding that dependent claims fall with the independent claim on which they depend unless argued separately

  5. In re Pearson

    494 F.2d 1399 (C.C.P.A. 1974)   Cited 28 times
    Affirming § 103 rejection when § 102 rejection would also have been appropriate

  6. Application of Kunzmann

    326 F.2d 424 (C.C.P.A. 1964)   Cited 3 times

    Patent Appeal No. 7038. January 23, 1964. George H. Spencer, Harvey Kaye, Spencer Kaye, Washington, D.C., for appellant. Clarence W. Moore, Washington, D.C. (George C. Roeming, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, SMITH, and ALMOND, Judges. SMITH, Judge. The issue presented by this appeal is whether the Patent Office Board of Appeals was correct in holding that claims 8, 9, 14-18 and 20-23 of appellant's application were directed to a structure

  7. Application of Dailey

    357 F.2d 669 (C.C.P.A. 1966)

    Patent Appeal No. 7491. March 24, 1966. John Rex Allen, Chicago, Ill. (Richard S. Phillips, Chicago, Ill., of counsel), for appellants. Clarence W. Moore, Washington, D.C. (J.F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for the Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, MARTIN, SMITH and ALMOND. Judges. WORLEY, Chief Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Board of Appeals which affirmed the examiner's rejection of claims 25-28 in appellants' application for "Nursing Container

  8. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,130 times   479 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  9. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 186 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  10. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  11. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)