Ex Parte Kutsuna et al

16 Cited authorities

  1. In re Kubin

    561 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009)   Cited 134 times   10 Legal Analyses
    Finding patent invalid where an inherent benefit "is not an additional requirement imposed by the claims . . . but rather a property necessarily present" when the other limitations are satisfied
  2. In re Baxter Travenol Labs

    952 F.2d 388 (Fed. Cir. 1991)   Cited 96 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Evaluating teaching of prior art at the time of disclosure
  3. In re Clay

    966 F.2d 656 (Fed. Cir. 1992)   Cited 88 times   10 Legal Analyses
    Concluding that a reference was not reasonably pertinent where a PHOSITA "would not reasonably have expected to solve the [relevant] problem ... by considering" that reference
  4. In re Oetiker

    977 F.2d 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1992)   Cited 66 times   9 Legal Analyses
    Reversing for "improperly combined" references, because "[i]f examination at the initial stage does not produce a prima facie case of unpatentability, then without more the applicant is entitled to grant of the patent"
  5. In re Dillon

    919 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1990)   Cited 69 times   6 Legal Analyses
    Finding a prima facie case of obviousness where the prior art tri-orthoester compound was found to be equivalent to the claimed tetra-orthoester compound and the use of the tri-orthoester as a fuel additive was expected to produce essentially the same result as the use of the tetra-orthoester
  6. In re Grasselli

    713 F.2d 731 (Fed. Cir. 1983)   Cited 19 times
    Concluding that unexpected results “limited to sodium only” were not commensurate in scope with claims to a catalyst having “an alkali metal”
  7. Application of Boesch

    617 F.2d 272 (C.C.P.A. 1980)   Cited 17 times

    Appeal No. 79-597. March 13, 1980. Rehearing Denied July 3, 1980. Robert F. Dropkin and Vincent G. Gioia, Pittsburgh, Pa., attorneys of record for appellants. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, John W. Dewhirst, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, MILLER and MALETZ, Judges. The Honorable Herbert N. Maletz of the United States Customs Court, sitting

  8. Application of Tiffin

    448 F.2d 791 (C.C.P.A. 1971)   Cited 21 times

    Patent Appeal No. 8502. October 7, 1971. Alvin Guttag, Washington, D.C., attorney of record, for appellants; William T. Bullinger, Washington, D.C., Sheldon F. Raizes, Wilmington, Del., Cushman, Darby Cushman, Washington, D.C., of counsel. S. Wm. Cochran, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents; Fred E. McKelvey, Washington, D.C., of counsel. ON PETITION FOR REHEARING PER CURIAM. The Patent Office petitions for a rehearing or modification of our decision, handed down June 10, 1971. The

  9. Application of Blondel

    499 F.2d 1311 (C.C.P.A. 1974)   Cited 10 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Reversing rejection of claims to compounds which prior art suggested would have longer-lasting pharmacological activity, where actual increase was beyond reasonable expectations
  10. Application of Chapman

    357 F.2d 418 (C.C.P.A. 1966)   Cited 9 times

    Patent Appeal No. 7412. March 17, 1966. Elizabeth Hunter, Morristown, N.J., George B. Campbell, New York City, Arnold B. Christen, Washington, D.C., for appellants. Clarence W. Moore, Washington, D.C., (Raymond E. Martin, Washington D.C., of counsel), for Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, MARTIN, SMITH and ALMOND, Judges. RICH, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals affirming the examiner's rejection of product claims 1 to 4 and

  11. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,129 times   479 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."
  12. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 186 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"
  13. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  14. Section 1.132 - Affidavits or declarations traversing rejections or objections

    37 C.F.R. § 1.132   Cited 104 times   14 Legal Analyses

    When any claim of an application or a patent under reexamination is rejected or objected to, any evidence submitted to traverse the rejection or objection on a basis not otherwise provided for must be by way of an oath or declaration under this section. 37 C.F.R. §1.132 65 FR 57057 , Sept. 20, 2000 Part 2 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations. Part 6 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations. Part 7 is placed in the

  15. Section 41.37 - Appeal brief

    37 C.F.R. § 41.37   Cited 32 times   25 Legal Analyses
    Requiring identification of support in specification and, for means-plus-function limitations, corresponding structure as well
  16. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)