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Ex Parte Krueger et al

12966949 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 25, 2015)
Ex Parte Krueger et al

12 Cited authorities

  1. In re Morris

    127 F.3d 1048 (Fed. Cir. 1997)   Cited 49 times   7 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in reviewing a claim construction decided under the ‘broadest reasonable interpretation’ standard, we determine whether the interpretation is within the range of reasonableness

  2. Application of Borkowski

    422 F.2d 904 (C.C.P.A. 1970)   Cited 52 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Noting that a claim of clear scope that is not adequately supported by an enabling disclosure commensurate with that scope is objectionable under § 112, ¶ 1, not § 112, ¶ 2

  3. Application of Cohn

    438 F.2d 989 (C.C.P.A. 1971)   Cited 15 times
    Finding claim term indefinite where the patentee's conflicting use of the term rendered the scope of the claims uncertain

  4. Application of Hammack

    427 F.2d 1378 (C.C.P.A. 1970)   Cited 12 times
    Finding claims invalid for indefiniteness where claims “serv[ed] as a shadowy framework upon which are located words lacking in precise referents in the specification”

  5. Application of Steele

    305 F.2d 859 (C.C.P.A. 1962)   Cited 2 times

    Patent Appeal No. 6719. July 25, 1962. J. Hart Evans, Louis C. Smith, Jr., New York City, and Paul A. Rose, Washington D.C., for appellants. Clarence W. Moore, Washington, D.C. (Joseph Schimmel, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for the Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, RICH, MARTIN, and SMITH, Judges, and Judge WILLIAM H. KIRKPATRICK. United States Senior District Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, designated to participate in place of Judge O'CONNELL, pursuant to provisions

  6. Ullstrand v. Coons

    147 F.2d 698 (C.C.P.A. 1945)

    Patent Appeal No. 4949. February 7, 1945. Appeal from the Board of Interference Examiners of the United States Patent Office, Interference No. 79,280. Interference proceeding to determine priority of invention between Hugo M. Ullstrand and Curtis C. Coons. From a decision of the Board of Interference Examiners awarding priority of invention to Curtis C. Coons, Hugo M. Ullstrand appeals. Affirmed. Oliver Titcomb, of New York City, for appellant. Richard R. Fitzsimmons, of Chicago, Ill. (Harry S. Demaree

  7. Section 112 - Specification

    35 U.S.C. § 112   Cited 7,370 times   1046 Legal Analyses
    Requiring patent applications to include a "specification" that provides, among other information, a written description of the invention and of the manner and process of making and using it

  8. Section 102 - Conditions for patentability; novelty

    35 U.S.C. § 102   Cited 6,004 times   1001 Legal Analyses
    Prohibiting the grant of a patent to one who "did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented"

  9. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 186 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  10. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  11. Section 41.37 - Appeal brief

    37 C.F.R. § 41.37   Cited 32 times   25 Legal Analyses
    Requiring identification of support in specification and, for means-plus-function limitations, corresponding structure as well

  12. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)