§

Ex Parte Karaoguz et al

10675491 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 16, 2012)
Ex Parte Karaoguz et al

11 Cited authorities

  1. Phillips v. AWH Corp.

    415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)   Cited 5,829 times   167 Legal Analyses
    Holding that "because extrinsic evidence can help educate the court regarding the field of the invention and can help the court determine what a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand claim terms to mean, it is permissible for the district court in its sound discretion to admit and use such evidence"

  2. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.

    52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995)   Cited 5,193 times   12 Legal Analyses
    Holding that inventor testimony as to "[t]he subjective intent of the inventor when he used a particular term is of little or no probative weight in determining the scope of a claim (except as documented in the prosecution history)."

  3. Ferguson Beauregard/Logic Controls v. Mega Systems, LLC

    350 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2003)   Cited 279 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that "inequitable conduct, while a broader concept than fraud, must be pled with particularity"

  4. In re Cruciferous Sprout Litigation

    301 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2002)   Cited 139 times   6 Legal Analyses
    Holding that preamble was limiting in light of arguments made during prosecution "show[ing] a clear reliance by the patentee on the preamble to persuade the Patent Office that the claimed invention is not anticipated by the prior art"

  5. In re Oetiker

    977 F.2d 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1992)   Cited 66 times   9 Legal Analyses
    Reversing for "improperly combined" references, because "[i]f examination at the initial stage does not produce a prima facie case of unpatentability, then without more the applicant is entitled to grant of the patent"

  6. In re Hoch

    428 F.2d 1341 (C.C.P.A. 1970)   Cited 20 times

    Patent Appeal No. 8323. July 30, 1970. Raymond F. Kramer, Buffalo, N.Y., Donald C. Studley, William J. Schramm, Niagara Falls, N.Y., attorneys of record, for appellant. Joseph Schimmel, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents. Jack E. Armore, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Before RICH, ALMOND, BALDWIN and LANE, Judges, and FISHER, Chief Judge, Eastern District of Texas, sitting by designation. RICH, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals affirming the

  7. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,130 times   479 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  8. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 186 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  9. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  10. Section 41.37 - Appeal brief

    37 C.F.R. § 41.37   Cited 32 times   25 Legal Analyses
    Requiring identification of support in specification and, for means-plus-function limitations, corresponding structure as well

  11. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)