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Ex Parte Kallio et al

10341332 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Apr. 11, 2013)
Ex Parte Kallio et al

9 Cited authorities

  1. Phillips v. AWH Corp.

    415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)   Cited 5,844 times   167 Legal Analyses
    Holding that "because extrinsic evidence can help educate the court regarding the field of the invention and can help the court determine what a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand claim terms to mean, it is permissible for the district court in its sound discretion to admit and use such evidence"

  2. In re Keller

    642 F.2d 413 (C.C.P.A. 1981)   Cited 47 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Stating "[t]he test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference"

  3. In re Chevalier

    500 F. App'x 932 (Fed. Cir. 2013)

    Serial No. 11/407,778 2012-1254 01-07-2013 IN RE GILBERT CHEVALIER, ALAIN VILLERMET, AND CHRISTIAN LARQUET ALLEN E. WHITE, Air Liquide USA, LLC, of Houston, Texas, for appellants. RAYMOND T. CHEN, Solicitor, Office of the Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, of Alexandria, Virginia, for respondent. With him on the brief were MONICA B. LATEEF and SYDNEY O. JOHNSON, JR., Associate Solicitors. PROST NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. Appeal from the United States Patent and

  4. In re Sneed

    710 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1983)   Cited 21 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Rejecting argument that a prior art reference should not be considered "because it deals with collapsible hose rather than flexible plastic pipe and teaches that rolling 600 feet of 4 inch, noncollapsible hose into a transportable bundle is virtually 'an insurmountable task'" because "it is not necessary that the inventions of the references be physically combinable to render obvious the invention under review."

  5. Application of Nievelt

    482 F.2d 965 (C.C.P.A. 1973)

    Patent Appeal No. 8975. August 30, 1973. L. Gaylord Hulbert, Whittemore, Hulbert Belknap, Detroit, Mich., attorneys of record, for appellant. S. Wm. Cochran, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents. Robert D. Edmonds, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, RICH, BALDWIN and LANE, Judges, and ALMOND, Senior Judge. RICH, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals, adhered to on reconsideration

  6. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,133 times   479 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  7. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 186 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  8. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  9. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)