Ex Parte Jaske et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jul 31, 2017

14072015 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 31, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/072,015 11/05/2013 MATTHEW J. JASKE SUB-0425 l-US-NP 1090
173 7590 08/02/2017
WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION - MD 3601
2000 NORTH M63
BENTON HARBOR, MI 49022
EXAMINER
PATEL, PREMAL R
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2623
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/02/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
whirlpool_patents_co@whirlpool.com
mike_lafrenz @ whirlpool .com
deborah_tomaszewski@whirlpool.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte MATTHEW J. JASKE and MATTHEW J. MATONICH
Appeal 2017-004743
Application 14/072,015
Technology Center 2600
Before MAHSHID D. SAADAT, ALLEN R. MacDONALD, and
JOHN P. PINKERTON, Administrative Patent Judges.
SAADAT, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants1 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
Final Rejection of claims 1—22. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is Whirlpool
Corporation. (App. Br. 2).
Appeal 2017-004743
Application 14/072,015
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants’ invention relates to a method of controlling the actuation
of a user interface (“UI”) having a plurality of discrete touch-sensitive inputs
(Spec. 12). Exemplary claims 1,21, and 22 under appeal read as follows:
1. A method of controlling the actuation of a user interface
(UI), the method comprising:
detecting a sequential touching of at least two adjacent
inputs in a plurality of physically discrete touch-sensitive inputs;
determining when the sequential touching is indicative of
a swiping motion by a user across the at least two adjacent inputs;
and
actuating the UI when a swiping motion is indicated.
21. A method of controlling the actuation of a user interface
(UI), the method comprising:
detecting a sequential touching of at least two adjacent
inputs in a plurality of discrete dedicated function inputs;
determining when the sequential touching is indicative of
a swiping motion by a user across the at least two adjacent inputs;
and
actuating the UI when a swiping motion is indicated
22. A method of controlling the actuation of a user interface
(UI), the method comprising:
detecting a sequential touching of at least two adjacent
inputs least two adjacent inputs in a plurality of physically
discrete touch-sensitive inputs, wherein the at least two adjacent
inputs are separated by a non-touch-sensitive portion of the UI;
determining when the sequential touching is indicative of
a swiping motion by a user across the at least two adjacent inputs;
and
actuating the UI when a swiping motion is indicated.
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REFERENCES and REJECTIONS
Claim 21 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) as anticipated
by Kirkland et al. (US 2005/0146508 Al; published July 7, 2005)
(“Kirkland”).
Claims 1, 3—12, and 22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Kirkland and Suggs (US 2012/0256839 Al; published
Oct. 11,2012) (“Suggs”).
Claim 2 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Kirkland, Suggs, and Hotelling et al. (US 2006/0197753 Al; published Sept.
7, 2006) (“Hotelling”).
Claims 13—20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Kirkland, Suggs, and Boyana et al. (US 2014/0208269 Al; published
July 24, 2014) (“Boyana”).
ANALYSIS
Section 102 Rejection of Claim 21
Appellants contend the Examiner’s interpretation of the claimed
“discrete dedicated function inputs” as reading on Kirkland’s virtual
keyboard is unreasonable, and thus, Kirkland fails to teach the claimed
“discrete dedicated function inputs,” as recited in independent claim 21 (see
App. Br. 9-10; see also Reply Br. 2). More specifically, Appellants contend
the dictionary definition of the claimed term “discrete” is “[sjeparate;
distinct; individual; non-continuous,” and the inputs described in Appellants’
Specification are tangible, immovable, immutable, physically discrete (i.e.,
distinct) inputs (see App. Br. 9—10). In contrast, as argued by Appellants,
Kirkland’s virtual keyboard is a simulation provided on a continuous touch
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Application 14/072,015
screen display, and such a virtual keyboard does not comport with either the
dictionary definition of the claimed term or the claimed term’s meaning as
used in Appellants’ Specification (see App. Br. 10).
We are not persuaded by Appellants’ argument. As a threshold matter,
there appears to be no difference between the Examiner’s interpretation of
the claimed term “discrete” under the broadest reasonable interpretation
standard, and Appellants’ proffered dictionary definition (see Ans. 11—12
(“First[,] the BRI of the claimed term ‘discrete’ as pointed out by Appellant
is ‘separate; distinct; individual; non-continuous’.”)). Thus, the only
apparent disagreement in claim interpretation is whether the term “discrete”
additionally requires that the inputs be tangible, immovable, immutable, and
physically distinct. We conclude that the term “discrete” does not
additionally require that the inputs be tangible, immovable, immutable, and
physically distinct. Appellants fail to identify an explicit definition of the
term “discrete,” either in the claim or Appellants’ Specification, requiring
tangibility, immovability, immutability, or physical distinctness. We refuse
to import features of example embodiments described in the Specification
into the claim, where the features are themselves not recited in the claims.
See SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (“Though understanding the claim language may be aided by the
explanations contained in the written description, it is important not to
import into a claim limitations that are not a part of the claim.”).
As the Examiner correctly finds, Kirkland discloses a virtual keyboard
displayed within a UI, where the virtual keyboard comprises distinct virtual
keys (e.g., ‘“Q,”’ ‘“W,”’ “‘E’”) (see Ans. 12). In light of the absence of an
explicit definition of the term “discrete” in Appellants’ claim or
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Application 14/072,015
Specification, the claim as presently written does not preclude the
Examiner’s interpretation of the claimed “discrete . . . inputs” reading on
Kirkland’s virtual keys.
Appellants further contend the claimed term “dedicated function
inputs” is easily understood in light of Appellants’ Specification as requiring
that each of the inputs have a permanent function separate and distinct from
every other input (see App. Br. 10). The virtual keys of Kirkland’s virtual
keyboard do not conform to this requirement, as contended by Appellants,
for at least three reasons: (a) a virtual keyboard can be reconfigured such
that a particular virtual key location can be redefined to represent different
characters; (b) the same virtual key may be represented by different areas of
a touch screen; and (c) each of the virtual keys does essentially the same
thing (i.e., cause a virtual keystroke to enter a character) (see id.).
We are not persuaded by this contention either. The claim term
“dedicated function” does not additionally require that the function be a
permanent function. Appellants do not identify any explicit definition of the
term “dedicated function,” either in the claim or Appellants’ Specification,
requiring that the function be a permanent function. As the Examiner
correctly finds, Kirkland discloses each virtual key of the virtual keyboard
has an input function associated with a specific character dedicated to the
virtual key (i.e., a detected interaction with virtual key “Q” results in a
display of the character “Q” in the UI) (see Ans. 13—14). In light of the
absence of an explicit definition of the term “dedicated function” in
Appellants’ claim or Specification, the claim as presently written does not
preclude the Examiner’s interpretation of the claimed “dedicated function
inputs” and reading such limitation on Kirkland’s virtual keys.
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Appellants also contend the Examiner’s interpretation of the claimed
“actuating” as reading on Kirkland’s changing of the text input portion of a
touch screen display is unreasonable, and thus, Kirkland also fails to teach
the claimed “actuating the UI” (see App. Br. 10-12; see also Reply Br. 2—3).
More specifically, Appellants contend the dictionary definition of the
claimed term “actuate” is “[t]o activate . . . [t]o put into action, to put to
work . . . [t]o turn on,” and is easily understood in light of Appellants’
Specification as requiring an input to change its state from an operatively
inactive state to an operatively active state (see App. Br. 10-11). In contrast,
as contended by Appellants, Kirkland’s UI is continually in an actuated state
and is never in a non-actuated state (see App. Br. 11).
This contention is also not persuasive. Similar to the term “discrete,”
both Appellants and the Examiner appear to agree that the correct
interpretation of the term “actuate” is “to activate” (see Ans. 15
(“Appellant’s remarks . . . provide [a] definition of term ‘actuate’ [as
meaning] ‘to activate’. Taking into consideration this meaning, [the term
‘actuate’] reads on prior art Kirkland . . .”)), and the only apparent
disagreement in claim interpretation is whether the term “actuate”
additionally requires an input to change its state from an operatively inactive
state to an operatively active state. We conclude that the term “actuate” does
not additionally require an input to change its state from an operatively
inactive state to an operatively active state. Appellants fail to identify an
explicit definition of the term “actuate,” either in the claim or Appellants’
Specification, requiring an input to change its state from an operatively
inactive state to an operatively active state. As the Examiner correctly finds,
Kirkland discloses causing the UI to activate a display of a character in
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Application 14/072,015
response to a detection of a user making content with a virtual key of the
virtual keyboard (see Final Act. 2—3; see also Ans. 15—16). In light of the
absence of an explicit definition of the term “actuate” in Appellants’ claim or
Specification, the claim as presently written does not preclude the
Examiner’s interpretation of the claimed “actuating the UI” as Kirkland’s UI
activating a display of a character.
Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claim 21 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(a)(1).
Section 103 Rejection of Claims 1 and 22
Appellants contend independent claims 1 and 22 are similar to claim
21, and Kirkland fails to teach or suggest the claimed “physically discrete
touch-sensitive inputs” and the claimed “actuating the UI” for reasons
similar to the reasons previously described in association with Appellants’
contention regarding claim 21 (see App. Br. 12—13; see also Reply Br. 4).
Appellants further contend Suggs, like Kirkland, is silent with regard to
changing a state of a specific input (i.e., a physically discrete key on a
keyboard) by detecting touching adjacent inputs and determining that the
touching indicates a swipe motion across adjacent inputs (see App. Br. 14-
lb; see also Reply Br. 4—6).
Claims 1 and 22 additionally recite “physically discrete touch-
sensitive inputs,” and claim 22 further recites “wherein the at least two
adjacent inputs are separated by a non-touch-sensitive portion of the UI.”
The Examiner found Kirkland teaches all of the limitations of claims 1 and
22, except for the claimed “physically discrete touch-sensitive inputs,” and
the claimed “non-touch-sensitive portion of the UI,” and Suggs’s keyboard,
including mechanical keys, teaches the aforementioned claim limitations
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(see Final Act. 3—4, 6—7; see also Ans. 18—19). Appellants’ contention
regarding Kirkland is not persuasive for the reasons previously discussed
with respect to Appellants’ contention regarding claim 21. Appellants’
contention regarding Suggs is also not persuasive because the Examiner
relied upon Kirkland, rather than Suggs for teaching or suggesting actuating
a UI by detecting touching adjacent inputs and determining that the touching
indicates a swipe motion across adjacent inputs (see Ans. 17).
Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claims 1 and 22 under 35 U.S.C.
§103.
Remaining Claims
Appellants’ arguments regarding claims 2 and 13—20 merely refer to
Appellants’ arguments regarding claims 1 and 22 (see App. Br. 16—18).
Because no separate arguments are presented for the remaining dependent
claims, we also sustain the rejections of claims 2 and 13—20 for the reasons
stated with respect to their base independent claims.
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1—22.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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