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Ex parte IWAMOTO et al.

08299123 (B.P.A.I. May. 12, 1998)
Ex parte IWAMOTO et al.

11 Cited authorities

  1. In re Donaldson Co., Inc.

    16 F.3d 1189 (Fed. Cir. 1994)   Cited 206 times   6 Legal Analyses
    Holding that 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6, which limits means-plus-function claims to the structures described in the specification and their equivalents, "applies regardless of the context in which the interpretation of means-plus-function language arises, i.e., whether as part of a patentability determination in the PTO or as part of a validity or infringement determination in a court"

  2. In re Dossel

    115 F.3d 942 (Fed. Cir. 1997)   Cited 48 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Finding that the written description at issue was sufficiently definite, even though “the written description d[id] not disclose exactly what mathematical algorithm w[ould] be used to compute the end result, ” when “it d[id] state that ‘known algorithms' c[ould] be used to solve standard equations which [we]re known in the art”

  3. Application of Bernhart

    417 F.2d 1395 (C.C.P.A. 1969)   Cited 38 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Discussing patentability of a programmed computer

  4. Application of Johnson

    558 F.2d 1008 (C.C.P.A. 1977)   Cited 12 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Reversing rejection for inadequate written description where specification disclosed several species of a genus and claims recited genus but excluded two species of lost interference count

  5. Application of Hammack

    427 F.2d 1378 (C.C.P.A. 1970)   Cited 12 times
    Finding claims invalid for indefiniteness where claims “serv[ed] as a shadowy framework upon which are located words lacking in precise referents in the specification”

  6. Fredkin v. Irasek

    397 F.2d 342 (C.C.P.A. 1968)   Cited 9 times

    Patent Appeal No. 7986. June 27, 1968. Certiorari Denied December 9, 1968. See 89 S.Ct. 450. Rines Rines, Robert H. Rines, David Rines, Boston, Mass., Nelson H. Shapiro, Washington, D.C., for appellant. Louis A. Kline, Dayton, Ohio, (John T. Matlago, Hawthorne, Cal., William T. Estabrook, Kemon, Palmer, Stewart Estabrook, Washington, D.C., of counsel) for appellee. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, SMITH, ALMOND and KIRKPATRICK, Judges. Senior District Judge, Eastern District of Pennsylvania

  7. Wilcox v. Danner

    53 F.2d 711 (C.C.P.A. 1931)   Cited 7 times

    Patent Appeal Nos. 2816, 2817. December 17, 1931. Appeal from Board of Appeals. Interference proceeding between Albert Charles Wilcox and Edward Danner. A decision of the Examiner of Interferences awarding priority of invention upon all counts in issue to the party last named was reversed by the Board of Appeals as to certain counts, and each party appeals upon counts awarded to the other. Decision of Board of Appeals affirmed. Charles B. Belknap, of Detroit, Mich., for Wilcox. Charles W. Owen, of

  8. Section 112 - Specification

    35 U.S.C. § 112   Cited 7,362 times   1046 Legal Analyses
    Requiring patent applications to include a "specification" that provides, among other information, a written description of the invention and of the manner and process of making and using it

  9. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,129 times   479 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  10. Section 102 - Conditions for patentability; novelty

    35 U.S.C. § 102   Cited 5,995 times   1001 Legal Analyses
    Prohibiting the grant of a patent to one who "did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented"

  11. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)