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Ex Parte Howes et al

10328497 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 30, 2009)
Ex Parte Howes et al

10 Cited authorities

  1. In re Donaldson Co., Inc.

    16 F.3d 1189 (Fed. Cir. 1994)   Cited 206 times   6 Legal Analyses
    Holding that 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6, which limits means-plus-function claims to the structures described in the specification and their equivalents, "applies regardless of the context in which the interpretation of means-plus-function language arises, i.e., whether as part of a patentability determination in the PTO or as part of a validity or infringement determination in a court"

  2. In re Dossel

    115 F.3d 942 (Fed. Cir. 1997)   Cited 48 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Finding that the written description at issue was sufficiently definite, even though “the written description d[id] not disclose exactly what mathematical algorithm w[ould] be used to compute the end result, ” when “it d[id] state that ‘known algorithms' c[ould] be used to solve standard equations which [we]re known in the art”

  3. Application of Moore

    439 F.2d 1232 (C.C.P.A. 1971)   Cited 46 times
    Noting that the question is whether the scope of enablement conveyed by the disclosure to a person of ordinary skill in the art is commensurate with the scope of protection taught by the claims

  4. In re Sneed

    710 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1983)   Cited 21 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Rejecting argument that a prior art reference should not be considered "because it deals with collapsible hose rather than flexible plastic pipe and teaches that rolling 600 feet of 4 inch, noncollapsible hose into a transportable bundle is virtually 'an insurmountable task'" because "it is not necessary that the inventions of the references be physically combinable to render obvious the invention under review."

  5. Application of Kroekel

    504 F.2d 1143 (C.C.P.A. 1974)   Cited 3 times

    Patent Appeal No. 74-535. November 7, 1974. Michael B. Fein, Philadelphia, Pa., attorney of record, for appellants. George W.F. Simmons, Philadelphia, Pa., of counsel. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents. Jack E. Armore, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, LANE and MILLER, Judges. MARKEY, Chief Judge. This appeal is from a decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals which

  6. Section 112 - Specification

    35 U.S.C. § 112   Cited 7,420 times   1069 Legal Analyses
    Requiring patent applications to include a "specification" that provides, among other information, a written description of the invention and of the manner and process of making and using it

  7. Section 102 - Conditions for patentability; novelty

    35 U.S.C. § 102   Cited 6,033 times   1028 Legal Analyses
    Prohibiting the grant of a patent to one who "did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented"

  8. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 188 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  9. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 99 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  10. Section 1.136 - [Effective until 1/19/2025] Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)