Patent Appeal No. 7535. February 17, 1966. Burgess, Dinklage Sprung, Arnold Sprung, New York City, for appellant. Clarence W. Moore, Washington, D.C. (Jere W. Sears, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for the Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, MARTIN, SMITH, and ALMOND, Judges. SMITH, Judge. The Board of Appeals affirmed the examiner's rejection of claims 9, 11 and 12 of appellant's application for patent Serial No. 845,743, filed August 12, 1959, for "Highly Porous And Absorptive
Patent Appeal No. 8796. December 29, 1972. Marion C. Staves, Wilmington, Del., attorney of record, for appellants. S. Wm. Cochran, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents; Fred E. McKelvey, Washington, D.C. Robert D. Edmonds, Oakton, Va., of Counsel. Appeal from the Patent Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, ALMOND, BALDWIN, and LANE, Judges. LANE, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Board of Appeals sustaining the examiners's rejection of claims 1-4
Patent Appeal No. 8871. April 12, 1973. Rehearing Denied July 26, 1973. John W. Melville, Charles H. Melville, Gibson R. Yungblut, Cincinnati, Ohio, Melville, Strasser, Foster Hoffman, Cincinnati, Ohio, of record, for appellant. S. Wm. Cochran, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents: Raymond E. Martin, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, ALMOND, BALDWIN and LANE, Judges. MARKEY, Chief Judge. This appeal is from the decision
(a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622
(a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)