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Ex parte HERBERMANN

08338714 (B.P.A.I. Mar. 24, 1998)
Ex parte HERBERMANN

12 Cited authorities

  1. Graham v. John Deere Co.

    383 U.S. 1 (1966)   Cited 3,179 times   68 Legal Analyses
    Holding commercial success is a "secondary consideration" suggesting nonobviousness

  2. Lindemann Maschinenfabrik v. Am. Hoist

    730 F.2d 1452 (Fed. Cir. 1984)   Cited 199 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding that claims are not to be treated as "mere catalogs of separate parts, in disregard of the part-to-part relationships set forth in the claims and that give the claims their meaning"

  3. In re Oelrich

    666 F.2d 578 (C.C.P.A. 1981)   Cited 92 times   5 Legal Analyses
    Stating that "[t]he mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient" to establish inherency (quoting Hansgirg v. Kemmer , 102 F.2d 212, 214 (C.C.P.A. 1939) )

  4. In re Beattie

    974 F.2d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 1992)   Cited 61 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that an alternative to a well-entrenched theory does not preclude a finding of obviousness because the recommendation of a new system "does not require obliteration of another"

  5. In re Gorman

    933 F.2d 982 (Fed. Cir. 1991)   Cited 42 times   1 Legal Analyses

    No. 90-1362. May 13, 1991. Thomas W. Tolpin, Highland Park, Ill., argued for appellant. Teddy S. Gron, Associate Sol., Office of the Sol., Arlington, Va., argued for appellee. With him on the brief was Fred E. McKelvey, Sol. Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. Before RICH, NEWMAN, and RADER, Circuit Judges. PAULINE NEWMAN, Circuit Judge. Jeffrey B. Gorman and Marilyn Katz (hereinafter "Gorman") appeal the decision of the United States

  6. Application of Swinehart

    439 F.2d 210 (C.C.P.A. 1971)   Cited 42 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the term "transparent" was definite because the disclosure, which showed that a substantial amount of infrared radiation was always transmitted even though the precise degree of transparency varied depending on certain factors, was sufficiently clear

  7. Application of Johnson

    558 F.2d 1008 (C.C.P.A. 1977)   Cited 12 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Reversing rejection for inadequate written description where specification disclosed several species of a genus and claims recited genus but excluded two species of lost interference count

  8. Application of Bozek

    416 F.2d 1385 (C.C.P.A. 1969)   Cited 10 times
    Noting that a patent examiner may properly rely on "common knowledge and common sense of the person of ordinary skill in the art" in making conclusions regarding obviousness

  9. Application of Jacoby

    309 F.2d 513 (C.C.P.A. 1962)   Cited 4 times

    Patent Appeal No. 6838. November 14, 1962. Henry Powers, Edward J. Mahler, Robert Alpher, New York City, and Robert H. Bachman, Hamden, Conn., for appellant. Clarence W. Moore, Washington, D.C. (Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for the Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, RICH, MARTIN, and SMITH, Judges, and Judge JOSEPH R. JACKSON, Retired. RICH, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals affirming the examiner's rejection of claims

  10. Section 112 - Specification

    35 U.S.C. § 112   Cited 7,362 times   1046 Legal Analyses
    Requiring patent applications to include a "specification" that provides, among other information, a written description of the invention and of the manner and process of making and using it

  11. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,129 times   479 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  12. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)