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Ex Parte Hartshorne et al

14303196 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 16, 2017)
Ex Parte Hartshorne et al

11 Cited authorities

  1. In re Dillon

    919 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1990)   Cited 69 times   6 Legal Analyses
    Finding a prima facie case of obviousness where the prior art tri-orthoester compound was found to be equivalent to the claimed tetra-orthoester compound and the use of the tri-orthoester as a fuel additive was expected to produce essentially the same result as the use of the tetra-orthoester

  2. In re Deuel

    51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995)   Cited 52 times   5 Legal Analyses
    Commenting that scholars have been critical of Deuel, which "overly favored patent applicants in biotech by adopting an overly lax nonobviousness standard." ( citing Anita Varma David Abraham, DNA Is Different: Legal Obviousness and the Balance Between Biotech Inventors and the Market, 9 Harv. J.L. Tech. 53 (1996))

  3. In re Jung

    637 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2011)   Cited 24 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding the prima facie case during patent examination “is merely a procedural device that enables an appropriate shift of the burden of production” from the PTO to the patent applicant

  4. In re Pearson

    494 F.2d 1399 (C.C.P.A. 1974)   Cited 29 times
    Affirming § 103 rejection when § 102 rejection would also have been appropriate

  5. In re Wright

    848 F.2d 1216 (Fed. Cir. 1988)   Cited 9 times
    Holding that "[i]n evaluating obviousness, the hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the pertinent art is presumed to have the ability to select and utilize knowledge from other arts reasonably pertinent to particular problem to which the invention is directed

  6. Application of Wilder

    563 F.2d 457 (C.C.P.A. 1977)   Cited 17 times

    Patent Appeal No. 76-706. October 13, 1977. Ellsworth H. Mosher, Arlington, Va., attorney of record, for appellant, Edward P. Grattan, St. Louis, Mo., Richard O. Zerbe, Akron, Ohio, of counsel. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents, Jack E. Armore, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. BALDWIN, Judge. This appeal is from the April 30, 1976 decision of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) Board of Appeals (board)

  7. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,143 times   481 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  8. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 186 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  9. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  10. Section 41.37 - Appeal brief

    37 C.F.R. § 41.37   Cited 32 times   25 Legal Analyses
    Requiring identification of support in specification and, for means-plus-function limitations, corresponding structure as well

  11. Section 1.136 - [Effective until 1/19/2025] Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)