§

Ex Parte Gupta et al

07878100 (B.P.A.I. Sep. 15, 1998)
Ex Parte Gupta et al

12 Cited authorities

  1. Graham v. John Deere Co.

    383 U.S. 1 (1966)   Cited 3,179 times   68 Legal Analyses
    Holding commercial success is a "secondary consideration" suggesting nonobviousness

  2. Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp.

    488 U.S. 825 (1988)   Cited 212 times
    Holding that "one who republishes a defamatory statement `adopts' it as his own, and is liable in equal measure to the original defamer."

  3. In re Donaldson Co., Inc.

    16 F.3d 1189 (Fed. Cir. 1994)   Cited 206 times   6 Legal Analyses
    Holding that 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6, which limits means-plus-function claims to the structures described in the specification and their equivalents, "applies regardless of the context in which the interpretation of means-plus-function language arises, i.e., whether as part of a patentability determination in the PTO or as part of a validity or infringement determination in a court"

  4. Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp.

    837 F.2d 1044 (Fed. Cir. 1988)   Cited 163 times
    Holding that the burden of proof is not reduced when prior art presented to the court was not considered by the PTO

  5. ACS Hospital Systems, Inc. v. Montefiore Hospital

    732 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1984)   Cited 168 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding that patent claims "should be so construed, if possible, as to sustain their validity"

  6. Ashland Oil, v. Delta Resins Refractories

    776 F.2d 281 (Fed. Cir. 1985)   Cited 120 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding that "[w]hile the opinion testimony of a party having a direct interest in the pending litigation is less persuasive than opinion testimony by a disinterested party, it cannot be disregarded for that reason alone and may be relied upon when sufficiently convincing"

  7. In re Oetiker

    977 F.2d 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1992)   Cited 66 times   9 Legal Analyses
    Reversing for "improperly combined" references, because "[i]f examination at the initial stage does not produce a prima facie case of unpatentability, then without more the applicant is entitled to grant of the patent"

  8. In re Fine

    837 F.2d 1071 (Fed. Cir. 1988)   Cited 67 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Reversing the Board's determination that dependent claims were invalid because "[d]ependent claims are nonobvious under section 103 if the independent claims from which they depend are nonobvious."

  9. Section 112 - Specification

    35 U.S.C. § 112   Cited 7,362 times   1046 Legal Analyses
    Requiring patent applications to include a "specification" that provides, among other information, a written description of the invention and of the manner and process of making and using it

  10. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,129 times   479 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  11. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  12. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)