Patent Appeal No. 8607. March 15, 1973. Richard E. Lyon, James W. Geriak, Thomas D. Kiley, Los Angeles, Cal., Francis D. Thomas, Jr., Washington, D.C., Lyon Lyon, Los Angeles, Cal., attorneys of record, for appellant. S. Wm. Cochran, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents. Raymond E. Martin, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent Office Board of Appeals. Before RICH, Acting Chief Judge, ALMOND, BALDWIN and LANE, Judges, and RAO, Judge, United States Customs Court, sitting

Patent Appeal No. 8421. February 18, 1971. Clinton S. Janes, Jr., Corning, N.Y., attorney of record, for appellant. S. Wm. Cochran, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents; Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Before RICH, ALMOND, BALDWIN and LANE, Associate Judges, and DAVIS, Judge, United States Court of Claims, sitting by designation. ALMOND, Judge. This is an appeal from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals affirming the rejection of claims 18-23 of appellant's

No. 76-1605. Submitted February 4, 1977. Decided February 16, 1977. Richard L. Barnes of Kothe, Nichols Wolfe, Tulsa, Okl., for appellants. Tedrick A. Housh, Jr., Kansas City, Mo., and William J. Kilberg, Carin Ann Clauss, Jacob I. Karro and Joseph M. Woodward, Attys., U.S. Dept. of Labor, Washington, D.C., for appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. Before HEANEY, ROSS and HENLEY, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM. This is an appeal from the district

(a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

(a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)