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Ex Parte Flores et al

14121227 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 31, 2018)
Ex Parte Flores et al

12 Cited authorities

  1. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.

    550 U.S. 398 (2007)   Cited 1,559 times   185 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"

  2. Wyers v. Master Lock Co.

    616 F.3d 1231 (Fed. Cir. 2010)   Cited 207 times   7 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a motivation to combine and a reasonable expectation of success exist when "it is simply a matter of common sense" to combine known elements of the prior art to solve a known problem

  3. Ohio Willow Wood Co. v. Alps S., LLC

    735 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2014)   Cited 172 times   11 Legal Analyses
    Holding that collateral estoppel prevented a patentee from asserting claims that are "substantially similar" to claims that had previously been held invalid

  4. Texas Instruments v. U.S. Intl. Trade Com'n

    988 F.2d 1165 (Fed. Cir. 1993)   Cited 272 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that " 'whereby' clause that merely states the result of the limitations in the claim adds nothing to the patentability or substance of the claim."

  5. In re Kahn

    441 F.3d 977 (Fed. Cir. 2006)   Cited 148 times   11 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the motivation-suggestion-teaching test, much like the analogous-art test, is used to defend against hindsight

  6. Western Union Co. v. Moneygram Payment

    626 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2010)   Cited 61 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Concluding that the asserted dependent claims, which "add[ed] only trivial improvements that would have been a matter of common sense to one of ordinary skill in the art," were obvious as a matter of law

  7. In re Keller

    642 F.2d 413 (C.C.P.A. 1981)   Cited 47 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Stating "[t]he test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference"

  8. Application of Gershon

    372 F.2d 535 (C.C.P.A. 1967)   Cited 10 times   2 Legal Analyses

    Patent Appeal No. 7722. February 16, 1967. Eben M. Graves, Allen G. Weise, New York City, for appellants. Joseph Schimmel, Washington, D.C. (Jack E. Armore, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, RICH, SMITH, and ALMOND, Judges, and Judge WILLIAM H. KIRKPATRICK. Senior District Judge, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. ALMOND, Judge. This is an appeal from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals affirming final rejection

  9. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,148 times   482 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  10. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 186 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  11. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  12. Section 1.136 - [Effective until 1/19/2025] Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)