Ex parte Drago et al.

11 Cited authorities

  1. In re Keller

    642 F.2d 413 (C.C.P.A. 1981)   Cited 46 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Stating "[t]he test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference"
  2. In re Young

    927 F.2d 588 (Fed. Cir. 1991)   Cited 17 times
    Observing that in an obviousness inquiry, courts consider a prior art "reference for what it disclose in relation to the claimed invention."
  3. Application of Boesch

    617 F.2d 272 (C.C.P.A. 1980)   Cited 17 times

    Appeal No. 79-597. March 13, 1980. Rehearing Denied July 3, 1980. Robert F. Dropkin and Vincent G. Gioia, Pittsburgh, Pa., attorneys of record for appellants. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, John W. Dewhirst, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, MILLER and MALETZ, Judges. The Honorable Herbert N. Maletz of the United States Customs Court, sitting

  4. Application of Aller

    220 F.2d 454 (C.C.P.A. 1955)   Cited 47 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Finding no criticality where claimed conditions allegedly contributed to roughly 20 percentage point improvement in yield
  5. In re Sovish

    769 F.2d 738 (Fed. Cir. 1985)   Cited 8 times

    Appeal No. 85-781. July 26, 1985. James W. Geriak, Lyon Lyon, of Los Angeles, Cal., argued, for appellants. With him on brief were Roy L. Anderson and William E. Mouzavires, Lyon Lyon, Washington, D.C. Fred W. Sherling, Associate Solicitor, U.S. Patent Trademark Office, Arlington, Va., argued, for appellee. With him on brief were Joseph F. Nakamura, Sol. and Fred E. McKelvey, Deputy Sol., Washington, D.C. Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before RICH, Circuit

  6. In re Boe

    355 F.2d 961 (C.C.P.A. 1966)   Cited 26 times

    Patent Appeal No. 7535. February 17, 1966. Burgess, Dinklage Sprung, Arnold Sprung, New York City, for appellant. Clarence W. Moore, Washington, D.C. (Jere W. Sears, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for the Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, MARTIN, SMITH, and ALMOND, Judges. SMITH, Judge. The Board of Appeals affirmed the examiner's rejection of claims 9, 11 and 12 of appellant's application for patent Serial No. 845,743, filed August 12, 1959, for "Highly Porous And Absorptive

  7. Application of Preda

    401 F.2d 825 (C.C.P.A. 1968)   Cited 5 times   1 Legal Analyses

    Patent Appeal No. 8016. October 24, 1968. Wenderoth, Lind Ponack, A. Ponak, Washington, D.C. (John T. Miller, Washington, D.C., of counsel) for appellant. Joseph Schimmel, Washington, D.C. (Jack E. Armore, Washington, D.C., of counsel) for the Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge and RICH, SMITH, ALMOND, and BALDWIN, Judges. RICH, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals affirming the rejection of claims 7 and 8 of application serial No. 269,707

  8. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,129 times   479 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."
  9. Section 102 - Conditions for patentability; novelty

    35 U.S.C. § 102   Cited 5,995 times   1001 Legal Analyses
    Prohibiting the grant of a patent to one who "did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented"
  10. Section 1.192-1.196 - Reserved

    37 C.F.R. § 1.192-1.196   Cited 20 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Requiring "a statement . . . that the claims of the group do not stand or fall together," and an explanation "why the claims of the group are believed to be separately patentable"
  11. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)