Patent Appeal No. 75-602. December 4, 1975. Keith D. Beecher, Los Angeles, Cal., for appellant. Joseph E. Nakamura, Sol., R.V. Lupo, Assoc. Sol., Washington, D.C., for Commissioner of Patents. Appeal from the Board of Appeals of the Patent and Trademark Office. MILLER, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Board of Appeals of the Patent and Trademark Office affirming the examiner's rejection of claims 5 and 6 of application serial No. 314,180, filed Dec. 11, 1972, for "Portable Moisture
Patent Appeal No. 6083. February 8, 1955. Wenderoth, Lind Ponack, Washington, D.C. (John E. Lind, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for appellant. E.L. Reynolds, Washington, D.C. (S.W. Cochran, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for the Commissioner of Patents. Before O'CONNELL, Acting Chief Judge, and JOHNSON, WORLEY, and COLE, Judges. COLE, Judge. This appeal involves the question of whether patentable subject matter has been defined in claims 9, 10, 11, 13, and 14 of appellant's application for a patent
Patent Appeal No. 5634. May 9, 1950. Ernest F. Mechlin, Washington, D.C. (George F. Vaia, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for appellant. E.L. Reynolds, Washington, D.C., for Commissioner of Patents. W.W. Cochran, Washington, D.C., on the brief as former solicitor for Patent Office. Before GARRETT, Chief Judge, and JACKSON, O'CONNELL and JOHNSON, JJ. GARRETT, Chief Judge. This is an appeal from the decision of the Board of Appeals of the United States Patent Office affirming the rejection by the Primary
(a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622
(a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)