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Ex Parte Dai et al

11588873 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 30, 2012)
Ex Parte Dai et al

11 Cited authorities

  1. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.

    550 U.S. 398 (2007)   Cited 1,547 times   185 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"

  2. In re Kahn

    441 F.3d 977 (Fed. Cir. 2006)   Cited 144 times   11 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the motivation-suggestion-teaching test, much like the analogous-art test, is used to defend against hindsight

  3. In re O'Farrell

    853 F.2d 894 (Fed. Cir. 1988)   Cited 168 times   9 Legal Analyses
    Finding patent obvious where the prior art provided a "reasonable expectation of success"

  4. In re Keller

    642 F.2d 413 (C.C.P.A. 1981)   Cited 46 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Stating "[t]he test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference"

  5. In re Sovish

    769 F.2d 738 (Fed. Cir. 1985)   Cited 8 times

    Appeal No. 85-781. July 26, 1985. James W. Geriak, Lyon Lyon, of Los Angeles, Cal., argued, for appellants. With him on brief were Roy L. Anderson and William E. Mouzavires, Lyon Lyon, Washington, D.C. Fred W. Sherling, Associate Solicitor, U.S. Patent Trademark Office, Arlington, Va., argued, for appellee. With him on brief were Joseph F. Nakamura, Sol. and Fred E. McKelvey, Deputy Sol., Washington, D.C. Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before RICH, Circuit

  6. Application of Bozek

    416 F.2d 1385 (C.C.P.A. 1969)   Cited 10 times
    Noting that a patent examiner may properly rely on "common knowledge and common sense of the person of ordinary skill in the art" in making conclusions regarding obviousness

  7. Application of Siebentritt

    372 F.2d 566 (C.C.P.A. 1967)   Cited 6 times

    Patent Appeal No. 7708. February 23, 1967. Thomas J. Plante and Richard T. Seeger, Detroit, Mich., for appellant. Joseph Schimmel, Washington, D.C. (Lutrelle F. Parker, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, RICH, SMITH and ALMOND, Judges, and Judge WILLIAM H. KIRKPATRICK. Senior District Judge, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. RICH, Judge. This appeal is from a decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals, affirming the

  8. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,129 times   479 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  9. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 186 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  10. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  11. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)