Ex Parte Cychosz et al

12 Cited authorities

  1. Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd.

    133 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1998)   Cited 540 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that after all claims and counterclaims were decided or withdrawn, the district court acted properly when it “recognized that it could, in its discretion, decide this affirmative defense, but chose not to do so, citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c)”
  2. Helmsderfer v. Bobrick Washroom Equipment

    527 F.3d 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2008)   Cited 221 times
    Finding dictionary definitions supported district court's claim construction
  3. Brookhill-Wilk 1, LLC v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc.

    334 F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2003)   Cited 159 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that "the correct meaning of a word or phrase is informed only by considering the surrounding text. . . . [R]esort must always be made to the surrounding text of the claims in question, the other claims, the written description and the prosecution history."
  4. In re Huang

    100 F.3d 135 (Fed. Cir. 1996)   Cited 94 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the inventor's opinion as to the purchaser's reason for buying the product is insufficient to demonstrate a nexus
  5. In re Geisler

    116 F.3d 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1997)   Cited 52 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Finding a 26 percent improvement in wear resistance insufficient to constitute proof of "substantially improved results"
  6. In re Van Geuns

    988 F.2d 1181 (Fed. Cir. 1993)   Cited 21 times   1 Legal Analyses

    No. 91-1088. March 10, 1993. Jack E. Haken, U.S. Philips Corp., Tarrytown, NY, argued, for appellant. Fred E. McKelvey, Sol., Office of the Sol., Arlington, VA, argued, for appellee. With him on the brief, was Lee E. Barrett, Associate Sol. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. Before ARCHER, PLAGER, and RADER, Circuit Judges. ARCHER, Circuit Judge. Johannes R. Van Geuns appeals from the September 25, 1990 decision of the Patent and Trademark Office

  7. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,129 times   479 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."
  8. Section 102 - Conditions for patentability; novelty

    35 U.S.C. § 102   Cited 5,995 times   1001 Legal Analyses
    Prohibiting the grant of a patent to one who "did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented"
  9. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 186 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"
  10. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  11. Section 41.37 - Appeal brief

    37 C.F.R. § 41.37   Cited 32 times   25 Legal Analyses
    Requiring identification of support in specification and, for means-plus-function limitations, corresponding structure as well
  12. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)