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Ex Parte Crystal et al

11083627 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 20, 2014)
Ex Parte Crystal et al

10 Cited authorities

  1. Ultimax Cement Manufacturing Corp. v. CTS Cement Manufacturing Corp.

    587 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2009)   Cited 157 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the district court properly granted summary judgment disposing of plaintiffs’ trade secret claims under California law because plaintiffs could not prove the existence of a trade secret where its trade secret had been "disclosed in a patent," making it "generally known to the public"

  2. Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs

    806 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1986)   Cited 252 times
    Holding that the limitation that the claimed wheelchair have a "front leg portion . . . so dimensioned as to be insertable through the space between the doorframe of an automobile and one of the seats thereof" was not indefinite

  3. Comaper Corp. v. Antec, Inc.

    596 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2010)   Cited 76 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that "the district court was required to grant a new trial because the jury's verdicts ... were irreconcilably inconsistent."

  4. In re Crish

    393 F.3d 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2004)   Cited 19 times   1 Legal Analyses

    No. 04-1075. December 21, 2004. Appeal from the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. Peter G. Carroll, Medlen Carroll, LLP, of San Francisco, California, argued for appellants. With him on the brief was Thomas W. Brown. Mary L. Kelly, Associate Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, of Arlington, Virginia, argued for the Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office. With her on the brief were John M. Whealan, Solicitor, and William G. Jenks, Associate Solicitor.

  5. Application of Gardner

    427 F.2d 786 (C.C.P.A. 1970)   Cited 26 times

    Patent Appeal No. 8311. June 25, 1970. Arthur R. Eglington, attorney of record for appellants, George J. Harding, 3rd, Joan S. Keps, Philadelphia, Pa., of counsel. S. Wm. Cochran, Washington, D.C., for Commissioner of Patents, Leroy B. Randall, Jack Armore, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Before RICH, Acting Chief Judge, ALMOND, BALDWIN, and LANE, Judges, and FISHER, Chief Judge, Eastern District of Texas, sitting by designation. RICH, Acting Chief Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent

  6. Section 112 - Specification

    35 U.S.C. § 112   Cited 7,394 times   1049 Legal Analyses
    Requiring patent applications to include a "specification" that provides, among other information, a written description of the invention and of the manner and process of making and using it

  7. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,148 times   482 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  8. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 186 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  9. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  10. Section 1.136 - [Effective until 1/19/2025] Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)