Ex Parte Cotton et al

13 Cited authorities

  1. Liebel-Flarsheim Company v. Medrad, Inc.

    358 F.3d 898 (Fed. Cir. 2004)   Cited 1,324 times   6 Legal Analyses
    Holding that claim terms are given the full breadth of their ordinary meaning unless a clear disavowal of scope is stated in the specification
  2. Superguide Corp. v. Directv Enterprises

    358 F.3d 870 (Fed. Cir. 2004)   Cited 305 times   12 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a party "waived its right to assert a construction other than 'matches or equals' for the term 'meet'" because it agreed to that construction in its briefs
  3. Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc.

    952 F.2d 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1992)   Cited 401 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that claim construction is particularly amenable to summary judgment
  4. In re Paulsen

    30 F.3d 1475 (Fed. Cir. 1994)   Cited 232 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding an inventor may define specific terms used to describe invention, but must do so "with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision" and, if done, must "'set out his uncommon definition in some manner within the patent disclosure' so as to give one of ordinary skill in the art notice of the change" in meaning
  5. In re Schreiber

    128 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1997)   Cited 150 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that once the Examiner established a prima facie case of anticipation, the burden of proof was properly shifted to the inventor to rebut the finding of inherency
  6. In re Pearson

    494 F.2d 1399 (C.C.P.A. 1974)   Cited 28 times
    Affirming § 103 rejection when § 102 rejection would also have been appropriate
  7. In re Self

    671 F.2d 1344 (C.C.P.A. 1982)   Cited 6 times

    Appeal No. 81-542. February 18, 1982. Rehearing Denied April 22, 1982. Roland T. Bryan, Stamford, Conn., for appellant. Joseph F. Nakamura, Sol., John W. Dewhirst, Associate Sol., Washington, D.C., for Patent and Trademark Office. Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, MILLER and NIES, Judges. RICH, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) Board of Appeals (board)

  8. Application of Sinex

    309 F.2d 488 (C.C.P.A. 1962)   Cited 12 times

    Patent Appeal No. 6834. November 14, 1962. Wm. Griffith Edwards, McGrew Edwards, Denver, Colo., Jesse Bowyer, Washington, D.C., for appellant. Clarence W. Moore, Washington, D.C. (Lutrelle F. Parker, Arlington, Va., of counsel), for the Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, RICH and SMITH, Judges, Judge JOSEPH R. JACKSON, Retired, and Judge WILLIAM H. KIRKPATRICK. United States Senior District Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, designated to participate in place of Judge

  9. Section 102 - Conditions for patentability; novelty

    35 U.S.C. § 102   Cited 5,995 times   1001 Legal Analyses
    Prohibiting the grant of a patent to one who "did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented"
  10. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 186 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"
  11. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  12. Section 41.37 - Appeal brief

    37 C.F.R. § 41.37   Cited 32 times   25 Legal Analyses
    Requiring identification of support in specification and, for means-plus-function limitations, corresponding structure as well
  13. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)