Serial No. 11/161,741 2011-1195 10-12-2011 IN RE JIE XIAO JIE XIAO, of Holbrook, New York, pro se. RAYMOND T. CHEN, Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, of Alexandria, Virginia, for appellee. With him on the brief were LYNNE E. PETTIGREW and SCOTT C. WEIDENFELLER. LOURIE NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences JIE XIAO, of Holbrook, New York, pro se. RAYMOND T. CHEN, Solicitor
Appeal No. 86-1692. Decided April 21, 1987. Philip A. Mallinckrodt, of Mallinckrodt Mallinckrodt, Salt Lake City, Utah, for appellant. Harris A. Pitlick, Associate Solicitor, Office of the Solicitor, Arlington, Va., for appellee. With him on the brief were Joseph F. Nakamura, Solicitor, and Fred E. McKelvey, Deputy Solicitor. Appeal from the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. Before SMITH, NEWMAN, and BISSELL, Circuit Judges. PAULINE NEWMAN, Circuit Judge. Patent applicant Jay P. Nielson
Bankruptcy No. 279-00687. Adv. No. 279-0002. June 27, 1980. Richard E. Poulos, Portland, Me., for debtor-in-possession. Gregory A. Tselikis, Bernstein, Shur, Sawyer Nelson, Portland, Me., for Creditors' Committee. George J. Marcus, Pierce, Atwood, Scribner, Allen, Smith Lancaster, Portland, Me., for Grumman Credit Corp. MEMORANDUM DECISION FREDERICK A. JOHNSON, Bankruptcy Judge. On December 4, 1979, Circus Time, Inc., a Chapter 11 Debtor in Possession, filed a complaint with this Court seeking authority
(a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622
(a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)