Ex parte Case et al.

4 Cited authorities

  1. In re Vamco Mach. and Tool, Inc.

    752 F.2d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1985)   Cited 26 times   1 Legal Analyses

    Appeal No. 84-1383. Reexamination No. 29795. January 17, 1985. Arland T. Stein, Reed, Smith, Shaw McClay, Pittsburgh, Pa., argued for appellant. With him on the brief were Frederick H. Colen and Tracey G. Benson, Pittsburgh, Pa. Henry W. Tarring, II, Associate Sol., Arlington, Va., argued for appellee. With him on the brief were Joseph F. Nakamura, Sol., and Jere W. Sears, Deputy Sol., Washington, D.C. Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before RICH, Circuit

  2. In re Boe

    355 F.2d 961 (C.C.P.A. 1966)   Cited 26 times

    Patent Appeal No. 7535. February 17, 1966. Burgess, Dinklage Sprung, Arnold Sprung, New York City, for appellant. Clarence W. Moore, Washington, D.C. (Jere W. Sears, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for the Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, MARTIN, SMITH, and ALMOND, Judges. SMITH, Judge. The Board of Appeals affirmed the examiner's rejection of claims 9, 11 and 12 of appellant's application for patent Serial No. 845,743, filed August 12, 1959, for "Highly Porous And Absorptive

  3. In re Snow

    471 F.2d 1400 (C.C.P.A. 1973)   Cited 2 times

    Patent No. 8785. January 26, 1973. Rehearing Denied April 5, 1973. Carl A. Randles, Jr., Kalamazoo, Mich., attorney of record, for appellants. John Kekich, Kalamazoo, Mich., of counsel. S. Wm. Cochran, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents. Fred E. McKelvey, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, ALMOND, BALDWIN and LANE, Judges. MARKEY, Chief Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent Office Board

  4. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)