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Ex Parte Carbunar et al

15179765 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 15, 2019)
Ex Parte Carbunar et al

11 Cited authorities

  1. Phillips v. AWH Corp.

    415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)   Cited 5,828 times   167 Legal Analyses
    Holding that "because extrinsic evidence can help educate the court regarding the field of the invention and can help the court determine what a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand claim terms to mean, it is permissible for the district court in its sound discretion to admit and use such evidence"

  2. Vitronics Corporation v. Conceptronic, Inc.

    90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996)   Cited 4,373 times   10 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a claim construction that excludes the preferred embodiment is "rarely, if ever, correct and would require highly persuasive evidentiary support"

  3. Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd.

    133 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1998)   Cited 540 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that after all claims and counterclaims were decided or withdrawn, the district court acted properly when it “recognized that it could, in its discretion, decide this affirmative defense, but chose not to do so, citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c)”

  4. Helmsderfer v. Bobrick Washroom Equipment

    527 F.3d 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2008)   Cited 221 times
    Finding dictionary definitions supported district court's claim construction

  5. In re Am. Academy of Science Tech Ctr.

    367 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2004)   Cited 88 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that descriptions of deficiencies of using mainframe computers set out in the "Background of the Invention" portion of the specification did not exclude mainframes from the definition of "'user computer'" where the "specification as a whole" did not express a clear disavowal of that subject matter

  6. In re Morris

    127 F.3d 1048 (Fed. Cir. 1997)   Cited 49 times   7 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in reviewing a claim construction decided under the ‘broadest reasonable interpretation’ standard, we determine whether the interpretation is within the range of reasonableness

  7. In re Merck Co., Inc.

    800 F.2d 1091 (Fed. Cir. 1986)   Cited 70 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a person of skill in the art would have expected amitriptyline to resemble imipramine in the alleviation of depression in humans because of the drugs’ close structural similarity and similar use

  8. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,129 times   479 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  9. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 186 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  10. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  11. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)