Patent Appeal No. 76-681. Decided August 18, 1977. Arthur H. Seidel, Thomas W. Ehrmann, Milwaukee, Wis. (Quarles Brady, Milwaukee, Wis.), attorneys of record, for appellant. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents, R.D. Edmonds, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, RICH, BALDWIN and MILLER, Judges, and HERBERT N. MALETZ, Judge, United States Customs Court. BALDWIN, Judge. This is an appeal
Appeal No. 79-597. March 13, 1980. Rehearing Denied July 3, 1980. Robert F. Dropkin and Vincent G. Gioia, Pittsburgh, Pa., attorneys of record for appellants. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, John W. Dewhirst, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, MILLER and MALETZ, Judges. The Honorable Herbert N. Maletz of the United States Customs Court, sitting
Appeal No. 81-557. November 5, 1981. Frank C. Hilberg, Jr., Wilmington, Del., and Hoge T. Sutherland, Arlington, Va., for appellant. Joseph F. Nakamura, Sol., and Henry W. Tarring, II, Associate Sol., Washington, D.C., for Patent and Trademark Office. Before MARKEY Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, MILLER and NIES Judges. MILLER, Judge. This is an appeal from a decision of the Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") Board of Appeals ("board"), sustaining the examiner's 35 U.S.C. § 103 rejection of claims
(a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622
(a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)