2014-1288 12-08-2014 IN RE RICHARD A. GRAFF MICHAEL K. MUTTER, Birch, Stewart, Kolasch & Birch, of Falls Church, Virginia, argued for appellant. With him on the brief was D. RICHARD ANDERSON. Of counsel on the brief was PETER K. TRYNA, Peter K. Trzyna Law Office P.C., of Chicago, Illinois. JOSEPH MATEL, Associate Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, of Alexandria, Virginia, argued for appellee. With him on the brief were NATHAN K. KELLEY, Solicitor, THOMAS W. KRAUSE, Deputy Solicitor
Serial No. 11/161,741 2011-1195 10-12-2011 IN RE JIE XIAO JIE XIAO, of Holbrook, New York, pro se. RAYMOND T. CHEN, Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, of Alexandria, Virginia, for appellee. With him on the brief were LYNNE E. PETTIGREW and SCOTT C. WEIDENFELLER. LOURIE NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences JIE XIAO, of Holbrook, New York, pro se. RAYMOND T. CHEN, Solicitor
Patent Appeal No. 4077. February 27, 1939. Appeal from the Board of Patent Appeals, Interference No. 73,230. Interference proceeding between Fritz Hansgirg and Frank R. Kemmer. From a decision of the Board of Appeals of the United States Patent Office affirming decision of the Examiner of Interferences, the former appeals. Reversed. Brown, Critchlow Flick, of Pittsburgh, Pa. (Jo. Baily Brown and Fulton B. Flick, both of Pittsburgh, Pa., of counsel), for appellant. H.C. Bierman, of New York City,
(a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622
(a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)