Ex Parte Brooks

11 Cited authorities

  1. Key Pharmaceuticals v. Hercon Lab. Corp.

    161 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 1998)   Cited 374 times
    Holding that trial court can hear extrinsic evidence to educate itself about patent and relevant technology, but may not use extrinsic evidence to vary or contradict claim terms
  2. Comaper Corp. v. Antec, Inc.

    596 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2010)   Cited 76 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that "the district court was required to grant a new trial because the jury's verdicts ... were irreconcilably inconsistent."
  3. In re Fulton

    391 F.3d 1195 (Fed. Cir. 2004)   Cited 81 times   8 Legal Analyses
    Holding that "a particular combination" need not "be the preferred, or the most desirable, combination described in the prior art in order to provide motivation"
  4. In re Morris

    127 F.3d 1048 (Fed. Cir. 1997)   Cited 49 times   7 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in reviewing a claim construction decided under the ‘broadest reasonable interpretation’ standard, we determine whether the interpretation is within the range of reasonableness
  5. Application of Sinex

    309 F.2d 488 (C.C.P.A. 1962)   Cited 12 times

    Patent Appeal No. 6834. November 14, 1962. Wm. Griffith Edwards, McGrew Edwards, Denver, Colo., Jesse Bowyer, Washington, D.C., for appellant. Clarence W. Moore, Washington, D.C. (Lutrelle F. Parker, Arlington, Va., of counsel), for the Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, RICH and SMITH, Judges, Judge JOSEPH R. JACKSON, Retired, and Judge WILLIAM H. KIRKPATRICK. United States Senior District Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, designated to participate in place of Judge

  6. Ullstrand v. Coons

    147 F.2d 698 (C.C.P.A. 1945)

    Patent Appeal No. 4949. February 7, 1945. Appeal from the Board of Interference Examiners of the United States Patent Office, Interference No. 79,280. Interference proceeding to determine priority of invention between Hugo M. Ullstrand and Curtis C. Coons. From a decision of the Board of Interference Examiners awarding priority of invention to Curtis C. Coons, Hugo M. Ullstrand appeals. Affirmed. Oliver Titcomb, of New York City, for appellant. Richard R. Fitzsimmons, of Chicago, Ill. (Harry S. Demaree

  7. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,130 times   479 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."
  8. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 186 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"
  9. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  10. Section 41.37 - Appeal brief

    37 C.F.R. § 41.37   Cited 32 times   25 Legal Analyses
    Requiring identification of support in specification and, for means-plus-function limitations, corresponding structure as well
  11. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)