No. 93-1206. November 23, 1993. Edward W. Goodman, North American Philips Corp., of Tarrytown, NY, argued for appellant. With him on the brief was Algy Tamoshunas. Lee E. Barrett, Associate Sol., Office of the Sol., Arlington, VA, argued for appellee. With him on the brief was Fred E. McKelvey, Sol. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office. Before MAYER and LOURIE, Circuit Judges, and LAY, Senior Circuit Judge. Honorable Donald P. Lay, Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the
Civil No. 89-430-SD. April 20, 1995. Craig L. Staples, Cleveland, Waters Bass, PA, Concord, NH, Jack R. Pirozzolo, Willcox, Pirozzolo McCarthy, Boston, MA, for Curtis Manufacturing Company, Inc. W. Wright Danenbarger, Wiggin Nourie, William O. Hennessey, Hayes, Soloway, Hennessey, Grossman Hage, Jamie N. Hage, Roussos, Hage Hodes, Manchester, NH, for Plasti-Clip Corporation, Daniel Faneuf. Craig L. Staples, Cleveland, Waters Bass, PA, Concord, NH, Jack R. Pirozzolo, Willcox, Pirozzolo McCarthy, Boston
(a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622
(a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)
(a)Effect within Office - (1)Estoppel. A judgment disposes of all issues that were, or by motion could have properly been, raised and decided. A losing party who could have properly moved for relief on an issue, but did not so move, may not take action in the Office after the judgment that is inconsistent with that party's failure to move, except that a losing party shall not be estopped with respect to any contested subject matter for which that party was awarded a favorable judgment. (2)Final disposal