Ex Parte Binder

15 Cited authorities

  1. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.

    550 U.S. 398 (2007)   Cited 1,565 times   187 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"
  2. Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc.

    688 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2012)   Cited 160 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Finding no motivation to combine where "doctors were not using the disclosed devices and methods to heal wounds with negative pressure because they did not believe that these devices were capable of such healing"
  3. Applied Materials v. Advanced Semiconductor

    98 F.3d 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1996)   Cited 163 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that disputed claim limitation, read in light of the written description, requires a function not performed by the accused device
  4. Leapfrog v. Fisher-Price

    485 F.3d 1157 (Fed. Cir. 2007)   Cited 90 times   5 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the objective considerations of nonobviousness presented, including substantial evidence of commercial success, praise, and long-felt need, were inadequate to overcome a strong showing of primary considerations that rendered the claims at issue invalid
  5. In re Bigio

    381 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2004)   Cited 71 times   10 Legal Analyses
    Affirming conclusion that toothbrush and small hair brush were in same field of endeavor because "the structural similarities between toothbrushes and small brushes for hair would have led one of ordinary skill in the art working in the specific field of hairbrushes to consider all similar brushes including toothbrushes"
  6. In re Keller

    642 F.2d 413 (C.C.P.A. 1981)   Cited 47 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Stating "[t]he test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference"
  7. In re Watkinson

    900 F.2d 230 (Fed. Cir. 1990)   Cited 5 times   1 Legal Analyses

    No. 89-1537. March 30, 1990. Steven B. Kelber, Oblon, Spivak, McClelland, Maier Neustadt, P.C., Arlington, Va., argued for appellant. John W. Dewhirst, Associate Sol., Office of Sol., Arlington, Va., argued for appellee. With him on the brief was Fred E. McKelvey, Sol. Appeal from the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. Before ARCHER and MICHEL, Circuit Judges, and BALDWIN, Senior Circuit Judge. BALDWIN, Senior Circuit Judge. Sarah C. Watkinson (Watkinson) appeals the decision of the Board

  8. Application of Hengehold

    440 F.2d 1395 (C.C.P.A. 1971)   Cited 16 times

    Patent Appeal No. 8345. April 29, 1971. Roy F. Schaeperklaus, Pearce Schaeperklaus, Cincinnati, Ohio, attorney of record for appellant. William A. Smith, Jr., Smith, Michael, Bradford Gardiner, Washington, D.C., James W. Pearce, Pearce Schaeperklaus, Cincinnati, Ohio, of counsel. S. Wm. Cochran, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents. Jere W. Sears, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Before RICH, ALMOND, BALDWIN and LANE, Judges, and McMANUS, Judge, Northern District of Iowa, sitting by designation

  9. In re Mlot-Fijalkowski

    676 F.2d 666 (C.C.P.A. 1982)   Cited 4 times

    Appeal No. 81-597. April 15, 1982. Otto R. Krause, Chicago, Ill., for appellant. Joseph F. Nakamura, Sol., and Henry W. Tarring, II, Associate Sol., Washington, D.C., for the Patent and Trademark Office. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, MILLER and NIES, Judges. MARKEY, Chief Judge. This is an appeal from a decision of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) Board of Appeals (board) sustaining the examiner's rejection of claims

  10. Application of Ellis

    476 F.2d 1370 (C.C.P.A. 1973)   Cited 8 times

    Patent Appeal No. 8860. April 26, 1973. Francis D. Thomas, Jr., Washington, D.C., attorney of record, for appellant. S. Wm. Cochran, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents; John W. Dewhirst, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, RICH, BALDWIN, and LANE, Judges, and WATSON, Judge, United States Customs Court, sitting by designation. BALDWIN, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals,

  11. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,157 times   488 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."
  12. Section 121 - Divisional applications

    35 U.S.C. § 121   Cited 218 times   72 Legal Analyses
    Explaining that "the other invention [can be] made the subject of a divisional application"
  13. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 188 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"
  14. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  15. Section 1.136 - [Effective until 1/19/2025] Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)