Ex Parte Berry

14 Cited authorities

  1. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.

    550 U.S. 398 (2007)   Cited 1,547 times   185 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"
  2. Tec Air, Inc. v. Denso Manufacturing Michigan Inc.

    192 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1999)   Cited 112 times
    Holding that regardless of whether defendant had shown a motivation to combine the prior art, the showing could be rebutted by evidence of commercial success
  3. In re Am. Academy of Science Tech Ctr.

    367 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2004)   Cited 88 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that descriptions of deficiencies of using mainframe computers set out in the "Background of the Invention" portion of the specification did not exclude mainframes from the definition of "'user computer'" where the "specification as a whole" did not express a clear disavowal of that subject matter
  4. In re Oetiker

    977 F.2d 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1992)   Cited 66 times   9 Legal Analyses
    Reversing for "improperly combined" references, because "[i]f examination at the initial stage does not produce a prima facie case of unpatentability, then without more the applicant is entitled to grant of the patent"
  5. Saab Cars USA, Inc. v. United States

    434 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2006)   Cited 41 times
    Holding that in the absence of evidence of temporal proximity, claimant must provide more than warranty agreements and more specific descriptions
  6. In re Spada

    911 F.2d 705 (Fed. Cir. 1990)   Cited 58 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the claims were properly rejected by the PTO because they were anticipated by a prior art reference
  7. In re Crish

    393 F.3d 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2004)   Cited 19 times   1 Legal Analyses

    No. 04-1075. December 21, 2004. Appeal from the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. Peter G. Carroll, Medlen Carroll, LLP, of San Francisco, California, argued for appellants. With him on the brief was Thomas W. Brown. Mary L. Kelly, Associate Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, of Arlington, Virginia, argued for the Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office. With her on the brief were John M. Whealan, Solicitor, and William G. Jenks, Associate Solicitor.

  8. In re Rijckaert

    9 F.3d 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1993)   Cited 22 times   4 Legal Analyses

    No. 93-1206. November 23, 1993. Edward W. Goodman, North American Philips Corp., of Tarrytown, NY, argued for appellant. With him on the brief was Algy Tamoshunas. Lee E. Barrett, Associate Sol., Office of the Sol., Arlington, VA, argued for appellee. With him on the brief was Fred E. McKelvey, Sol. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office. Before MAYER and LOURIE, Circuit Judges, and LAY, Senior Circuit Judge. Honorable Donald P. Lay, Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the

  9. In re Grabiak

    769 F.2d 729 (Fed. Cir. 1985)   Cited 19 times

    Appeal No. 84-1718. Decided: August 9, 1985. J. Timothy Keane, Monsanto Company, of St. Louis, Mo., argued for appellants. Richard H. Shear, Monsanto Company, was on the brief. Fred W. Sherling, U.S. Patent Trademark Office, of Arlington, Va., argued for appellee. With him on the brief were Joseph F. Nakamura, Sol., John W. Dewhirst, Associate Sol., and Harris A. Pitlick, Associate Sol., Washington, D.C. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before FRIEDMAN, NIES, and NEWMAN

  10. Application of Sponnoble

    405 F.2d 578 (C.C.P.A. 1969)   Cited 36 times

    Patent Appeal No. 8007. January 16, 1969. Raywood H. Blanchard, Kalamazoo, Mich., (Eugene O. Retter, George T. Johannesen, Kalamazoo, Mich., of counsel) for appellant. Joseph Schimmel, Washington, D.C., (Fred W. Sherling, Washington, D.C., of counsel) for the Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, SMITH, ALMOND and BALDWIN, Judges. BALDWIN, Judge. This is an appeal from the decision of the Board of Appeals, affirming the examiner's rejection of the sole remaining claim in

  11. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,129 times   479 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."
  12. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 186 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"
  13. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  14. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)