Ex Parte Arasu et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Nov 26, 2014

12347931 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 26, 2014)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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Ex parte VENMAL ARASU and BRUCE ROBERT ABBOTT
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Appeal 2012-006838
Application 12/347,9311
Technology Center 3600
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Before BIBHU R. MOHANTY, JAMES A. WORTH, and
SCOTT C. MOORE, Administrative Patent Judges.

MOORE, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Claims 19–27 are pending in the subject patent application. Appeal
Br. 4, Ans. 3. Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from the Examiner’s
decision rejecting claims 19–27. Id. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6.
We AFFIRM.

1 Appellants state that the real party in interest is eBay Incorporated. Appeal
Br. 2.
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Claimed Subject Matter
Claims 19 and 25 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 19,
reproduced below, is illustrative of the subject matter on appeal.
19. A method comprising:
receiving a request from a seller via a
computer network to list one or more items on the
computer network that are part of a residence-
based garage sale;
receiving data from the seller relating to the
one or more items that are part of the residence-
based garage sale;
providing a yard sign to the seller, the yard
sign including a web address that indicates where
the items in the residence-based garage sale can be
found using the computer network;
providing a pricing discount to a buyer that
uses the computer network to view the one or more
items that are part of the residence-based garage
sale; and
receiving a request from the buyer via the
computer network to purchase at least one of the
items on the computer network that are part of the
residence-based garage sale.

Rejections
The Examiner relies on the following prior art references in rejecting
the claims on appeal:
Chen US 2005/0273405 A1 Dec. 8, 2005
Litt US 2006/0069611 A1 Mar. 30, 2006
O’Hanlon US 2007/0141977 A1 June 21, 2007
Abhyanker US 2007/0233582 A1 Oct. 4, 2007

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Claims 19–21 and 23 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Litt, O’Hanlon, and Chen.
Claims 22 and 24 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Litt, O’Hanlon, Chen, and Abhyanker
Claims 25–27 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Litt and O’Hanlon.

ANALYSIS
Rejection of Claims 19–21 and 23
Appellants’ arguments concerning claims 19–21 and 23 focus on the
following limitation of independent claim 19: “providing a yard sign to the
seller, the yard sign including a web address that indicates where the items
in the residence-based garage sale can be found using the computer
network.” See Appeal Br. 9–11. The Examiner finds that this limitation is
obvious in view of the combined teachings of the Litt and O’Hanlon
references. See Ans. 6–7.
The Litt reference is directed to a “method for advertising and selling
products online.” Litt Abstract. The Examiner finds that Litt teaches
advertising the electronic address of a web page that lists items for sale via a
non-electronic medium, such as a flyer. Ans. 6. The Examiner notes that,
although Litt discloses physical advertisements, Litt does not disclose that
the physical advertisements are yard signs. Id. The Examiner then finds that
O’Hanlon teaches the use of signs for outdoor placement that provide link
information for a sale. Id. at 6–7. The Examiner concludes that it would
have been obvious to use a sign of the type disclosed in O’Hanlon in the
method of Litt. Id. at 7.
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Appellants argue that the Examiner erred in finding that O’Hanlon
teaches “providing a yard sign to a seller that is conducting a garage sale in
addition to listing the items in the garage sale for the seller.” Appeal Br.
9–10. This argument is not persuasive because it mischaracterizes the
Examiner’s rejection. As discussed above, the Examiner did not rely on
O’Hanlon alone, but instead relied on the combined teachings of Litt and
O’Hanlon. Where, as here, the Examiner relies on teachings from a
combination of references, Appellants cannot show non-obviousness by
attacking references individually. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA
1981). Instead, each reference cited by the Examiner must be read, not in
isolation, but for what it fairly teaches in combination with the prior art as a
whole. See In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
Appellants also argue that the cited prior art does not teach:
receiving/providing to a seller (i) a request via a
computer network to list one or more items on the
computer network that are part of a residence-
based garage sale; (ii) data relating to the one or
more items that are part of the residence-based
garage sale: AND (iii) a yard sign having a web
address that indicates where the items in the
residence-based garage sale can be found using the
computer network from a seller.
Appeal Br. 10. This argument is not persuasive. Litt teaches receiving via a
computer information describing one or more items for sale by a customer,
and creating a web page to display the items the customer is attempting to
sell. See Litt ¶ 3. Litt also teaches that the sale may be a garage sale. See
id. ¶ 60. Litt further teaches providing physical advertisements that include
the electronic address of the web page that lists the customer’s items. See,
e.g., id. ¶¶ 4, 7. As discussed above, O’Hanlon teaches the use of yard signs
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to provide link information for a sale. See O’Hanlon ¶ 9. Thus, the record
contains ample evidentiary support for the Examiner’s findings.
Appellants further argue that none of the cited references “discloses a
yard sign having a web address that indicates where the items in the
residence-based garage sale can be found using the computer network from a
seller as recited in the claims.” Appeal Br. 10. This argument is not
persuasive. Appellants cannot show non-obviousness by attacking
references individually where, as here, the Examiner is relying on the
combined teachings of multiple references. Moreover, as discussed above,
the record contains ample evidentiary support for the Examiner’s findings.
Appellants additionally argue that “the only disclosure relating to
providing a yard sign to a seller that is conducting a garage sale in addition
to listing the items in [a] garage sale for the seller is found in Appellant[s’]
disclosure,” and that the Examiner is thus “impermissibly using
Appellant[s’] own teachings against the Appellant[s].” Appeal Br. 11. This
argument is not persuasive. As discussed above, the prior art teaches the use
of physical media to advertise a sale, such as a garage sale, in addition to
listing the items for sale on a web page. The prior art also teaches the use of
a yard sign to advertise a sale. Thus, the record contains ample evidentiary
support for the Examiner’s findings. In contrast, Appellants have provided
no persuasive evidence or technical reasoning in support of their argument
that the Examiner’s findings are erroneous.
Because none of Appellants’ arguments regarding the patentability of
independent claim 19 are persuasive, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
claim 19.
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Appellants do not make any separate patentability arguments with
respect to dependent claims 20, 21, and 23, all of which depend from claim
19. Thus, we also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 20, 21, and 23.

Rejection of Claims 22 and 24
Appellants do not make any separate patentability arguments with
respect to claim 22. Thus, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 22.
With respect to claim 24, Appellants argue that the prior art of record
does not teach “shipping the yard sign to a location specified by the seller,”
as recited by that claim. Appeal Br. 11. The Examiner concedes Litt does
not explicitly teach mailing advertising materials, but finds that Abhyanker
teaches shipping advertising materials to a location specified by the seller.
Ans. 12. In particular, the Examiner finds that Abhyanker discloses mailing
advertising fliers to residents within a threshold radius of the planned garage
sale. Id. (citing Abhyanker ¶ 9).
Appellants assert that the Examiner’s rejection should be reversed
because “Abhyanker discusses mailing brochures to customers based on the
location of [the] seller, but does not teach shipping a yard sign directly to a
seller that is conducting a garage sale.” Appeal Br. 11–12. This argument
is not persuasive. As discussed above, the Examiner does not rely on
Abhyanker as teaching a yard sign or a link to a website. Thus, the fact that
Abhyanker does not disclose “a yard sign that includes a web address” (see
id. at 12) is irrelevant. Appellants’ assertion that Abhyanker “does not teach
shipping . . . directly to a seller that is conducting a garage sale” is not
persuasive because claim 24 does not require that the sign be shipped to the
seller. Claim 24 merely requires that the sign be shipped “to a location
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specified by the seller.” Abhyanker discloses that the seller may select a
threshold radius to which advertising materials are shipped. See, e.g., id.
¶ 90 (disclosing a radius module that allows a seller to specify a radius), ¶ 94
(disclosing that flyers may then be mailed to residents within this radius).
Thus, the record contains ample evidentiary support for the Examiner’s
findings. In contrast, Appellants have provided no persuasive evidence or
technical reasoning in support of their argument that the Examiner’s findings
are erroneous.
Because none of Appellants’ arguments regarding the patentability of
claim 24 are persuasive, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 24.

Rejection of Claims 25–27
Appellants argue that the Examiner erred in finding that Litt and
O’Hanlon teach “a yard sign that includes a web address that indicates
where the items in the residence-based garage sale can be found using a
computer network,” as recited by independent claim 25. Appeal Br. 12. In
particular, Appellants concede that O’Hanlon describes a yard sign to
advertise, but argues that neither Litt nor O’Hanlon describes a yard sign
“that includes a web address that indicates where the items in the residence-
based garage sale can be found using a computer network.” Id. at 13. This
argument is not persuasive because Appellants cannot show non-
obviousness by attacking references individually where, as here, the
Examiner is relying on the combined teachings of multiple references.
As discussed above, Litt teaches advertising the electronic address of
a web page that lists items for sale via a non-electronic medium, such as a
flyer. O’Hanlon teaches the use of signs for outdoor placement that provide
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link information for a sale. Thus, the record contains ample evidentiary
support for the Examiner’s findings. In contrast, Appellants have provided
no persuasive evidence or technical reasoning in support of their argument
that the Examiner’s findings are erroneous.
Because none of Appellants’ arguments regarding the patentability of
independent claim 25 are persuasive, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
claim 25.
Appellants do not make any separate patentability arguments with
respect to dependent claims 26 and 27, both of which depend from claim 25.
Thus, we also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 26 and 27.

DECISION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the Examiner’s decision
rejecting claims 19–27.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. §
1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED

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