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Ex parte ARAKAWA

08103174 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 28, 1998)
Ex parte ARAKAWA

8 Cited authorities

  1. Dillon v. Manbeck

    500 U.S. 904 (1991)   Cited 34 times

    No. 90-1264. April 29, 1991, OCTOBER TERM, 1990. C.A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 919 F. 2d 688.

  2. In re Dillon

    919 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1990)   Cited 69 times   6 Legal Analyses
    Finding a prima facie case of obviousness where the prior art tri-orthoester compound was found to be equivalent to the claimed tetra-orthoester compound and the use of the tri-orthoester as a fuel additive was expected to produce essentially the same result as the use of the tetra-orthoester

  3. In re Beattie

    974 F.2d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 1992)   Cited 61 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that an alternative to a well-entrenched theory does not preclude a finding of obviousness because the recommendation of a new system "does not require obliteration of another"

  4. San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Haugrud

    848 F.3d 1216 (9th Cir. 2017)   Cited 14 times
    Distinguishing a broad grant of authority from an ambiguous one

  5. Application of Kronig

    539 F.2d 1300 (C.C.P.A. 1976)   Cited 18 times
    Holding no new ground of rejection when the Board relied on the same statutory basis and the same reasoning advanced by the examiner

  6. In re Heck

    699 F.2d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 1983)   Cited 6 times
    Explaining that "[t]he use of patents as references is not limited to what the patentees describe as their own inventions"

  7. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,130 times   479 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  8. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)