Edwards Lifesciences Corporation v. Vigilanz Corporation

26 Cited authorities

  1. Star Scientific v. R.J. Tobacco

    537 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2008)   Cited 396 times   8 Legal Analyses
    Holding that intent may be proven circumstantially, "[b]ut such evidence must still be clear and convincing, and inferences drawn from lesser evidence cannot satisfy the deceptive intent requirement"
  2. Gart v. Logitech, Inc.

    254 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2001)   Cited 267 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the notice must contain a "specific charge of infringement"
  3. In re Bose Corp.

    580 F.3d 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2009)   Cited 172 times   13 Legal Analyses
    Holding that an applicant commits fraud when it knowingly makes false, material representations of fact with an intent to deceive the PTO
  4. In re E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co.

    476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973)   Cited 190 times   32 Legal Analyses
    Reciting thirteen factors to be considered, referred to as "DuPont factors"
  5. Palm Bay Imp. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin

    396 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005)   Cited 72 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Finding similarity between "VEUVE ROYALE" and "VEUVE CLICQUOT" because "VEUVE ... remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label"
  6. Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp.

    222 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2000)   Cited 74 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Finding similarity between LASER for golf clubs and golf balls and LASERSWING for golf practice devices, and noting that "the term ‘swing’ is both common and descriptive" and therefore "may be given little weight in reaching a conclusion on likelihood of confusion"
  7. Recot, Inc. v. Becton

    214 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000)   Cited 57 times
    Holding that the Board legally erred in not according sufficient weight to evidence of a mark's fame in a likelihood of confusion analysis, vacating, and remanding for further consideration
  8. In re Nat. Data Corp.

    753 F.2d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1985)   Cited 73 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a "likelihood of confusion cannot be predicated on dissection of a mark"
  9. Kenner Parker Toys v. Rose Art Industries

    963 F.2d 350 (Fed. Cir. 1992)   Cited 51 times
    Holding that in light of the appearance, sound and meaning of the marks PLAY-DOH and FUNDOUGH, consumers may receive the "same commercial impression" from the marks
  10. Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio Products, Inc.

    293 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2002)   Cited 35 times   2 Legal Analyses
    In Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio Prods., Inc., 293 F.3d 1367, 1375 (Fed.Cir.2002), this court held that the marks WAVE and ACOUSTIC WAVE have trademark strength independent of the Bose “house mark,” although the marks appear in the same sales literature.
  11. Rule 26 - Duty to Disclose; General Provisions Governing Discovery

    Fed. R. Civ. P. 26   Cited 100,063 times   680 Legal Analyses
    Adopting Fed.R.Civ.P. 37
  12. Rule 201 - Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts

    Fed. R. Evid. 201   Cited 29,690 times   26 Legal Analyses
    Holding "[n]ormally, in deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, courts must limit their inquiry to the facts stated in the complaint and the documents either attached to or incorporated in the complaint. However, courts may also consider matters of which they may take judicial notice."
  13. Section 1052 - Trademarks registrable on principal register; concurrent registration

    15 U.S.C. § 1052   Cited 1,603 times   274 Legal Analyses
    Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"
  14. Section 2.120 - Discovery

    37 C.F.R. § 2.120   Cited 23 times   5 Legal Analyses
    Providing that the TTAB "in its discretion, may refuse to consider the additional written disclosures or responses"
  15. Section 2.122 - Matters in evidence

    37 C.F.R. § 2.122   Cited 23 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Providing that in inter partes proceeding, "[t]he allegation in an application for registration, or in a registration, of a date of use is not evidence on behalf of the applicant or registrant" but, rather, "a date of use of a mark must be established by competent evidence"