ECOER INC.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 24, 2022

2022001864 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 24, 2022)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 16/468,803 06/12/2019 Jianliang Zhang ECOER13 1079 123363 7590 03/24/2022 John Ye John Ye 2608 Woodedge Road Silver Spring, MD 20906 EXAMINER CHOI, ALICIA M ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2117 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/24/2022 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): johnye@hotmail.com johnye@yespllc.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte JIANLIANG ZHANG Appeal 2022-001864 Application 16/468,803 Technology Center 2100 Before JEAN R. HOMERE, ADAM J. PYONIN, and MICHAEL J. ENGLE, Administrative Patent Judges. HOMERE, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE1 Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant appeals from the Examiner’s rejection of claims 6-15, all of the pending claims.2 Claims App. Claims 1-5 are canceled. Id. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. 1 We refer to the Specification filed June 12, 2019 (“Spec.”); the Final Office Action, mailed Sept. 16, 2021 (“Final Act.”); the Appeal Brief, filed Dec. 15, 2021 (“Appeal Br.”); the Examiner’s Answer, mailed Jan. 26, 2022 (“Ans.”); and the Reply Brief, filed Feb. 7, 2022 (“Reply Br.”). 2 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies Ecoer Inc., as the real party-in- interest. Appeal Br. 3. Appeal 2022-001864 Application 16/468,803 2 II. CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER According to Appellant, the claimed subject matter relates to a method for detecting a clog in air conditioner (AC) heat exchange or air filter. Spec. ¶ 5. In particular, a heat exchanger coefficient3 is calculated based on received sensor operation data and refrigerant lookup data to estimate the amount of dirt accumulated on the indoor/outdoor heat exchange or air filter. Id. ¶¶ 5-7. If the calculated coefficient exceeds a predetermined threshold, a warning is provided to indicate that the filter or heat exchange needs cleaning. Id. ¶¶ 9-11. Claims 6 and 11 are independent. Claim 6, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 6. An air conditioner control method for cooling and heating, comprising: calculating actual heat exchange coefficient for actual operation timing cycle based on sensor data from operation data and refrigerant lookup data, wherein the actual heat exchange coefficient is used to determine maintenance status wherein Step 1, calculating fluid outlet enthalpy from the sensor data and the refrigerant lookup data and; Step 2, calculating fluid inlet enthalpy from the sensor data and the refrigerant lookup data and; Step 3, calculating heat exchanger capacity based on the values of Step 1 fluid outlet enthalpy and Step 2 fluid inlet enthalpy and; Step 4, calculating the actual heat exchanger coefficient based on the value in Step 3 heat exchanger capacity and the sensor data and 3 Claim 6, reproduced above, inconsistently refers to heat exchange coefficient and heat exchanger coefficient. In the event of further prosecution, Appellant should consider using a consistent term supported by the written description. Appeal 2022-001864 Application 16/468,803 3 Step 5, providing accurate estimation on dirt accumulation on indoor/outdoor heat exchange and filter, so that a warning on cleaning is needed when necessary or to stop the system from damaging itself. III. REJECTION4 The Examiner rejects claims 6-15 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 6-17. IV. ANALYSIS An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.” Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (quoting Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013)). In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217-18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75-77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 4 The Examiner withdraws the written description rejection previously entered against claims 6-15. Ans. 2. Appeal 2022-001864 Application 16/468,803 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”). Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219-20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594-95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes, such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267-68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1877))). In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”). Appeal 2022-001864 Application 16/468,803 5 If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent- eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221. “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id. The Office published revised guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50- 57 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“2019 PEG”). The Office also published an update to that guidance. October 2019 Patent Eligibility Guidance Update, 84 Fed. Reg. 55,942 (hereinafter “PEG Update”). Under the 2019 PEG and PEG Update (collectively referred to as “2019 Updated PEG”), we first look to whether the claim recites: (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)-(c), (e)-(h)).5 5 All references to the MPEP are to 9th Ed., Rev. 08.2017 (Jan. 2018). Appeal 2022-001864 Application 16/468,803 6 See 2019 PEG at 52, 55-56. Only if a claim: (1) recites a judicial exception; and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, does the Office then look to whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. See 2019 PEG at 56. We analyze the patent eligibility rejection with the principles identified above in mind. Examiner’s Findings and Conclusions In the first part of the Alice inquiry, the Examiner determines that claims 6-15 are directed to mathematical concepts and/or mental processes that are used to calculate a heat exchange coefficient for estimating the amount of dirt accumulated on an indoor/outdoor heat exchange or air filter. Final Act. 7-8. In particular, the Examiner avers that independent claims 6 and 11 merely recite the steps of using formulae to calculate fluid inlet/outlet enthalpy from sensor/refrigerant data, to calculate the heat exchanger capacity, and calculate the heat exchanger coefficient, which is used to determine whether the amount of dirt of the heat exchanger exceeds a threshold. Id.; Ans. 4-7. According to the Examiner, the cited steps are mathematical steps that can be performed with pen and paper by an operator to determine whether the calculated heat exchanger coefficient indicates a dirty heat exchanger/filter as set forth in the claim. Ans. 6. Therefore, the Examiner finds that because the cited claims merely estimate the amount of Appeal 2022-001864 Application 16/468,803 7 dirt on the heat exchanger/filter through mathematical operations, they are directed to an abstract idea consistent with the case law. Id. Further, the Examiner finds that because the recited step of estimating dirt accumulation on the heat exchange/filter amounts to necessary outputting of data (e.g., a warning to the user to clean the heat exchanger/filter or stop the system), the claims do not recite any additional elements that would integrate the judicial exceptions into a practical application. Ans. 7-8. In the second part of the Alice inquiry, the Examiner determines the claims do not recite additional elements sufficient to amount to significantly more than the abstract idea. Ans. 10-11; Final Act. 10. According to the Examiner, the claimed subject matter fails to show an inventive concept because it merely recites a set of instructions as part of the abstract idea for a user to keep a heat exchanger/filter from being clogged within an AC system. Id. at 10-13. Therefore, the Examiner avers that the claims do not recite additional elements beyond providing the instructions for performing the steps in the mental process, as supported by evidence of well-understood, routine, conventional activities. Id. Appellant’s Arguments and Contentions Appellant argues that the claims are patent-eligible because they address specific technological problems in running dirty AC systems without preempting the field. Appeal Br. 17. Appellant argues that because the claims do not recite a mathematical formula, the Examiner errs in concluding that the claims are directed to a mathematical concept. Id. at 18- 19 (citing Thales Visionix, Inc. v. United States, 850 F.3d 1343, 1348-49 (Fed. Cir. 2017)); Reply Br. 1-2. Further, Appellant argues that the Examiner did not follow PTO procedure in treating the claim as an abstract Appeal 2022-001864 Application 16/468,803 8 idea without the TC Director’s approval when the claim does not fall within any of the enumerated abstract idea groupings. Appeal Br. 19 (citing MPEP § 2106.04(a)(3)); Reply Br. 2. Additionally, Appellant argues that the Examiner errs in failing to appreciate that the claimed subject matter involves the practical application directed to a specific improvement in AC rather than invoking AC as a mere tool. Id. That is, the claimed subject matter makes specific improvement in AC capabilities by transforming AC into a self-diagnosing machine, which is better, more useful, and more powerful with more functionalities. Appeal Br. 21; Reply Br. 2-3. Our Review Applying the guidance set forth in the 2019 Updated PEG and controlling case law, we determine whether the Examiner has erred in rejecting the claims as directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. In revised step 1 of the 2019 PEG, we consider whether the claimed subject matter falls within the four statutory categories of patent-eligible subject matter identified by 35 U.S.C. § 101: process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter. Because independent claim 6 recites a “method” including a number of steps, claim 6 falls within the “process” category of patent-eligible subject matter. Because independent claim 11 recites a “non- transitory computer-readable medium” having stored thereon computer- executable instructions for performing various functions, claim 11 falls within the “manufacture” category of patent-eligible subject matter. In prong 1 of revised step 2A of the 2019 PEG, we determine whether any judicial exception to patent eligibility is recited in the claims. The guidance identifies three judicially-excepted groupings of abstract ideas: (1) mathematical concepts; (2) certain methods of organizing human Appeal 2022-001864 Application 16/468,803 9 activity, such as fundamental economic practices; and (3) mental processes. Independent claims 6 and 11 recite, inter alia, the steps of (1) calculating fluid inlet/outlet enthalpy from sensor/refrigerant lookup data, (2) calculating heat exchanger capacity based on calculated inlet/outlet enthalpy, (3) calculating the heat exchanger coefficient based on heat exchanger capacity/sensor data, and (4) estimating dirt accumulation on an indoor/outdoor heat exchange/filter to issue a warning that cleaning is needed. As an initial matter, we note that independent claims 6 and 11 merely recite performing certain calculations regarding an AC heat exchanger/filter without detailing any particular hardware circuitry to execute steps 1 through 4 above. Such a manipulation of the input data relates to the pre- Internet activity of performing mathematical computations to convert input data into equivalent output performance data. As drafted, these claim limitations, under their broadest reasonable interpretation, recite a mental process for organizing information through mathematical correlations that can be performed in the human mind or using a pen and paper. See, e.g., CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372-73 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (determining that a claim whose “steps can be performed in the human mind, or by a human using a pen and paper” is directed to an unpatentable mental process). We thus agree with the Examiner that the claimed subject matter merely relates to the basic concept of mathematical concepts and/or mental processes that are used to estimate dirt accumulation on an indoor/outdoor heat exchange/filter. Ans. 4-7. Accordingly, we find that independent claims 6 and 11 recite the judicial exception of a mental process. Appeal 2022-001864 Application 16/468,803 10 Having determined that the claims recite a judicial exception, our analysis under the 2019 PEG turns now to determining whether there are “additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application.” See MPEP § 2106.05(a)-(c), (e)-(h).6 “Integration into a practical application” requires an additional element or a combination of additional elements in the claim to apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception. 2019 PEG at 53. Appellant’s claims 6 and 11 recite computer-related limitations (e.g., a first device performing steps 1-4 to determine whether the heat exchanger/filter needs to be cleaned). Appellant argues that because the claims make specific improvements in AC capabilities, they recite a technological solution that integrates the alleged judicial exception into a practical application. Appeal Br. 20-21; Reply Br. 2-3. We do not find the recited computer-related limitations or the ultimate estimation of dirt on the heat exchanger/filter are sufficient to integrate the 6 Specifically, we determine whether the claims recite: (i) an improvement to the functioning of a computer [(or a mobile device)]; (ii) an improvement to another technology or technical field; (iii) an application of the abstract idea with, or by use of, a particular machine; (iv) a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing; or (v) other meaningful limitations beyond generally linking the use of the abstract idea to a particular technological environment. Id. Appeal 2022-001864 Application 16/468,803 11 judicial exception into a practical application. Although the claim nominally requires these steps to be performed by a computer, this computer implementation of a mental process is insufficient to take the invention out of the realm of abstract ideas. Versata Dev. Grp. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Courts have examined claims that required the use of a computer and still found that the underlying, patent-ineligible invention could be performed via pen and paper or in a person’s mind.”); Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 (“Stating an abstract idea while adding the words ‘apply it with a computer’” is insufficient to confer eligibility.). Further, the Specification does not provide additional details about the general purpose computer that would transform it into a specific computing device for converting input data from one form to another. Although we do not dispute that the processing circuitry includes specific instructions for performing the recited functions, Appellant has not explained persuasively how the derived content transforms the received data into a new state or thing. See MPEP § 2106.05(a). Rather, the claims merely adapt the mental process of calculating input data into an equivalent output performance data, and subsequently displaying the performance data. See Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Our prior cases have made clear that mere automation of manual processes using generic computers does not constitute a patentable improvement in computer technology.”); see also Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can. (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (A computer “employed only for its most basic function . . . does not impose meaningful limits on the scope of those claims.”). Appeal 2022-001864 Application 16/468,803 12 Further, Appellant’s identified improvements are to the abstract idea itself, not improvements to a technology or computer functionality. That is, the additional elements do not improve the functionality of the general purpose computer system, nor do they achieve an improved technological result in conventional industry practice. See McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am., Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Thus, we agree with the Examiner that the claims do not recite an additional element reflecting an improvement in the functioning of a computer, or an improvement to other technology or technical field. Ans. 7-8; see Diehr, 450 U.S. at 175; DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1258-59 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015). As correctly noted by the Examiner, the claims do not recite an additional element that implements the abstract idea with a particular machine or manufacture that is integral to the claim. Id. Instead, the claim limitations only recite result-based functional steps that do not describe how to achieve the performance enhancement of an AC heat exchanger/filter in a non-abstract way. Ans. 7-8; see RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co., 855 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2017); CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1375. Prior to the Internet, such activities were widely practiced, and became computerized to facilitate conversion of input data into an equivalent output performance data, which is subsequently displayed. See OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Because the claimed subject matter outlined above does not (1) provide any technical solution to a technical problem as required by Appeal 2022-001864 Application 16/468,803 13 DDR Holdings7; (2) provide any particular practical application as required by BASCOM8; or (3) entail an unconventional technological solution to a technological problem as required by Amdocs, 9 we agree with the Examiner’s determination that Appellant’s claims 6 and 11 are directed to an abstract idea that is not integrated into a practical application. Alice/Mayo-Step 2B (Inventive Concept) Turning to step 2B of the 2019 PEG, we look to whether the claim: (a) recites a specific limitation or combination of limitations that are not well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the field; or (b) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. 2019 PEG at 56; see Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (“[W]e consider the elements of each claim both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’” to determine whether the claim includes “significantly more” than the ineligible concept); see also BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1350 (“[A]n inventive concept can be found in the non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of known, conventional pieces.”). 7 The Federal Circuit found DDR’s claims are patent-eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because DDR’s claims: (1) do not merely recite “the performance of some business practice known from the pre-Internet world” previously disclosed in Bilski and Alice; but instead (2) provide a technical solution to a technical problem unique to the Internet, i.e., a “solution . . . necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer networks.” DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1257. 8 See BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 9 See Amdocs Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Appeal 2022-001864 Application 16/468,803 14 We discern no additional element or combination of elements recited in Appellant’s independent claims 6 and 11 that contain any “inventive concept” or add anything “significantly more” to transform the abstract concept into a patent-eligible application. Alice, 573 U.S. at 221. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s remarks, noted above, alleging the claims are directed to a non-routine and unconventional system because it recites a new method for estimating the amount of dirt in the heat exchange/filter to determine whether the filter needs to be cleaned. Appellant has failed to establish on this record how converting input data into equivalent output performance data is distinguished from the conventional processor- implemented calculation of data. We agree with the Examiner that using generic processing circuitry is a routine and conventional approach to performing mathematical data calculations. Ans. 10-11. Further, Appellant does not direct our attention to any portion of the Specification indicating that the claimed processing circuitry performs anything other than well- understood, routine, and conventional functions, such as receiving, processing, and displaying data. See Elec. Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Nothing in the claims, understood in light of the specification, requires anything other than off-the-shelf, conventional computer, network, and display technology for gathering, sending, and presenting the desired information.”); see also Alice, 573 U.S. at 224-26 (receiving, storing, and sending information over networks insufficient to add an inventive concept); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“That a computer receives and sends the information over a network-with no further specification-is not even arguably inventive.”). Instead, Appellant’s claimed subject matter simply Appeal 2022-001864 Application 16/468,803 15 uses a generic processing circuitry to perform the abstract idea of converting input data from one form to another, and displaying the result. As noted above, the use of a generic computer does not alone transform an otherwise abstract idea into patent-eligible subject matter. As our reviewing court has observed, “after Alice, there can remain no doubt: recitation of generic computer limitations does not make an otherwise ineligible claim patent- eligible.” DDR, 773 F.3d at 1256 (citing Alice, 573 U.S. at 223). Because the discussed claim elements only recite generic computer functions that were well-understood, routine, and conventional, individually and in combination, the claim is devoid of an inventive concept. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. “[T]he ‘inventive concept’ [under the second part of the Mayo/Alice test] cannot be the abstract idea itself” and “Berkheimer . . . leave[s] untouched the numerous cases from [the Federal Circuit] which have held claims ineligible because the only alleged ‘inventive concept’ is the abstract idea.” Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 890 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Moore, J., concurring). “It has been clear since Alice that a claimed invention’s use of the ineligible concept to which it is directed cannot supply the inventive concept that renders the invention ‘significantly more’ than that ineligible concept.” BSG Tech LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018). We, therefore, agree with the Examiner that the computer functions recited in the claims were, in fact, generic, and numerous precedent establishes that using a generic computer to expedite and automate processes traditionally performed manually, or that are otherwise abstract, was a well-understood, routine, and conventional use of such computers. Ans. 10-11; see also e.g., Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (utilizing an Appeal 2022-001864 Application 16/468,803 16 intermediary computer to forward information); Bancorp, 687 F.3d at 1278 (“The computer required by some of Bancorp’s claims is employed only for its most basic function, the performance of repetitive calculations, and as such does not impose meaningful limits on the scope of those claims.”). Therefore, we conclude that claim 6’s and 11’s elements, both individually and as an ordered combination, do not provide an inventive concept. See 2019 PEG at 56; see also Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“The limitations amount to no more than performing the abstract idea of parsing and comparing data with conventional computer components.”); Bancorp, 687 F.3d at 1278 (“[T]he use of a computer in an otherwise patent-ineligible process for no more than its most basic function-making calculations or computations-fails to circumvent the prohibition against patenting abstract ideas and mental processes.”). To the extent Appellant argues the claims necessarily contain an “inventive concept” based on their alleged novelty or non-obviousness over the cited references, Appellant misapprehends the controlling precedent. Although the second part in the Alice/Mayo framework is termed a search for an “inventive concept,” the analysis is not an evaluation of novelty or non-obviousness, but, rather, a search for “an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217-18 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. 72-73). A novel and nonobvious claim directed to a purely abstract idea is, nonetheless, patent- ineligible. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90. Appeal 2022-001864 Application 16/468,803 17 In many cases, “relying on a computer to perform routine tasks more quickly or more accurately is insufficient to render a claim patent eligible.” OIP Techs., 788 F.3d at 1363 (citing Alice, 573 U.S. at 224) (“[U]se of a computer to create electronic records, track multiple transactions, and issue simultaneous instructions” is not an inventive concept.); see also, e.g., Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank, 792 F.3d at 1370 (“[M]erely adding computer functionality to increase the speed or efficiency of the process does not confer patent eligibility on an otherwise abstract idea.”). Therefore, the functions recited in independent claims 6 and 11 do not add meaningful limitations beyond generally linking the abstract idea to the particular technological environment. See Ans. 9-11. Because Appellant’s claims 6 and 11 are directed to a patent-ineligible abstract concept and do not recite something “significantly more” under the second prong of the Alice analysis, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claims 6 and 11 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Regarding dependent claims 7-10 and 12-15, Appellant has not presented separate patentability arguments or has reiterated substantially the same arguments as those previously discussed for the patentability of claims 1 and 11. As such, claims 7-10 and 12-15 fall therewith. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). VI. CONCLUSION We affirm the Examiner’s patent eligibility rejection of claims 6-15 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. DECISION SUMMARY In summary: Appeal 2022-001864 Application 16/468,803 18 Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 6-15 101 Eligibility 6-15 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED