Dennis E. Brooks, Complainant,v.Pete Geren, Secretary, Department of the Army, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMay 15, 2008
0120064959 (E.E.O.C. May. 15, 2008)

0120064959

05-15-2008

Dennis E. Brooks, Complainant, v. Pete Geren, Secretary, Department of the Army, Agency.


Dennis E. Brooks,

Complainant,

v.

Pete Geren,

Secretary,

Department of the Army,

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120064959

Agency No. ARHQOSA03MAY0093

DECISION

On August 27, 2006, complainant filed an appeal from the agency's July

20, 2006, final decision concerning his equal employment opportunity

(EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of

the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended,

29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq. The appeal is deemed timely and is accepted

pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). For the following reasons, the

Commission AFFIRMS the agency's final decision.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, complainant worked

as a paralegal specialist at the agency's Legal Services Agency in the

Office of the Judge Advocate in Arlington, Virginia. On August 12, 2003,

complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that he was discriminated

against on the basis of age (54 years old) and in reprisal for prior

protected EEO activity (arising under an EEO statute that was unspecified

in the record) when:

1. On or about May 2, 2003, complainant's Senior Rater, the Colonel,

issued complainant a Senior System Civilian Evaluation Report for the

period of November 1, 2001 through October 31, 2002, with an overall

performance rating of Level 4 (Fair). Complainant contends that the

rating should be at least Level 3 (Successful); and

2. In February 2002, the Colonel failed to take any action regarding

complainant's request that the Colonel review his position description

and assigned duties. Complainant did not believe that his position as

a GS-0950-09 Paralegal Specialist was accurately classified.

In a letter dated November 19, 2003, the agency accepted claim 1 for

investigation and dismissed claim 2 on the grounds that claim 2 was

initiated by untimely EEO counselor contact. At the conclusion of

the investigation of claim 1, complainant was provided with a copy

of the report of investigation and notice of his right to request a

hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). When complainant did

not request a hearing within the time frame provided in 29 C.F.R. �

1614.108(f), the agency issued a final decision on claim 1, pursuant

to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(b). The decision concluded that complainant

failed to prove that he was subjected to discrimination as alleged.

Specifically, the agency found that complainant failed to establish

prima facie cases of reprisal or age discrimination. The agency further

determined that complainant failed to prove that the its articulated

non-discriminatory reasons for its actions were pretext for unlawful

discrimination or reprisal. Complainant did not submit a statement on

appeal, and the agency requests that we affirm its final decision.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant

to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(b), the agency's decision is subject to de novo

review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). See EEOC Management

Directive 110, Chapter 9, � VI.A. (November 9, 1999). (explaining that

the de novo standard of review "requires that the Commission examine

the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the

previous decision maker," and that EEOC "review the documents, statements,

and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions

of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission's

own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law").

Claim 1

In a claim such as the instant one which alleges disparate treatment,

and where there is an absence of direct evidence of such discrimination,

the allocation of burdens and order of presentation of proof is a

three-step process. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530

U.S. 133, 142 (2000) (applying the analytical framework described in

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973), to an ADEA

disparate treatment claim). First, complainant must establish a prima

facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained,

reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination; i.e., that a

prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action.

Complainant can establish a prima facie case of reprisal discrimination

by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to

an inference of discrimination. Shapiro v. Social Security Admin.,

EEOC Request No. 05960403 (Dec. 6, 1996) (citing McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). Specifically, in a reprisal

claim, and in accordance with the burdens set forth in McDonnell

Douglas, Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation for Experimental Biology,

425 F. Supp. 318, 324 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976),

and Coffman v. Department of Veteran Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05960473

(November 20, 1997), a complainant may establish a prima facie case

of reprisal by showing that: (1) he engaged in a protected activity;

(2) the agency was aware of the protected activity; (3) subsequently,

he was subjected to adverse treatment by the agency; and (4) a nexus

exists between the protected activity and the adverse treatment.

Whitmire v. Department of the Air Force, EEOC Appeal No. 01A00340

(September 25, 2000).

The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Department of Community

Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the agency has

articulated such a reason, the question becomes whether the proffered

explanation was the true reason for the agency's action, or merely

a pretext for discrimination. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509

U.S. 502, 511 (1993). Although the burden of production, in other words,

"going forward," may shift, the burden of persuasion, by a preponderance

of the evidence, remains at all times on complainant. Burdine, 450

U.S. at 256.

In this case, complainant failed to establish that he was treated less

favorably than a significantly younger similarly situated employee.

Complainant, a civilian employee, cited a staff sergeant as a comparator,

but this employee is an active duty soldier who has a different

supervisor than complainant. We conclude that complainant failed to

provide any evidence from which an inference of age discrimination

could be established. Therefore, we find that the agency properly

found that complainant failed to establish a prima facie case of age

discrimination.

With respect to reprisal, complainant established that he engaged

in prior activity when he filed EEO complaints in July 2002 and

September 2002 regarding matters that occurred while he was employed in

Germany. Those complaints were closed in August 2002 and November 2002.

Complainant alleges that the Colonel and supervisor who gave him a "fair"

rating were aware of his prior EEO activity after he inquired about the

status of his previous EEO complaints. However, we are not persuaded

that complainant has established the requisite nexus between his previous

EEO activity and the instant matter, which involves management officials

who were not involved in his prior EEO activity. Thus, we find that

the agency properly found that complainant failed to establish a prima

facie case of reprisal.

Moreover, we find that the agency articulated legitimate,

non-discriminatory reasons for its actions. Specifically, the agency

stated that complainant received a "fair" evaluation rating because

complainant failed to provide accurate and timely data regarding the

status of Public Financial Disclosure Reports (SF-278). Complainant

failed to provide any persuasive evidence that the agency's articulated

reason is a pretext for unlawful discrimination or reprisal. Consequently,

we find that the agency properly found no discrimination with respect

to claim 1.

Claim 2

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.105(a)(1) require that complaints of

discrimination should be brought to the attention of the Equal Employment

Opportunity Counselor within forty-five (45) days of the date of the

matter alleged to be discriminatory or, in the case of a personnel action,

within forty-five (45) days of the effective date of the action. The

Commission has adopted a "reasonable suspicion" standard (as opposed to a

"supportive facts" standard) to determine when the forty-five (45) day

limitation period is triggered. See Howard v. Department of the Navy,

EEOC Request No. 05970852 (February 11, 1999). Thus, the time limitation

is not triggered until a complainant reasonably suspects discrimination,

but before all the facts that support a charge of discrimination have

become apparent.

EEOC Regulations provide that the agency or the Commission shall extend

the time limits when the individual shows that he was not notified of the

time limits and was not otherwise aware of them, that he did not know

and reasonably should not have known that the discriminatory matter or

personnel action occurred, that despite due diligence he was prevented

by circumstances beyond his control from contacting the Counselor within

the time limits, or for other reasons considered sufficient by the agency

or the Commission.

Claim 2 concerns matters that occurred in February 2002. The record

reveals that complainant did not initiate EEO counselor contact until May

12, 2003, well beyond the 45-day time limit. Complainant has not made

any argument that would warrant a waiver or extension of the applicable

time limits. Consequently, we find that the agency properly dismissed

claim 2 on the basis of untimely counselor contact.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, based on a thorough review of the record, the Commission

affirms the agency's final decision.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0408)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0408)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0408)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your

time in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil

action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph

above ("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

__May 15, 2008________________

Date

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0120064959

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P. O. Box 19848

Washington, D.C. 20036

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0120064959

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