Delores E. Dean, Complainant, v. Donna E. Shalala, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, Agency.

8 Cited authorities

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
411 U.S. 792 (1973) Cited 53,293 times 96 Legal Analyses
Holding in employment discrimination case that statistical evidence of employer's general policy and practice may be relevant circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent behind individual employment decision
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks
509 U.S. 502 (1993) Cited 12,401 times 8 Legal Analyses
Holding that a trier of fact may infer discrimination upon rejecting an employer's proffered reason for termination
Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine
450 U.S. 248 (1981) Cited 20,221 times 9 Legal Analyses
Holding in the Title VII context that the plaintiff's prima facie case creates "a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption" that shifts the burden of proof to the employer, and "if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff"
Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters
438 U.S. 567 (1978) Cited 2,182 times 4 Legal Analyses
Holding that a district court was "entitled to consider the racial mix of the work force when trying to make the determination as to motivation" in the employment discrimination context
Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation
82 F.3d 157 (7th Cir. 1996) Cited 295 times
Holding that a race discrimination plaintiff need not establish he was replaced by a member of a different race but the "question instead is whether the plaintiff has established a logical reason to believe that the decision rests on a legally forbidden ground"
Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation for Experimental Biology
545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976) Cited 249 times 3 Legal Analyses
Holding that, in balancing the scope of reasonable opposition conduct, "[t]he requirements of the job and the tolerable limits of conduct in a particular setting must be explored"
Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation, Etc.
425 F. Supp. 318 (D. Mass. 1976) Cited 87 times
Holding that discharge six months after EEOC settlement and a month after an informal complaint satisfies causation requirement
Thompkins v. Morris Brown College
752 F.2d 558 (11th Cir. 1985) Cited 61 times
Holding that college president's statement that he saw no reason for a woman to have a second job and statement that males had families and needs that female plaintiff did not constitute direct evidence

Delores E. Dean, Complainant, v. Donna E. Shalala, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, Agency.

8 Cited authorities

Holding in employment discrimination case that statistical evidence of employer's general policy and practice may be relevant circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent behind individual employment decision

Holding that a trier of fact may infer discrimination upon rejecting an employer's proffered reason for termination

Holding in the Title VII context that the plaintiff's prima facie case creates "a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption" that shifts the burden of proof to the employer, and "if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff"

Holding that a district court was "entitled to consider the racial mix of the work force when trying to make the determination as to motivation" in the employment discrimination context

Holding that a race discrimination plaintiff need not establish he was replaced by a member of a different race but the "question instead is whether the plaintiff has established a logical reason to believe that the decision rests on a legally forbidden ground"

Holding that, in balancing the scope of reasonable opposition conduct, "[t]he requirements of the job and the tolerable limits of conduct in a particular setting must be explored"

Holding that discharge six months after EEOC settlement and a month after an informal complaint satisfies causation requirement

Holding that college president's statement that he saw no reason for a woman to have a second job and statement that males had families and needs that female plaintiff did not constitute direct evidence