David L. Dollison, Sr., )

8 Cited authorities

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
411 U.S. 792 (1973) Cited 53,667 times 99 Legal Analyses
Holding in employment discrimination case that statistical evidence of employer's general policy and practice may be relevant circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent behind individual employment decision
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks
509 U.S. 502 (1993) Cited 12,459 times 8 Legal Analyses
Holding that a trier of fact may infer discrimination upon rejecting an employer's proffered reason for termination
Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine
450 U.S. 248 (1981) Cited 20,322 times 9 Legal Analyses
Holding in the Title VII context that the plaintiff's prima facie case creates "a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption" that shifts the burden of proof to the employer, and "if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff"
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins
490 U.S. 228 (1989) Cited 4,668 times 164 Legal Analyses
Holding that an employer discriminated on the basis of sex when he "act[ed] on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be"
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody
422 U.S. 405 (1975) Cited 2,640 times 6 Legal Analyses
Holding that an employment policy cannot stand if another policy, "without a similarly undesirable racial effect, would also serve the employer's legitimate interest"
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank Tr.
487 U.S. 977 (1988) Cited 1,406 times 7 Legal Analyses
Holding that plaintiff has burden to show that a particular employment practice "caused the exclusion of applicants for jobs or promotions because of their membership in a protected group"
Loeb v. Textron, Inc.
600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979) Cited 721 times
Denying any such requirement
Wilson v. Firestone Tire Rubber Co.
932 F.2d 510 (6th Cir. 1991) Cited 154 times
Holding that the prima facie question is not reviewed "since the matter proceeded to trial"

David L. Dollison, Sr., )

8 Cited authorities

Holding in employment discrimination case that statistical evidence of employer's general policy and practice may be relevant circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent behind individual employment decision

Holding that a trier of fact may infer discrimination upon rejecting an employer's proffered reason for termination

Holding in the Title VII context that the plaintiff's prima facie case creates "a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption" that shifts the burden of proof to the employer, and "if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff"

Holding that an employer discriminated on the basis of sex when he "act[ed] on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be"

Holding that an employment policy cannot stand if another policy, "without a similarly undesirable racial effect, would also serve the employer's legitimate interest"

Holding that plaintiff has burden to show that a particular employment practice "caused the exclusion of applicants for jobs or promotions because of their membership in a protected group"

Denying any such requirement

Holding that the prima facie question is not reviewed "since the matter proceeded to trial"