01A32647_r
09-16-2003
Darlene McGuire, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Great Lakes Area), Agency.
Darlene McGuire v. United States Postal Service
01A32647
September 16, 2003
.
Darlene McGuire,
Complainant,
v.
John E. Potter,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service,
(Great Lakes Area),
Agency.
Appeal No. 01A32647
Agency No. 1-J-603-0016-01
Hearing No. 210-A2-6213X
DECISION
Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final order
concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of unlawful
employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. and
Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405. For the following reasons, the Commission affirms
the agency's final order.
The record reveals that complainant, a mail processing machine operator
at the agency's South Suburban Processing and Distribution Center in
Bedford Park, Illinois facility, filed a formal EEO complaint on January
18, 2001, alleging that the agency harassed and discriminated against
her on the bases of race (African-American), color (dark complexion),
sex (female), disability and in reprisal for prior EEO activity when:
(1) On November 7, 2000, complainant's immediate supervisor gave her a
direct order to start her machine and threatened to escort her out of
the facility if she failed to comply;
On March 8, 2001, complainant's supervisor sent her home after she
declined to accept a limited duty job offer; and
On March 15, 2002, complainant's supervisor snatched a tray from
her hand.
In a deposition, complainant testified that after her machine
malfunctioned on November 7, 2000, her supervisor ordered her to
reactivate her machine. Complainant maintained that when she questioned
how she could turn on the machine afer it jammed, her supervisor responded
that he would escort complainant out of the building and take her off the
clock if she did not turn it on. Complainant stated that her supervisor
subsequently took her off the clock for ten minutes and escorted her to
the tour office, but a supervisor ordered her supervisor to place her
back on the clock.
Regarding claim (2), complainant alleged that management sent her home
early on March 8, 2001, after she refused to accept a limited duty
job offer. Complainant stated the time was charged as annual leave.
Regarding claim (3), complainant alleged that while sitting at a table,
the supervisor "snuck up" on the her side and "snatched" her work tray.
Complainant maintained that her hands were scraped when the supervisor
snatched the tray from her hands.
At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant received a copy
of the investigative report and requested a hearing before an EEOC
Administrative Judge (AJ). On September 4, 2002, the agency moved for
a decision without a hearing. On February 13, 2003, the AJ issued a
decision without a hearing, finding no discrimination.
Specifically, the AJ concluded that complainant failed to provide any
evidence from which a prima facie case of race/color, sex, disability
discrimination or reprisal could be established for any of her claims.
The AJ concluded further concluded that even considering the alleged
actions together as a harassment claim, the matters were not severe or
pervasive enough to constitute a hostile work environment.
The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a
hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material
fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the
summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment
is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive
legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists
no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment,
a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine
whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of
the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and
all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor.
Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that
a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party.
Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital
Equip. Corp., 846 F.2D 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material"
if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. If a case
can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, the issuance of
a decision without a hearing is not appropriate. In the context of
an administrative proceeding, an AJ may properly consider issuing a
decision without a hearing only upon a determination that the record
has been adequately developed for summary disposition. See Petty
v. Department of Defense, EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003).
In this matter, we find that the issuance of a decision without a hearing
was appropriate because complainant did not establish a threshold
prima facie case of unlawful discrimination or reprisal for any of
her claims. The burden of proof in discrimination cases is generally
allocated according to the standards established in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-805 (1973). Initially, complainant
must establish a prima facie case of discrimination by demonstrating,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that she was subjected to an adverse
employment action under circumstances which, if left unexplained, raise an
inference of unlawful motivation. Texas Department of Community Affairs
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).<1> Here, complainant failed to
present any similarly situated employees outside of her protected classes
who were treated more favorably than she under similar circumstances,
nor any other evidence from which an inference of unlawful discrimination
or reprisal could be inferred.<2> Finally, construing complainant's
complaint as a hostile work environment claim, we find that the alleged
matters are not sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute a hostile
work environment.
Therefore, after a careful review of the record, the Commission finds
that the issuance of a decision without a hearing was appropriate, as
no genuine dispute of material fact exists. Further, construing the
evidence to be most favorable to complainant, we find that complainant
failed to present evidence that any of the agency's actions were motivated
by discriminatory animus toward complainant's protected classes.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0701)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as
the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
__September 16, 2003________________
Date
1For the purposes of analysis, we assume without finding that complainant
established that she is a qualified individual with a disability and
is entitled to coverage under the Rehabilitation Act.
2We note that complainant alleges that a black female with a lighter
complexion was treated more favorably because management failed to notice
that the lighter complexioned employee was absent from her machine during
the November 7, 2000 incident. However, we note that this employee was
not similarly situated to complainant because this employee was allegedly
absent from her machine, whereas complainant's supervisor cited her for
failing to restart her machine after being instructed to do so. Moreover,
the proferred comparative is of the same sex and race as complainant,
and there is no evidence regarding the comparative's prior EEO activity
or disability status.