Complainant,v.Eric K. Shinseki, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.Download PDFEqual Employment Opportunity CommissionFeb 12, 20150120121517 (E.E.O.C. Feb. 12, 2015) Copy Citation U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 , Complainant, v. Eric K. Shinseki, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency. Appeal No. 0120121517 Hearing No. 510-2010-00351X Agency No. 200I-0573-2009104813 DECISION Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405, the Commission accepts Complainant’s appeal from the Agency’s January 12, 2012 final decision concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq. The Commission’s review is de novo. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the FAD. BACKGROUND At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a Police Officer at the Agency’s VA North Florida/South Georgia Healthcare System in Gainesville, Florida. On August 25, 2008, Complainant was injured when his weapon discharged while he was driving. Complainant claimed that he was reaching for his weapon while driving and drifted off the road, causing the gun to discharge and a bullet to graze his left hand. Complainant had surgery on his hand and was out from work from August 26, 2008 to October 20, 2008. On October 20, 2008, Complainant’s doctor released him to work light duty. Complainant was assigned to an Evening Police Dispatcher position as light duty. Complainant had a second surgery on his hand in December 2008, and was out of work for four weeks. According to Complainant, his doctor verbally released him to work light duty on January 6, 2009. Complainant claims that he advised his second-level supervisor (S2) that he had been released for light duty; however, he failed to provide any documentation in support. As a result, S2 informed him that Complainant would have to undergo a fitness-for-duty examination (FFDE) before returning to work. In addition, S2 had concerns about a series of 0120121517 2 “very bizarre and incriminating statements” Complainant had made, including that he was being sued and/or under investigation for child molestation and other disturbing statements. Complainant was examined by the Employee Health Physician (P1). Based on Complainant’s self-inflicted gunshot wound, P1 believed it would be reasonable to include a psychological assessment to determine whether Complainant was “psychologically equipped” to handle a firearm. Complainant was referred to the doctor (P2), who previously conducted his annual examinations to conduct the psychological evaluation. On February 4, 2009, P2 conducted the psychological examination. P2 expressed reservations about Complainant’s emotional stability and suitability to be a police officer. P2 noted that Complainant had a “long history of interpersonal conflict, difficulty managing anger and legal entanglements that reflect disregard for the law or poor judgment.” P2 recommended to P1 that Complainant might be better suited for a different work area, but not to return as a police officer. On February 4, 2009, Complainant’s own doctor released him to return to full-duty, and Complainant provided documentation to the Agency. On March 18, 2009, Complainant was detailed to the Acquisition and Material Management Service (AMMS) pending completion of the investigation as to whether he should be removed for failure to maintain position requirements. On April 13, 2009, Complainant submitted to a private FFDE. On April 16, 2009, the private FFDE psychologist (P3) concluded that Complainant was fit for duty and that he should be allowed to have “full police powers” once his hand injury was medically cleared. On April 27, 2009, S2 issued Complainant a proposed removal for failure to maintain the position requirements of a police officer position following an unfit-for-duty finding after a FFDE. On March 10, 2010, Complainant was informed that the proposed removal would be reduced to a reassignment to a Supply Technician position in AMMS. While assigned to AMMS, Complainant alleged that the Service Chief harassed him. Complainant claimed that he contacted the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) to investigate false statements contained in his FFDE. Complainant claimed that he and another employee were assigned to go to Jacksonville to look for lost inventory and that he planned to see an FBI agent on his lunch break. Complainant stated that when he informed the Service Chief that he had something to do on his lunch break, the Service Chief insisted that a third employee join Complainant and the other individual on the trip. In addition, Complainant claimed that the Service Chief told him that he was going to start a sign-in/sign-out sheet for him. On December 21, 2009 (and twice amended), Complainant filed a formal complaint. In his complaint, Complainant alleged that the Agency discriminated against him and subjected him to a hostile work environment on the basis of disability when: 1. On January 6, 2009, after he was released by his doctor to return to work in a light- duty status, his supervisor (S2) informed him that there were no light duty positions available; 2. On January 15, 2009, management required him to undergo a FFDE; and 0120121517 3 3. On February 4, 2009, he was not allowed to return to work even though his doctor approved him to return to full-duty status. Further, Complainant alleged that the Agency discriminated against him and subjected him to a hostile work environment in reprisal for his prior protected EEO activity as evidenced by multiple incidents including, inter alia, he was detailed from his Police Officer position to a position in AMMS; he received a proposed removal; management directed a co-worker to accompany Complainant and another employee to the Jacksonville Outpatient Clinic; the Service Chief told him he was going to “start a sign-in/sign-out sheet” to keep track of Complainant’s whereabouts; and he was reassigned “to another position, of the same grade and pay” within AMMS at the Ocala Community Based Outpatient Clinic and later to The Villages Outpatient Clinic, effective March 15, 2010.1 At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation (ROI) and notice of his right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge. Complainant timely requested a hearing, but subsequently withdrew his request. Consequently, the Agency issued a FAD pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b). In the FAD, the Agency initially assumed arguendo that Complainant established a prima facie case of disability discrimination and reprisal. The Agency determined that management articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. As to his claim that he was not allowed to return to duty in February 2009, S2 affirmed that Complainant had not been cleared by P1. S2 explained that it was routine procedure for police officers who had been off from work for an extended period of time to be cleared by P1 before they can return to work, and Complainant had been absent from work for three to four months. Further, S2 stated that Complainant exhibited “very bizarre and incriminating behavior” including making statements that he was under investigation for child molestation and other disturbing comments. S2 believed that an FFDE was necessary. As a result, management decided not to allow Complainant to return to work until after the FFDE was completed. With respect to the detail assignment, S2 confirmed that Complainant was detailed to AMMS in March 2009 because he could not maintain his position as a police officer until his FFDE was resolved. Complainant had run out of leave; therefore, S2 detailed him to AMMS to avoid having to place him on leave without pay. Regarding the reassignment in March 2010, S2 explained that Complainant was permanently reassigned to another position with the same grade and pay because he failed his psychological examination. S2 added that he could not allow Complainant to carry a firearm after he failed the examination. Because he could not carry a firearm, Complainant could not maintain the 1 The Agency dismissed several additional claims as untimely and for failure to state a claim. Complainant raised no challenges to the dismissal of these claims on appeal; therefore, the Commission will not address them in this decision. 0120121517 4 requirements of his Police Officer position. The Labor and Employee Relations Specialist corroborated S2’s explanation. In attempting to establish that management’s reasons for its actions were pretextual, Complainant argued that management officials retaliated against him because he reported an altercation he had at a shooting range with a co-worker. Complainant believed that the co- worker was attempting to get revenge against him. The Agency noted that the activity described by Complainant was not protected EEO activity. In addition, Complainant alleged that management was motivated by vindictiveness and bad faith and that management officials did not like him because of his beard, which he wore because he was unable to shave due to a permanent skin condition. The Agency concluded that Complainant failed to show that management’s actions were pretext for unlawful discrimination and reprisal. Accordingly, the Agency found that Complainant had not been discriminated or retaliated against as alleged. As to Complainant’s hostile work environment claim, the Agency determined that the conduct complained of by Complainant was ordinary work-related conduct that occurred between a supervisor and a subordinate that did not rise to the level of a hostile work environment. For example, the Service Chief stated that he did arrange for a third person to accompany Complainant on his trip to Jacksonville because he was concerned that Complainant would defy his instructions and take care of personal business on official time. Further, the Agency found that there was no evidence that the incidents were based on his protected classes. As a result, the Agency concluded that Complainant had not been subjected to a hostile work environment as alleged. The instant appeal followed. CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL On appeal, Complainant argues that the Agency sent him for the FFDE under false pretenses. Complainant contends that the Agency tried to use his accident as an excuse to justify the FFDE and violated his rights under the Rehabilitation Act. Further, Complainant alleges that the Agency did not follow its policies, regulations, and rules in the processing of the FFDE. Complainant claims that S2 did everything he could to get Complainant out of his service and that the proposed removal was in violation of the Agency’s Master Agreement with the Union. Complainant contends that the evidence shows that the Agency discriminated and retaliated against him and subjected him to a hostile work environment. Accordingly, Complainant requests that the Commission reverse the FAD. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS Disparate Treatment To prevail in a disparate treatment claim such as this, Complainant must satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). He must generally establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that he was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances that would support an 0120121517 5 inference of discrimination. Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). The prima facie inquiry may be dispensed with in this case, however, since the Agency has articulated legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons for its conduct. See U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-17 (1983. To ultimately prevail, Complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Agency's explanation is a pretext for discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133. 143 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502. 519 (1993); Tx. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine , 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981). In the instant case assuming arguendo that Complainant established a prima facie case of reprisal and disability discrimination, the Commission finds that the Agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. Specifically, as to issues related to Complainant’s return to work, Complainant suffered a self-inflicted gunshot wound in August 2008, and was cleared to return to work by his doctor after a second surgery in January 2009. S2 affirmed that since Complainant had been out for an extended time, he needed to be cleared by the Employee Health Physician prior to returning to work even though he had been cleared by his own doctor. Id. at 229. In addition, management was concerned with Complainant’s explanation for the self-inflicted gunshot wound, and he had made a series of bizarre and incriminating statements over a period of time. Id. at 229-31. Based on these circumstances, management would not allow Complainant to return to work until he passed a FFDE. Id. at 229-30. When Complainant failed the FFDE, management issued Complainant a Notice of Proposed Removal based on his failure to maintain the requirements of the police officer position. Id . at 367-68. Complainant was subsequently detailed to AMMS (and later the Villages Outpatient Clinic) with his regular pay. Complainant now bears the burden of establishing that the Agency's stated reasons are merely a pretext for discrimination. EEOC Request No. 05960403 (Dec. 6, 1996). Complainant can do this directly by showing that the Agency's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. Tx. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine , 450 U.S. at 256. As Complainant withdrew his request for a hearing, the Commission does not have the benefit of an Administrative Judge's credibility determinations after a hearing. Therefore, the Commission can only evaluate the facts based on the weight of the evidence presented. The Commission finds that the record lacks persuasive evidence that Complainant's protected classes were factors in any of the Agency's actions. At all times, the ultimate burden remains with Complainant to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the Agency's reasons were not the real reasons and that the Agency acted on the basis of discriminatory or retaliatory animus. Complainant failed to carry this burden. As a result, the Commission finds that Complainant has not established that he was subjected to discrimination or reprisal as alleged. 0120121517 6 Fitness for Duty Examination Next, the Commission will determine whether the Agency violated the Rehabilitation Act by sending Complainant for an FFDE. The Commission notes that whether Complainant is an individual with a disability is irrelevant to the issue of whether the Agency properly ordered him to undergo a FFDE because the Rehabilitation Act's limitations regarding disability-related inquiries and medical examinations apply to all employees. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Disability-Related Inquiries and Medical Examinations of Employees Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (Enforcement Guidance on Disability-Related Inquiries), No. 915.002 (July 27, 2000). The inquiry may be made or the examination ordered only if it is job-related and consistent with business necessity. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.13(b), 1630.14(c). This means that the employer must have a reasonable belief based on objective evidence that an employee will be unable to perform the essential functions of his job or pose a direct threat because of a medical condition. EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Disability-Related Inquiries, Notice No. 915.002 (July 27, 2000), at Q.5. Objective evidence is reliable information, either directly observed or provided by a credible third party, that an employee may have or has a medical condition that will interfere with his ability to perform essential job functions or will result in direct threat. Id. It is the burden of the employer to show that its disability-related inquiries and requests for medical examination are job-related and consistent with business necessity. See Cerge v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec. , EEOC Appeal No. 0120060363 (Oct. 9, 2007). Here, as discussed above, the record reveals that management sent Complainant for the FFDE based on multiple reasons. First, S2 affirmed that Agency policy required Complainant to be cleared by the Agency’s Employee Health Physician before returning to work because he had been out an extended period of time. ROI, at 229. In addition, S2 stated that Agency management had concerns about the circumstances surrounding Complainant’s accident and his explanation of the accident. Id. at 231, 309. Further, S2 was concerned about a series of “very bizarre and incriminating” statements Complainant made sometime prior to his accident that he had been accused of child molestation, that he was accused of passing a sexually- transmitted disease to his own child, that he had been questioned by his wife regarding an incestuous affair with his daughter, and other statements related to oral sex and his daughter. Id. at 230. S2 noted that Complainant repeated these statements over the course of several months. Id. Thus, based on the totality of this evidence, management sent Complainant for an FFDE, which subsequently found that he was unfit for duty as a police officer. Id . at 319. The Commission finds that there was nothing unlawful about the FFDE as the Agency has established that S2 ordered the FFDE based upon objective evidence that Complainant may have been unfit to carry a weapon and therefore unable to perform the essential functions of his job. Hostile Work Environment Harassment of an employee that would not occur but for the employee's race, color, sex, national origin, age, disability, religion or prior EEO activity is unlawful, if it is sufficiently patterned or pervasive. Wibstad v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01972699 (Aug. 14, 0120121517 7 1998) (citing McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1138-39 (D.C. Cir. 1985)); EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. at 3, 9 (Mar. 8, 1994). In determining that a working environment is hostile, factors to consider are the frequency of the alleged discriminatory conduct, its severity, whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, and if it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance. See Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); Enforcement Guidance at 6. The Supreme Court has stated that: “Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile work environment - an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive - is beyond Title VII's purview.” Harris , 510 U.S. at 22 (1993). Here, Complainant asserted that based on his protected classes, he was subjected to a hostile work environment. Complainant has cited incidents where Agency management took actions which seemed adverse or disruptive to him. However, the Commission finds that Complainant has not established that the alleged incidents were based on his protected classes. As discussed above, the Agency provided legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the events related to the FFDE, Complainant’s proposed removal, and his detail to AMMS. Finally, with respect to the claims while detailed to AMMS, the Service Chief affirmed that he sent an NX Technician to accompany Complainant to Jacksonville because Complainant had mentioned that he intended to visit a U.S. Attorney for personal business while on an assignment there. ROI, at 216. To ensure that Complainant did not improperly use an Agency vehicle to conduct personal business on Agency time, the Service Chief sent another employee with Complainant. Id. In addition, the Service Chief stated that, while he considered instituting a sign-in sheet for all employees, he ultimately decided against doing so. Id . at 218. The Commission finds that there is no persuasive evidence in the record that Complainant’s protected classes played a role in any of the Agency’s actions. As a result, the Commission finds that Complainant has not established that he was subjected to discriminatory or retaliatory harassment. CONCLUSION After a review of the record in its entirety, including consideration of all statements submitted on appeal, it is the decision of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to AFFIRM the Agency’s final decision because the preponderance of the evidence of record does not establish that discrimination occurred. STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0610) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that: 0120121517 8 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency. Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party. Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610) You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610) If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action. Both the request and 0120121517 9 the civil action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above (“Right to File a Civil Action”). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations Date February 12, 2015 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation