Butler Home Products, LLC

12 Cited authorities

  1. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.

    550 U.S. 398 (2007)   Cited 1,559 times   185 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"
  2. In re Huai-Hung Kao

    639 F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2011)   Cited 88 times   16 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a "food effect" was obvious because the effect was an inherent property of the composition
  3. In re O'Farrell

    853 F.2d 894 (Fed. Cir. 1988)   Cited 168 times   9 Legal Analyses
    Finding patent obvious where the prior art provided a "reasonable expectation of success"
  4. In re Am. Academy of Science Tech Ctr.

    367 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2004)   Cited 88 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that descriptions of deficiencies of using mainframe computers set out in the "Background of the Invention" portion of the specification did not exclude mainframes from the definition of "'user computer'" where the "specification as a whole" did not express a clear disavowal of that subject matter
  5. In re Gurley

    27 F.3d 551 (Fed. Cir. 1994)   Cited 102 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Upholding obviousness finding where patent was directed to one of two alternative resins disclosed in prior art reference, even though reference described claimed resin as "inferior."
  6. Velander v. Garner

    348 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2003)   Cited 61 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Reviewing the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences' finding of a reasonable expectation of success under a "substantial evidence" standard
  7. In re De Blauwe

    736 F.2d 699 (Fed. Cir. 1984)   Cited 49 times   1 Legal Analyses

    Appeal No. 84-513. June 8, 1984. Jeffrey G. Sheldon, Pasadena, Cal., argued for appellants. John F. Pitrelli, Arlington, Va., argued for appellee. With him on the brief were Joseph F. Nakamura, Sol., and John W. Dewhirst, Associate Sol., Washington, D.C. Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before BENNETT, Circuit Judge, SKELTON, Senior Circuit Judge, and MILLER, Circuit Judge. JACK R. MILLER, Circuit Judge. This appeal is from that part of the decision of the

  8. Tyco Healthcare Group LP v. Mutual Pharmaceutical Co.

    642 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2011)   Cited 12 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Affirming summary judgment where the "district court acknowledged the product's commercial success but properly found that the evidence as a whole did not overcome [defendant's] strong prima facie case of obviousness."
  9. Application of Lindner

    457 F.2d 506 (C.C.P.A. 1972)   Cited 18 times
    Involving dispersant compositions designed to emulsify solutions such as insecticide
  10. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 186 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"
  11. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  12. Section 1.136 - [Effective until 1/19/2025] Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)