477 U.S. 242 (1986) Cited 241,243 times 39 Legal Analyses
Holding that summary judgment is not appropriate if "the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party"
477 U.S. 317 (1986) Cited 220,634 times 41 Legal Analyses
Holding that a movant's summary judgment motion should be granted "against a [nonmovant] who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial"
530 U.S. 133 (2000) Cited 21,527 times 22 Legal Analyses
Holding that a "trier of fact can reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose"
411 U.S. 792 (1973) Cited 53,199 times 96 Legal Analyses
Holding in employment discrimination case that statistical evidence of employer's general policy and practice may be relevant circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent behind individual employment decision
450 U.S. 248 (1981) Cited 20,199 times 9 Legal Analyses
Holding in the Title VII context that the plaintiff's prima facie case creates "a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption" that shifts the burden of proof to the employer, and "if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff"
460 U.S. 711 (1983) Cited 2,419 times 5 Legal Analyses
Holding that because "[t]here will seldom be `eyewitness' testimony to the employer's mental process," evidence of the employer's discriminatory attitude in general is relevant and admissible to prove discrimination
438 U.S. 567 (1978) Cited 2,179 times 4 Legal Analyses
Holding that a district court was "entitled to consider the racial mix of the work force when trying to make the determination as to motivation" in the employment discrimination context
Holding that where a supervisor makes sexual overtures to employees of both genders, or where the conduct is equally offensive to male and female workers, the conduct may be actionable under state law, but it is not actionable as harassment under Title VII because men and women are accorded like treatment