Asami Yoshida et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 29, 2019

14048927 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jul. 29, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/048,927 10/08/2013 Asami YOSHIDA 11192US03CON PPM-SH 4909
154930 7590 07/29/2019
XSENSUS LLP
200 Daingerfield Road
Suite 201
Alexandria, VA 22314
EXAMINER
NIGH, JAMES D
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3685
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/29/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
Arlene.Hudgens@Xsensus.com
Faith.Baggett@xsensus.com
anaquadocketing@Xsensus.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte ASAMI YOSHIDA and TAKUYA IWAMOTO1

___________

Appeal 2018-000488
Application 14/048,927
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before ALLEN R. MACDONALD, ERIC B. CHEN, and
CYNTHIA L. MURPHY, Administrative Patent Judges.

CHEN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

1 Appellants identify the real party in interest as SONY CORP. (App. Br. 2.)
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This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the final rejection of
claims 41–44, 46–54, 56–58, and 60. Claims 1–40, 45, 55, and 59 have been
cancelled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). An oral hearing
scheduled for June 10, 2019 was waived. We affirm.
This application is a continuation of US RE45696, based on
Application No. 13/299,163, filed November 17, 2011, which is a reissue of
US 7,627,505, based on Application No. 10/325,940, filed December 23,
2002.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants’ invention relates to an activity-area/time-frame weighting
table, which indicates the likelihood of where a user is most likely to be in a
certain time frame, and weighting is set depending on times frames, which
are divided into weekdays and weekends. (Abstract.)
Claim 41 is exemplary, with disputed limitations in italics:
41. An information processing system comprising:
processing circuitry; and
memory storing instructions that when executed by the
processing circuitry cause the processing circuitry[:]
[i] to receive collection data collected by a user
device in a location remote from the information
processing system as user history data,
[ii] select an authentication procedure from a
plurality of authentication procedures based on both the
user history data and information including at least one
of time and a location, and
[iii] execute an authentication by the selected
authentication procedure,
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[iv] wherein the memory further stores instructions
that when executed by the processing circuitry cause the
processing circuitry to register user authentication log
data corresponding to previous authentication
executions, and
[v] further select at least one authentication
procedure based on the user authentication log data.

Claims 41–44, 46–54, 56–58, and 60 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 as directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.
Claims 41–44, 46, 48–54, 56–58, and 60 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as being anticipated by Dickinson (US 7,187,771 B1;
Mar. 6, 2007).
Claim 47 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Dickinson and MacDoran (US 5,757,916; May 26, 1998).

ANALYSIS
§ 101 Rejection
We are unpersuaded by Appellants’ arguments (App. Br. 8–12) that
independent claims 41, 53, and 57 are directed to patent-eligible subject
matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
The Examiner determined that the claims are
similar in nature to claims held by the courts as being directed
towards abstract ideas such as Cybersource (Cybersource Corp.
v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2011))
in which the claims at issue detected fraud in a credit card
transaction based on the gathered transaction and Internet
address data.
(Final Act. 8.) In particular, the Examiner determined that
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[t]he claimed operations are analogous to the mapping of the
credit card numbers in Cybersource where the map was
“denoted by their dates, times, card holder names, card
numbers, IP addresses, transaction amounts, and shipping
addresses” as . . . the [claimed] authentication procedure is
selected based on “the collection data and information including
at least one of a time and a location.”
(Id. at 9.) The Examiner further determined that “[n]o technological
improvement is being made to any of the elements within the claim, nor is
there any improvement realized by the combination of devices” and “no
technological improvement to any external technology is realized by virtue
of the operations recited in the claim.” (Id. at 10.) In particular, the
Examiner determined that “[t]he written disclosure at column 6 line 28
through column 7 line 19 describes only the use of a generic unimproved
computing environment.” (Ans. 11.) We agree with the Examiner’s
determinations and ultimate conclusion that the claims are directed to patent-
ineligible subject matter.
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208,
216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573
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U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
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environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). “A claim
that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that
the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
[abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing]
generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into
a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The PTO recently published revised guidance on the application of
§ 101. USPTO’s 2019 REVISED PATENT SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY
GUIDANCE, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019). Under that guidance, we first
look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed.
2019)).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to
whether the claim:
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(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that are not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
See 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.

Are the claims at issue directed
to a patent-ineligible concept?
Step One
Claim 41 is a system claim, which falls within the “manufacture”
category of 35 U.S.C. § 101. Likewise, claim 53 is a method claim having
several steps, which falls within the “process” category of 35 U.S.C. § 101,
and claim 57 is a computer readable medium claim, which falls within the
“manufacture” category of 35 U.S.C. § 101. Although claims 41, 53, and 57
fall within the statutory categories, we must still determine whether the
claim is directed to a judicial exception, namely an abstract idea. See Alice,
573 U.S. at 217–18. Thus, we must determine whether the claims recite a
judicial exception, and fail to integrate the exception into a practical
application. See 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55. If both elements are satisfied, the
claim is directed to a judicial exception under the first step of the Alice/Mayo
test. See id.

Step 2A, Prong One
Claim 41 is a system claim having a memory for storing instructions,
which can be performed in the human mind or by a human using pen and
paper. See CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366,
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1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (explaining that “unpatentable mental processes”
include “steps [that] can be performed in the human mind, or by a human
using a pen and paper”).
First, claim 41 recites “[i] to receive collection data collected by a
user device in a location . . . as user history data,” which can be performed
by a human reviewing: (1) a database of credit card transactions when a
user device is connected to a home IP address, including the time and day;
and (2) a database of credit card transactions when the user device is
connected to a work IP address, including the time and day. Second,
claim 41 recites “[ii] select an authentication procedure from a plurality of
authentication procedures based on both the user history data and
information including at least one of time and a location,” which can be
performed by a human reviewing credit card transactions from the work IP
address during business hours, or alternatively, reviewing credit card
transactions from the home IP address during nights and weekends. Third,
claim 41 recites “[iii] execute an authentication by the selected
authentication procedure,” which can be performed by a human confirming
that a credit card transaction occurred using the work IP address during
business hours. Last, claim 41 recites “to register user authentication log
data corresponding to previous authentication executions” and “further
select at least one authentication procedure based on the user authentication
log data,” which can be performed by a human by creating a written ledger
of credit card transactions with instructions to continuously confirm that a
credit card transaction occurred using the work IP address during business
hours or the home IP address during nights and weekends.
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Because all the limitations of claim 41 can be performed either by
human thought alone or by a human using pen and paper, claim 41 is
directed to a patent-ineligible abstract idea of mental steps. Claims 53 and
57 recite limitations similar to those discussed with respect to claim 41.
Thus, claims 53 and 57 are also directed to a patent-ineligible abstract idea.

Step 2A—Prong Two
Because claims 41, 53, and 57 are directed to an abstract idea, we next
determine if the claim recites additional elements that integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application.
With respect to the claimed hardware components, system claim 41
recites “memory storing instructions that when executed by the processing
circuitry cause the processing circuitry to receive collection data collected
by a user device in a location remote from the information processing
system as user history data” and “[iv] wherein the memory further stores
instructions that when executed by the processing circuitry cause the
processing circuitry to register user authentication log data corresponding to
previous authentication executions.” Thus, the recited hardware components
of a “memory” and “processing circuitry” are not improved in the claimed
system, but merely serve as tools for performing the abstract idea. See
Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) (“[T]he claims are directed not to an improvement in cellular
telephones but simply to the use of cellular telephones as tools in the aid of a
process focused on an abstract idea”).
Accordingly, claims 41, 53, and 57 do not recite additional elements
that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application.
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Appellants argue:
For instance, the claims in Cybersource were directed to
a method for verifying the validity of a credit card transaction.
The claims were written at a high level of generality and there
was no practical application of the abstract idea of validating.
The present claims are completely different. In particular, the
present claims are directed to a specific and particular technique
and application of selecting an authentication procedure and
then actually executing the authentication.
(App. Br. 8 (emphasis omitted).) Similarly, Appellants argue that “the
Office Action has asserted that the claims are abstract based on being similar
to the claims of Cybersource” and “the present claims are in fact not similar
to the claims of Cybersource.” (Id. at 9.) Contrary to Appellants’
arguments, the Examiner has identified the appropriate judicial exception as
concepts relating to mental steps (e.g., “[t]he claimed operations are
analogous to the mapping of the credit card numbers in Cybersource” (Final
Act. 9)). Moreover, the Examiner has compared the claimed concepts of
independent claim 41 to an appropriate Federal Circuit decision (i.e.,
Cybersource). Accordingly, the Examiner has met the burden of a general
prima facie notice requirement. See In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (“[A]ll that is required of the [Patent] [O]ffice to meet its prima
facie burden of production is to set forth the statutory basis of the rejection
and the reference or references relied upon in a sufficiently articulate and
informative manner as to meet the notice requirement of § 132.” ).
Appellants further argue:
In this case, the present claims are directed to a specific
and particular technique and application of selecting an
authentication procedure and then actually executing the
authentication. The present claims are not directed to simply
moving data around or validating data but are directed to the
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specific steps outlined above. These steps are aimed at
improving and simplifying authentication processing. As such,
the present claims provide an improvement in computer-related
technology.
(App. Br. 12 (emphasis omitted).) However, other than providing
conclusory statements that “[t]hese [claimed] steps are aimed at improving
and simplifying authentication processing” and “provide an improvement in
computer-related technology,” Appellants have not provided any additional
explanation or evidence to support this position. For example, Appellants
have not provided citations to the Specification to demonstrate that the
claimed invention is an improvement of an existing technology or
demonstrated a deficiency in the prior art. See Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft
Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[O]ur conclusion that the
claims are directed to an improvement of an existing technology is bolstered
by the specification’s teachings that the claimed invention achieves other
benefits over conventional databases, such as increased flexibility, faster
search times, and smaller memory requirements”).

Is there something else in the claims
that ensures that they are directed to significantly
more than a patent-ineligible concept?
Because claims 41, 53, and 57 are directed to an abstract idea, the
question to be settled next, according to Alice, is whether these claims recite
an element, or combination of elements, that is enough to ensure that the
claim is directed to significantly more than an abstract idea.
Claim 41 is a system claim, which recites a “memory” and
“processing circuitry.” Claim 53, a corresponding method claim, and
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claim 57, a corresponding computer-readable medium claim, recite a
“computer” having “processing circuitry.”
With respect to the claimed hardware components, the Appellants’
Specification discloses the following:
In accordance with such input signals [instructions entered by
the administrator of the server 11], the CPU 61 executes various
processes. A ROM (read only memory) 65 essentially stores
constant data out of programs and computational parameters
used by the CPU 61. A RAM (random access memory) 66
stores a program used and executed by the CPU 61 and
parameters that vary as appropriate in response to the execution.
The CPU 61, the ROM 65, and the RAM 66 are interconnected
through the internal bus 63.
(Col. 6, ll. 34–42.) The generalized functional terms by which the computer
components are described reasonably indicate that Appellants’ Specification
discloses: (i) a conventional “computer” (e.g., CPU 61); and (ii)
conventional “memory” (e.g., ROM 65 and RAM 66). Appellants’
Specification is silent with respect to “processing circuitry.” In view of
Appellants’ Specification, the claimed hardware components, including the
“memory,” the “processing circuitry,” and the “computer” reasonably may
be determined to be generic, purely conventional computer elements. Thus,
the claims do no more than require generic computer elements to perform an
abstract idea, rather than improve computer capabilities.
Accordingly, appending a conventional “memory,” “processing
circuitry,” and “computer” to an abstract idea is not enough to transform the
abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 223
(“[T]he mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-
ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention”).
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Appellants argue that “the claims clearly include an element, or a
combination of elements, that are sufficient to ensure that the claims amount
to significantly more than the judicial exception.” (App. Br. 12.) However,
other than a conclusory statement that “the claims clearly include an element
. . . that are sufficient to ensure that the claims amount to significantly
more,” Appellants do not adequately explain why the claims recite
“significantly more,” much less identify the purported claim elements.
Appellants further argue that
the Action should 1) identify any additional elements
(specifically point to claim features/limitations/steps) recited in
the claim beyond the identified judicial exception, and 2)
explain the reason(s) that the additional elements taken
individually, and also taken as a combination, do not result in
the claim as a whole amounting to significantly more than the
judicial exception.
(App. Br. 12.) Accordingly, Appellants argue, “[t]he Action has not
identified such limitations.” (Id.) However, Appellants have not cited any
legal authority for their perceived heightened burden for the Examiner with
respect to Alice step two. Pursuant to Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360
(Fed. Cir. 2018), the Examiner cited to Appellants’ Specification in support
of a finding that the additional elements were “well-understood, routine, and
conventional.”
Thus, we agree with the Examiner that claims 41, 53, and 57 are
directed towards patent-ineligible subject matter. Accordingly, we sustain
the rejection of independent claims 41, 53, and 57 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claims 42–44, 46–52, 54, 56, 58, and 60 depend from independent
claims 41, 53, and 57, and Appellants have not presented any additional
substantive arguments with respect to these claims. We sustain the rejection
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of claims 42–44, 46–52, 54, 56, 58, and 60 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 for the
same reasons discussed with respect to independent claims 41, 53, and 57.

§ 102 Rejection—Dickinson
We are unpersuaded by Appellants’ arguments (App. Br. 15; see also
Reply Br. 6) that Dickinson does not describe the limitation “data collected
by a user device in a location remote from the information processing
system as user history data,” as recited in independent claim 41.
The Examiner found that the cryptographic system of Dickinson,
which stores authentication data remotely, such that the user can make
authentication requests either from home or work, collectively correspond to
the limitation “data collected by a user device in a location remote from the
information processing system as user history data.” (Final Act. 17.) We
agree with the Examiner’s findings.
Dickinson relates to a server-side cryptographic system, “in particular
to a trust engine for securely storing cryptographic keys and authentication
data.” (Col. 1, ll. 17–20.) Dickinson explains that:
Another aspect of the invention includes a remotely
accessible secure cryptographic system. The cryptographic
system comprises a depository system having at least one server
which stores at least one private key and a plurality of
enrollment authentication data, wherein each enrollment
authentication data identifies one of multiple users.
(Col. 3, ll. 50–55.) Dickinson further explains that in one embodiment, a
user can make authentication requests both from work and from home.
(Col. 39, l. 61 to col. 40, l. 9.) Because Dickinson explains that a remotely
accssible cryptographic system includes enrollment authentication data, and
that a user can make authentication requests from home or work, Dickinson
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teaches the limitation “data collected by a user device in a location remote
from the information processing system as user history data.”
Appellants argue that “this reference [Dickinson] clearly does not
teach selecting an authentication procedure based on . . . user history data
collected by a user device in a location remote from the computer.” (App.
Br. 15 (emphasis omitted); see also Reply Br. 6.) Contrary to Appellants’
arguments, as discussed previously, Dickinson explains that the
cryptographic system is remotely accessible and stores enrollment
authentication data, and that a user can make authentication requests from
home or work. Other than a conclusory statement that Dickinson does not
disclose the disputed limitation, Appellants have not provided any
persuasive arguments or evidence as to why the Examiner’s findings with
respect to Dickinson are improper.
Therefore, we agree with the Examiner that Dickinson describes the
limitation “data collected by a user device in a location remote from the
information processing system as user history data.”
We are unpersuaded by Appellants’ arguments (App. Br. 15) that
Dickinson does not describe the limitation “select an authentication
procedure from a plurality of authentication procedures based on both the
user history data and information including at least one of time and a
location,” as recited in independent claim 41.
The Examiner found that the user authentication data of Dickinson, in
which a profile for user requests are generated to determine reliability,
corresponds to the limitation “select an authentication procedure from a
plurality of authentication procedures based on both the user history data and
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information including at least one of time and a location.” (Ans. 12–13.)
We agree with the Examiner’s findings.
Dickinson explains the following:
These factors can be used to produce a profile of the type
of authentication that is normally requested by the user. . . .
One manner is to consider whether the user is requesting
authentication in a manner which is consistent with the normal
profile of authentication by this user. If the user normally
makes authentication requests from one network address during
business days (when she is at work) and from a different
network address during evenings or weekends (when she is at
home), an authentication which occurs from the home address
during the business day is less reliable because it is outside the
normal authentication profile.
(Col. 39, l. 61 to col. 40, l. 9.) Moreover, Dickinson explains that if an
authentication is deficient, “[a] request to produce one or more additional
authentication instances to improve the overall confidence level of the
authentication may also be sent.” (Col. 45, ll. 22–26.) Because the system
of Dickinson determines reliability of authentication requests from two
network addresses via comparison to a “normal authentication profile,” and
can request additional authentication for a “less reliable” authentication,
Dickinson discloses the limitation “select an authentication procedure from a
plurality of authentication procedures based on both the user history data and
information including at least one of time and a location.”
Appellants argue that “Dickinson never discloses any step of selecting
an authentication procedure” and “none of the teachings in Dickinson
mention or even suggest selecting an authentication procedure from a
plurality of authentication procedures based on both 1) the user history data
and 2) information including at least one of time and a location.” (App.
Br. 15 (emphasis omitted).) Contrary to Appellants’ arguments, as discussed
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previously, Dickinson determines reliability of authentication requests from
two network addresses via comparison to a “normal authentication profile,”
and can request additional authentication for “less reliable” authentication.
Again, other than a conclusory statement that Dickinson does not disclose
the disputed limitation, Appellants have not provided any persuasive
arguments or evidence as to why the Examiner’s findings with respect to
Dickinson are improper.
Therefore, we agree with the Examiner that Dickinson describes the
limitation “select an authentication procedure from a plurality of
authentication procedures based on both the user history data and
information including at least one of time and a location.”
We are unpersuaded by Appellants’ arguments (App. Br. 16) that
Dickinson does not describe the limitation “register user authentication log
data corresponding to previous authentication executions,” as recited in
independent claim 41.
The Examiner found that the “persistent cookie” or other electronic
data of Dickinson, which can be placed on the user system, corresponds to
“register user authentication log data corresponding to previous
authentication executions.” (Final Act. 18.) We agree with the Examiner’s
findings.
Dickinson explains the following:
It is also possible that a cookie or other electronic data
may be placed upon the system being used by a user when they
interact . . . with the trust engine 110. This data is written to the
storage of the system of the user and may contain an
identification which may be read by a Web browser or other
software on the user system. If this data is allowed to reside on
the user system between sessions (a “persistent cookie”), it may
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be sent with the authentication data as further evidence of the
past use of this system during authentication of a particular
user. In effect, the metadata of a given instance, particularly a
persistent cookie, may form a sort of token based authenticator
itself.
(Col. 40, ll. 22–33.) Because Dickinson explains that a “persistent cookie”
resides on the user system, which can be sent with authentication data as
further evidence of past use, Dickinson discloses the limitation “register user
authentication log data corresponding to previous authentication
executions.”
Appellants argue that “Dickinson is silent as to describing registering
user authentication log data and further selecting at least one authentication
procedure based on the user authentication log data” and “Dickinson merely
describes reliability factors determined in advance based on a user’s
enrollment with trust engines and are not based on actual authentication.”
(App. Br. 16 (emphases omitted).) However, the Examiner also cited to
“persistent cookie” of Dickinson for disclosing the disputed limitation.
Appellants have not presented any persuasive arguments or evidence as to
why the Examiner’s findings with respect to “persistent cookie” of
Dickinson are improper.
Therefore, we agree with the Examiner that Dickinson describes the
limitation “register user authentication log data corresponding to previous
authentication executions.”
Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of independent claim 41 under
35 U.S.C. § 102(e). Claims 42–44, 46, and 48–52 depend from independent
claim 41, and Appellants have not presented any substantive arguments with
respect to these claims. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claims 42–44,
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46, and 48–52 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) for the same reasons discussed with
respect to independent claim 41.
Independent claims 53 and 57 recite limitations similar to those
discussed with respect to independent claim 41, and Appellants have not
presented any substantive arguments with respect to these claims. We
sustain the rejection of claims 53 and 57, as well as dependent claims 54, 56,
58, and 60, for the same reasons discussed with respect to claim 41.
§ 103 Rejection—Dickinson and MacDoran
Although Appellants nominally argue the rejection of dependent
claim 47 separately (App. Br. 17), the arguments presented do not point out
with particularity or explain why the limitations of this dependent claim are
separately patentable. Instead, Appellants merely argument that “Claim 47
is believed to be allowable at least by its virtue of its dependence on
Claim 44” and “the MacDoran reference does not cure the above noted
deficiencies of Dickinson.” (Id.) We are not persuaded by these arguments
for the reasons discussed with respect to claim 41, from which claim 47
depends. Accordingly, we sustain this rejection.
DECISION
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 41–44, 46–54, 56–58, and
60 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is affirmed.
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 41–44, 46–54, 56–58, and
60 under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(e) and 103(a) is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED