Alfred M. Anderson, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionAug 28, 2003
01A21427 (E.E.O.C. Aug. 28, 2003)

01A21427

08-28-2003

Alfred M. Anderson, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Alfred M. Anderson v. United States Postal Service

01A21427

08-28-03

.

Alfred M. Anderson,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A21427

Agency Nos. 1C-191-0012-00

1C-191-0122-00

1C-191-0089-00

Hearing No. 170-A0-8542X

DECISION

INTRODUCTION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final decision

concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of unlawful

employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq., and Section 501 of the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. �

791 et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405.

ISSUES PRESENTED

The issues presented herein are whether complainant has shown that

he was discriminated against based on his race (Black), sex (male),

disability (psychosis and back injury), and previous EEO activity when:

(1) he was scheduled to undergo a fitness for duty examination; (2)

from September 24, 1999 to May 19, 2000, the agency denied his request

for a reasonable accommodation; (3) in October 1999, his workload was

increased; (4) in October 1999, he was charged with being Absent Without

Leave (AWOL); and (5) in October 1999, he was issued a Letter of Warning.

BACKGROUND

Complainant filed three formal complaints that raised the above

issues. Following an investigation, complainant was provided a copy

of the investigative report. He requested a hearing before an EEOC

Administrative Judge (AJ). Following the hearing, the AJ issued a bench

decision finding no discrimination. The agency's notice of final action

adopted the AJ's finding of no discrimination. This appeal followed.

The record reveals that, at the time of his complaints, complainant was

a mail handler/equipment operator assigned to the Airmail Facility (AMF)

at the Philadelphia Airport. He had held the position for approximately

16 years and was under the supervision of A-1, Supervisor of Distribution

Operations on Tour II. Complainant drove a battery-operated vehicle

in order to transport mail containers. These containers were both

empty and full. Complainant also relocated equipment that was used to

transport mail to storage or staging areas, and performed mail handler

duties as requested.

In 1994, complainant was involved in a non-work related car accident,

which resulted in an injury to his back. He was off work for

approximately six or seven months and returned to full duty without any

medical restrictions. Intermittently, he experienced back pain and was

assigned duties that did not require prolonged standing or stooping such

as mail repair or forklift operations by A-1. In May 1996, complainant

had an on-the-job accident, which exacerbated his back condition and

resulted in his absence from work. Upon his return from this injury,

complaint again went back to full duty without restrictions.

During the summer of 1999, A-1 assigned complainant to perform manual

lifting duties at the Roller Tables. Subsequently, complainant obtained a

letter from his doctor, Doctor D, dated July 26, 1999, which states that

complainant, �Has a history of chronic low back pain, and a herniated

disk, which prevent him from lifting any objects greater than 10 pounds.�

Additionally, Doctor D indicated that complainant, �Should also be limited

in the amount of repetitive bending that he does.� Complainant gave the

letter to another supervisor, A-2, not A-1. A-2 initialed the letter as

received on July 27. The letter was at some point placed in complainant's

file at the Medical Unit, which was at a different location from the AMF.

From July 27, 1999, until early September 1999, complainant was assigned

to equipment operator duties, which were within the restrictions set

forth by Doctor D. According to complainant, sometime in early September

1999, A-1 tried to assign him certain manual duties at the Roller Tables.

Complainant testified at this time he informed A-1 that he had medical

restrictions on file. A-1, he maintained, sarcastically told him that

he was going �to send him downtown for a fitness-for-duty examination.�

However, according to A-1, complainant did not inform him that he had

medical restrictions on file until Friday, September 24, 1999, when he

gave him a copy of Doctor D's letter. Prior to this, A-1 maintains that

he was not aware of complainant's restrictions.

There is no dispute that, at some point on September 24, complainant was

performing forklift duties when A-1 directed him to go to the concourse

area to dump mail. Complainant performed these duties as directed, but

he also began hooking and unhooking airline carts. A-1 denied telling

complainant to perform this task. Another supervisor, A-3, confirms that

complainant was only told to dump mail. According to A-3, they already

had �a hookup man established.� Complainant does not dispute A-1's

assertion that he was only told to dump mail. He maintains, however,

that because he was the mail handler/equipment operator with the lowest

seniority, he was automatically expected to perform the task of hooking

and unhooking carts when he was sent to the concourse area. Moreover,

he indicated that, upon his arrival, C-1, a co-worker, promptly informed

A-3, who was supervising that location, that because complainant had less

seniority that she would no longer perform this task. A-3, according

to complainant, merely looked at him; therefore, he took this to mean

that he had to do it. A-3 denied that any such conversation with C-1

took place. The record contains no affidavit from C-1.

The next day, Saturday, September 25, complainant performed equipment

operator duties at Roller Table 3 and 4, transporting containers. Sunday,

September 26, was an unscheduled day. According to complainant, he began

experiencing back pain, on Monday, September 27, 1999, and requested

leave from work. He remained absent through October 11, 1999, on the

advice of Doctor D. At the hearing, complainant testified that pulling

on the carts and lifting heavy bags from the containers, on September 24,

1999, caused him to re-injure his back.

Upon his return to duty on October 12, 1999, A-1 convened a meeting of

the mail handler/equipment operators. A-1 informed them of changes to

their duty assignments, effective the next day. Complainant maintained

that his workload was increased as a result of these changes. He was

now responsible for equipment operator duties for Roller Table 2 and the

container loader. Complainant acknowledged that the work assignments

for the other mail handlers/equipment operators also changed, but he

maintained that his duties were increased because he opposed A-1's

efforts to violate his medical restrictions in September. The record

indicates that the other mail handler/equipment operators were white.

During the hearing, complainant testified that he was not alleging

that the increase in his workload violated his medical restrictions,

but that, with his physical limitations, he could not keep up with what

he described as performing two jobs.

Among other things, A-1 testified that complainant's duties increased

because he was lower in seniority to the other mail handlers/equipment

operators. Apparently, complainant had gone from being fourth in

seniority out of five employees to now being the lowest. A-1 also

indicated that the other mail handlers/equipment operators were supposed

to assist complainant. Complainant and C-2, a co-worker, testified that

complainant did not receive any assistance. C-2 also maintained that

Black mail handlers who were assigned complainant's duties when he was

absent, after October 12, were never given such assistance.

In September 1999, A-1 requested a fitness for duty examination

(FFD examination) for complainant. Because he was absent from work,

complainant did not actually undergo the FFD examination until October

13, 1999. A-1 wrote that the exam was sought because of �chronic low

back pain/herniated disk, and inability to lift over 10 pounds.� Prior

to reporting for the FFD examination, complainant was examined by Doctor

H, a doctor that he was referred to by Doctor D. Doctor D increased

complainant's lifting restriction to 40 pounds. Later, the agency's

Medical Unit found that complainant could perform the functions of

the mail handler/equipment operator position with limited bending and

stooping and no lifting more than 40 pounds.

On October 14, 1999, complainant was performing duties at Roller

Table 2 and the container loader. On that day, A-3 informed A-1 that

containers, assigned to complainant for transporting, had not been moved.

A-1 confronted complainant about the backup and directed him to move

the containers. Complainant refused, stating that he was being required

to do two jobs. A-1 told complainant to �clock off� and leave the AMF.

Complainant left and did not return until October 26, 1999, despite

the fact that A-1 left him a telephone message telling him to return

to work on October 15. Because complainant had not requested leave for

the period, A-1 charged him with being AWOL. According to complainant,

he left town after being told by A-1 that he was suspended. Complainant

admitted that he never contacted the AMF in order to request leave.

On October 27, 1999, A-1 issued complainant a Letter of

Warning. Complainant was charged with insubordination and failure to

follow orders. Among other things, the letter referred to the events

of October 14, 1999 and complainant's failure to report to work on

October 15. From October 26, 1999, until early March 2000, complainant

was assigned to Roller Table 2. He also performed container loader

duties as well as occasional forklift operator duties.

In March 2000, complainant gave A-1 a note, dated March 1, 2000, from

Doctor V. Doctor V asked that complainant be allowed to perform light

duty tasks due to an �acute exacerbation of a herniated L4-L5 disk, for

two three-week periods.� On March 7, 2000, complainant was assigned to

view safety videotapes at the AMF. Afterward, he was offered a limited

duty job repairing damaged mail at the Processing and Distribution Center

(PDC). This offer was made pursuant to the agency Injury Compensation

Program. Complainant accepted this offer and performed the assignment

from March 8, 2000 until the end of April 2000. Doctor V, on a March

2000 OWCP claim form, wrote that complainant's lifting restrictions were

now 10 to 20 pounds. He also indicated that complainant's sitting and

standing should be limited to four hours per day.

On April 26, 2000, Doctor V recommended that complainant return to his

assignment at the AMF and work 4 hours per day.<1> Complainant reported

to the AMF on May 2, and gave Doctor V's recommendations to A-1 and A-4,

the Manager of Distribution Operations. From May 2 to May 19, he was

assigned to work at the AMF on Roller Table 2 and the container loader

for 4 hours per day. He was also allowed to take 4 hours of leave without

pay on his scheduled workdays.

On May 19, 2000, complainant was presented with a second limited duty

job offer for a position at the PDC. The second offer provided:

regular duties as equipment operator - 4 hours daily; restrictions -

4 hours daily, as well as limited bending, 20 pounds, pushing/pulling

limitations, and 2 hour limitation reaching over the shoulder, and a

four hour sitting, walking and standing limitation.

Thus, complainant was being asked to work a total of 8 hours per day

(4 hours regular and 4 hours limited), not 4 as set forth in Doctor

V's letter. Complainant declined this offer.

Both the March and May 2000 limited duty job offers were drafted by H-1,

a Human Resources Specialist. Her specialty was Injury Compensation.

According to H-1, at the time she prepared the May 2000 job offer, on

or about May 16, she was unaware that complainant was back working at

the AMF and did not have his updated medical information.

Complainant did not return to work after May 19, 2000. On May 23, 2000,

he began being seen by Doctor D-2 at the VA Medical Center because

of stress. Complainant provided documentation indicating that he

was treated for anxiety attacks, depression, and diminished ability

to concentrate. He was prescribed various medications for anxiety.

The record also indicates that during the 1970s, while in the Navy,

complainant experienced what was referred to as a psychotic episode.

A November 2000 note from Doctor V indicated that complainant was

medically cleared to return to his �usual position at the post office,�

with restrictions only on his hours worked per day for a period of two

months. However, Doctor V indicated that his clearance was conditioned

upon complainant's VA psychiatrist. A January 8, 2001 note from Doctor

V states, in pertinent part, that, �At this point it is evident that he

has not recovered from his depression anxiety sufficiently to permit

him to return to work.� Although the record does not indicate when

complainant returned to duty, he was working at an agency facility in

Philadelphia at the time of the hearing in September 2001.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by

an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Substantial evidence is defined as �such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.� Universal

Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)

(citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory

intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint,

456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982).

Medical Examination

The Rehabilitation Act was amended in 1992 to apply the standards of the

Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to complaints of discrimination by

federal employees or applicants for employment. See EEOC Enforcement

Guidance on Disability-Related Inquiries and Medical Examinations

of Employees Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (Enforcement

Guidance - Disability Related Inquiries), No. 915.002 (July 26,

2000); Enforcement Guidance on the Americans with Disabilities Act and

Psychiatric Disabilities (March 25, 1997); and EEOC Enforcement Guidance

on Preemployment Disability-Related Questions and Medical Examinations

(Enforcement Guidance - Preemployment) (October 10, 1995). Because the

restrictions on employers with regard to disability-related inquiries

and medical examinations apply to all employees, and not just to those

with disabilities, it is not necessary to inquire whether the employee

is a person with a disability. Enforcement Guidance - Disability Related

Inquiries, p. 3. Instead, we focus on the issue of whether the agency's

order that complainant undergo a Fitness-for-Duty examination was lawful.

The Rehabilitation Act places certain limitations on an employer's

ability to make disability-related inquiries or require medical

examinations of employees only if it is job-related and consistent with

business necessity. 29 C.F.R. �� 1630.13(b), .14(c). Generally, a

disability-related inquiry or medical examination of an employee may be

"job-related and consistent with business necessity" when an employer

"has a reasonable belief, based on objective evidence, that: (1) an

employee's ability to perform essential job functions will be impaired

by a medical condition; or (2) an employee will pose a direct threat due

to a medical condition."<2> Enforcement Guidance - Disability-Related

Inquiries, at 15-16. It is the burden of the employer to show that its

disability-related inquiries and requests for examination are job-related

and consistent with business necessity. Id. at 15-23.

The record indicates that A-1 submitted a request for a FFD examination

for complainant. Prior to the request, A-1 maintains that he was

unaware that complainant had medical restrictions on file that might have

prevented him from performing the essential functions of his position.<3>

These restrictions, set forth in Doctor D's July 26, 1999 letter,

prohibited complainant from lifting any objects greater than 10 pounds.

A-1 testified that he submitted the FFD examination request, �Because

I felt at that point with the doctor's certificate that [complainant]

was not able to do his duties and responsibilities as [an] equipment

operator.� Although he could not recall the exact text of the Doctor D's

note, A-1 noted complainant's 10-pound weight restriction. A-1 noted,

for example, that he had discovered from another employee that the hook

that was used with the carts weighed about 15 pounds. As noted above,

the Medical Unit found that complainant could perform the functions of

the mail handler/equipment operator position with limited bending and

stooping and no lifting more than 40 pounds.

Upon review of the record and the AJ's findings of fact, we conclude that

the agency met its burden of showing that the FFD examination at issue

was job-related and consistent with business necessity. Accordingly, we

find that the examination was not a violation of the Rehabilitation Act.

Reasonable Accommodation

Under the Commission's regulations, an agency is required to make

reasonable accommodation to the known physical and mental limitations of

an otherwise qualified individual with a disability unless the agency can

show that accommodation would cause an undue hardship. 29 C.F.R. � 1630.9.

The Commission also notes that an employee must show a nexus between

the disabling condition and the requested accommodation. See Wiggins

v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01953715 (April 22,1997).

As a threshold matter in a case of disability discrimination under a

failure to accommodate theory, the complainant must demonstrate that he

is a qualified �individual with a disability." See 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(g)

and 29 C.F.R.� 1630.2(m). For purposes of our analysis, we will assume,

arguendo, that complainant was able to establish that he was a qualified

individual with the disabilities alleged. We find, however, that the

record does not indicate that he was denied a reasonable accommodation.

As noted in the AJ's findings of fact, complainant, after he submitted

Doctor D's July 26, 1999 letter to a supervisor, was assigned equipment

operator duties until September 1999.<4> There is no dispute that these

duties were within complainant's medical limitations. On September

24, 1999, A-1 asked complainant to go to the concourse and dump mail.

Complainant maintains that his medical restrictions were violated

when he had to hook and unhook airline carts. However, there is no

persuasive evidence that any management official ever told complainant

to perform this task. As noted above, A-1 denied telling him to do so.

A-3 denied hearing A-1 tell complainant to do so. He also denied telling

complainant to do so himself either directly or otherwise. By his own

testimony, complainant never claimed that he was told to hook and unhook

carts by A-1 or A-3. According to him, he did so because he had less

seniority than C-1 and felt that it was required. Furthermore, other

than saying that some of the bags that he had to lift that day were

heavy, complainant provided no objective evidence that the duties he

was directed to perform on September 24, i.e., dumping mail, required

him to lift objects that exceeded his 10-pound lifting restriction.

We also note that complainant did not indicate that he ever informed

A-1 or A-3 that some of the bags may have been heavier than 10 pounds.

On Monday, September 28, complainant experienced back pain and was off

work until October 12. Upon his return, he was again assigned equipment

operator duties, which were within his restrictions. In March 2000, in

accordance with Doctor V's recommendations, the agency offered complainant

a limited duty position at the Philadelphia PDC. Complainant performed

these duties until May 2000, when his limitations were changed. From

May 2 through May 19, 2000, complainant, based on the recommendation

of Doctor V, worked at the AMF for 4 hours per day. We note that,

notwithstanding his belief that his workload was excessive, complainant

does not maintain that the agency violated his medical restrictions from

October 12, 1999 through May 19, 2000.

Finally, the limited duty job offer that complainant was provided in

May 2000 did exceed the medical restrictions set forth in Doctor V's

letter of April 26, 2000. Doctor V indicated that complainant should

only work 4 hours per day. The offer was for 8 hours. However, the

AJ correctly found that the Injury Compensation Specialist, H-1, made

this offer. She testified that she did not have complainant's updated

medical information when the offer was made. Therefore, it is reasonable

to conclude that H-1 made an error. However, even if H-1 did not err,

we note that A-1 and A-4 never required complainant to work more than 4

hours per day when he worked at the AMF from May 2 through May 19. Thus,

we find no evidence that he was denied an accommodation by management.<5>

Accordingly, the Commission finds that complainant failed to establish

his claim that the agency failed to provide him with a reasonable

accommodation.

Remaining Claims of Discrimination

Complainant also alleged that he was subjected to disparate treatment

on the bases of race, sex, disability and reprisal when: on October 12,

1999, his workload doubled, on October 14, 1999, he was charged with

being AWOL, and on October 27, 1999, he was issued a Letter of Warning.

After a careful review of the record, we discern no basis to disturb

the AJ's finding of no discrimination as to these remaining issues.

The findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, and the AJ

correctly applied the appropriate regulations, policies, and laws to

these claims.

CONCLUSION

Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including arguments

and evidence not specifically discussed in this decision, the Commission

AFFIRMS the agency's final order finding no discrimination.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

____08-28-03______________

Date

1According to the complainant, he had only intended to work four hours

per day for about six weeks, after which, he felt he could return to a

full 8-hour day.

2"Direct threat" means a significant risk of substantial harm that

cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation. 29 C.F.R. �

1630.2(r).

3Notwithstanding A-1's contention that he personally was not aware

of complainant's medical restrictions, the agency, as the employer,

is presumed to be aware of the fact that A-2 received Doctor D's July

26 letter and that this information was on file at the Medical Office.

4The position description for the mail handler/equipment operator

position indicates that the functional purpose of the position is to

�operate a jitney, fork-lift or pallet truck for the movement of mail,

and perform other mail handler functions as required.�

5In its Enforcement Guidance on Workers' Compensation and the ADA,

No. 915.002 (September 3, 1996), the Commission recognized that the

standards and requirements for workers' compensation laws are different

from the purposes and standards of the ADA.