Okla. Stat. tit. 12A, § 3-104
Oklahoma Code Comment
1. A number of instruments may not qualify as negotiable instruments under the requirements of this Section. Three examples are (1) a certificate of deposit that is not payable to order or to bearer or that is not transferable without restriction, (2) a draft to pay for an oil and gas lease that is payable only on approval of title, and (3) a guaranty agreement uncertain as to amount and time of payment. The panics to these agreements nonetheless may desire the certainty provided by the rules of Article including the Article 3 suretyship rules (updated by the 1992 revisions) in the case of a guaranty. Comment 2 to this Section makes it clear that the parties may contract for the application of one or more of the Article 3 rules by providing in the instrument for that consequence. For example, a note might provide: "The panics agree that if a court determines this instrument is not subject to Article 3 of the Oklahoma Uniform Commercial Code, 12A O.S. §§ 3-101 to 3-605, then their rights and obligations and those of other persons with respect to this instrument shall be governed by the rules of 12A O.S. §§ 3-101 to 3-605."
2. The 1992 UCC revisions rewrote this Section not only to make certain substantive changes, but also to make it more readable and to eliminate provisions that no longer served a real purpose and thus cluttered the statute. As a result, although the wording and style were changed, many principles in and cases interpreting the pre-revision provisions are still good. For example, the authorization contained in subsection (a)(3) bears only on the negotiability of the instrument, and does not validate a term that otherwise would be invalid; the truisms stated in pre-revision sub sections 3-106(2) and 3-112(2) are not restated. Compare, e.g., subsection (a)(3)(ii) with 14A O.S. § 3-407, as to an authorization to confess judgment on this point. The authorization in subsection (a)(3) also encompasses the provisions permitted by pre-revision sub section 3-112(1) , and thus the cases annotated under that provision continue as authority to the extent they were authority under pre-revision Section 3-112 . Further, nothing in current Section 3-104, or sections related to it, should be interpreted to question the holdings as to the scope of Article 3 in the following cases: Wickware v. National Mortgage Corp. of Am., 570 P.2d 330 (Okra. 1977); Sunrizon Homes, Inc. v. American Guar. Inv.Corp., 782 P.2d 103 (Okra. 1988), James Talcott, Inc. v. Finley, 389 P.2d 988 (Okra. 1964) (but as to references to rights with respect to collateral, prepayment or acceleration, see sub section 3-106(b)(i) ); Walls v. Morris Chevrolet, Inc., 515 P.2d 1405 (Okra. Ct. App. 1973); and Circle v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 535 F.2d 583 (lOth Cir. 1976), on remand, 470 F.Supp. 39 (W.D. Okla. 1979), aff'd, 654 F.2d 688 (lOth Cir. 19811.