Colo. R. App. P. 21
C.A.R. 21
COMMENT 2024
Except for the revisions made to subsection (g), most of the rule revisions to C.A.R. 21 are not substantive. The amendments were made for clarity, readability, and to reflect the current practices of the supreme court clerk's office.
To parallel the language of original jurisdiction rules in other states, the term "rule to show cause" was replaced with "order to show cause." The change in terminology does not affect the substance of the rule or the relief requested or granted by the rule. Parties may continue to rely on case law referring to a "rule to show cause," as the terms "rule to show cause" and "order to show cause" are used interchangeably.
The court may dispose of an order to show cause with or without an opinion. Any ruling made without an opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited as precedent. Parties may file a petition for rehearing only if the court issues an opinion.
Annotation I. General Consideration. Law reviews. For article, "Supreme Court Proceedings: Rules 111-119", see 23 Rocky Mtn. L. Rev. 618 (1951). For note, "Habeas Corpus in Colorado for the Convicted Criminal", see 30 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 145 (1958). For article, "One Year Review of Civil Procedure and Appeals", see 37 Dicta 21 (1960). For note, "One Year Review of Colorado Law -- 1964", see 42 Den. L. Ctr. J. 140 (1965). For note, "Colorado Appellate Procedure", see 40 U. Colo. L. Rev. 551 (1968). For note, "Civil Procedure Application of 'Indispensable Party' Provision of Colo. R. Civ. P. 19 --the 'Procedural Phantom' Still Stalks in Colorado", see 46 U. Colo. L. Rev. 609 (1974-75). For comment, "Reporter's Privilege: Pankratz v. District Court", see 58 Den. L.J. 681 (1981). For article, "A Summary of Colorado Supreme Court Internal Operating Procedures", see 11 Colo. Law. 356 (1982). For article, "Original Proceedings in the Colorado Supreme Court", see 12 Colo. Law. 413 (1983). For article, "Knowing When to Change Trains: The Ins and Outs of Interlocutory Appeals", see 41 Colo. Law. 31 (June 2012). For article, "Raising New Issues on Appeal: Waiver and Forfeiture in Colorado's Federal and State Appellate Courts", see 46 Colo. Law. 25 (July 2017). For article, "Practical Considerations for Rule 21 Proceedings in the Colorado Supreme Court", see 96 Denv. L. Rev. 203 (2019). For article, "Civil Interlocutory Appeals in Colorado State Courts", 49 Colo. Law. 38 (Oct. 2020). Annotator's note. For other annotations concerning original jurisdiction of supreme court, see Const. Colo., art. VI, sec. 3. Purpose of original proceedings. Original proceedings are authorized to test whether the trial court is proceeding without or in excess of its jurisdiction and to review a serious abuse of discretion where an appellate remedy would not be adequate. Margolis v. District Court, 638 P.2d 297 (Colo. 1981); People v. District Court, Arapahoe County, 868 P.2d 400 (Colo. 1994); Vail/Arrowhead, Inc. v. District Court, 954 P.2d 608 (Colo. 1998); Kourlis v. District Court, 930 P.2d 1329 (Colo. 1997); Hawkinson v. Biddle, 880 P.2d 748 (Colo. 1994); Semental v. Denver County Court, 978 P.2d 668 (Colo. 1999). The general function of a writ of prohibition is to enjoin an excessive or improper assumption of jurisdiction. Vaughn v. District Court, 192 Colo. 348, 559 P.2d 222 (1977). An original proceeding is an appropriate way to challenge a district court ruling allegedly in excess of the court's jurisdiction. Chavez v. District Court, 648 P.2d 658 (Colo. 1982). An original proceeding pursuant to this rule is not a substitute for an appeal and is limited to an inquiry into whether the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion. Hayes v. District Court, 854 P.2d 1240 (Colo. 1993); Lambdin v. District Ct. of Arapahoe Cty., 903 P.2d 1126 (Colo. 1995); Pearson v. District Court, 18th Jud. Dist., 924 P.2d 512 (Colo. 1996). An original proceeding is appropriate to prevent an excess of jurisdiction by a lower court when no other remedy would be adequate. Paul v. People, 105 P.3d 628 (Colo. 2005). The supreme court may exercise original jurisdiction and review a discovery order if it appears that a trial court has abused its discretion in circumstances in which a remedy on appeal would be inadequate. Gateway Logistics, Inc. v. Smay, 2013 CO 25, 302 P.3d 235. Original and remedial writs are the common-law writs. Lucas v. District Court, 140 Colo. 510, 345 P.2d 1064 (1959); Leonhart v. District Court, 138 Colo. 1, 329 P.2d 781 (1958). But present authority to entertain original and remedial writs is conferred by the constitution. Lucas v. District Court, 140 Colo. 510, 345 P.2d 1064 (1959). Colorado supreme court's original jurisdiction has its source in § 3 of art. VI, Colo. Const.; its exercise is discretionary and governed by the circumstances of the case. Sanchez v. District Court, 624 P.2d 1314 (Colo. 1981). C.R.C.P. 106 and this rule are to be construed together. Solliday v. District Court, 135 Colo. 489, 313 P.2d 1000 (1957). Prohibition is not available where party has adequate remedies at law, or where it will supersede the functions of an appeal. Fitzgerald v. District Court, 177 Colo. 29, 493 P.2d 27 (1972). Where a municipal court has jurisdiction over the defendants and the subject matter of the action, and an adequate remedy at law is available, original proceedings in prohibition will not be entertained. Douglas v. Municipal Court, 151 Colo. 358, 377 P.2d 738 (1963). Court will not consider issues not presented below. The orderly administration of justice requires that parties first present all evidence and arguments to the trial court. Simply stated, the supreme court will not consider issues and evidence presented for the first time in original proceedings. Panos Inv. Co. v. District Court, 662 P.2d 180 (Colo. 1983). Petitioner responsible for providing substantiating record. A petitioner seeking prohibition has the responsibility of providing the supreme court with a record that will substantiate the request for extraordinary relief. Mitchell v. District Court ex rel. Eighth Judicial Dist., 672 P.2d 997 (Colo. 1983). In the absence of a compelling need, this rule may not serve as a substitute for an adequate appellate remedy that a party simply fails to exercise. C.A.R. 3.4 provides adequate process for appellants to the court of appeals in dependancy and neglect cases. People ex rel. A.H., 216 P.3d 581 (Colo. 2009). Original writ disfavored where appeal available. There is a general policy which disfavors the use of an original writ where an appeal would be an appropriate remedy. Weaver Constr. Co. v. District Court, 190 Colo. 227, 545 P.2d 1042 (1976). Absent a showing that appellate review would not afford adequate relief, relief by original proceedings is disfavored. Coquina Oil Corp. v. District Court, 623 P.2d 40 (Colo. 1981). In contempt proceedings to enforce an order, the validity of the questioned order can be challenged and defendants will be afforded full opportunity to justify their failure or refusal to comply therewith. If, by any judgment entered by the trial court in those proceedings, the parties feel aggrieved, their remedy by appeal is speedy and altogether adequate for the protection of their rights, and there is no occasion for invoking the original jurisdiction of the supreme court. Valas v. District Court, 130 Colo. 21, 273 P.2d 1017 (1954); Meaker v. District Court, 134 Colo. 151, 300 P.2d 805 (1956). But to be used where appeal inadequate. Where an appeal is not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, one may be entitled to an original writ of prohibition. Weaver Constr. Co. v. District Court, 190 Colo. 227, 545 P.2d 1042 (1976). A proceeding under this rule is appropriate to review a serious abuse of discretion where an appellate remedy would not be adequate. Halliburton v. County Court ex rel. City & County of Denver, 672 P.2d 1006 (Colo. 1983); Direct Sales Tire Co. v. District Court, 686 P.2d 1316 (Colo. 1984). Where the damage that may result from the court's abuse of discretion cannot be cured on appeal, mandamus will lie to ensure observance of the rules of civil procedure. Tyler v. District Court, 193 Colo. 31, 561 P.2d 1260 (1977). Although the questions involved upon which the relief in original jurisdiction is asked may be reviewed on appeal, that is not conclusive against the right as to relief if in the judgment of the court, such remedies are not plain, speedy, and adequate. People ex rel. Lackey v. District Court, 30 Colo. 123, 69 P. 597 (1902); People ex rel. L'Abbe v. District Court, 26 Colo. 386, 58 P. 604, 46 L.R.A. 850(1899). A writ in the nature of prohibition is an extraordinary remedy and should be granted only in cases where the party seeking relief does not have an adequate remedy on appeal. Valas v. District Court, 130 Colo. 21, 273 P.2d 1017 (1954); Meaker v. District Court, 134 Colo. 151, 300 P.2d 805 (1956). Original proceedings are only applicable to those matters in which an adequate remedy is not available on appeal. DeLong v. District Court, 151 Colo. 364, 377 P.2d 737 (1963). Original jurisdiction under this rule will be invoked where appellate remedies are inadequate. People v. District Court, 664 P.2d 247 (Colo. 1983); Hawkinson v. Biddle, 880 P.2d 748 (Colo. 1994); Kourlis v. District Court, El Paso County, 930 P.2d 1329 (Colo. 1997). The exercise of original jurisdiction is appropriate where a pre-trial ruling will place a party at a significant disadvantage in litigating the merits of the controversy and conventional appellate remedies are inadequate. Mitchell v. Wilmore, 981 P.2d 172 (Colo. 1999). Original jurisdiction under this rule appropriate where trial court's erroneous order allowing defendant access to alleged victim's home would irreparably damage her privacy rights. People v. Chavez, 2016 CO 20, 368 P.3d 943. A trial court's decision to vacate a jury-imposed death verdict is a matter of public importance invoking original jurisdiction. People v. Harlan, 109 P.3d 616 (Colo. 2005). Original jurisdiction may be exercised to entertain an interlocutory appeal that was improperly brought pursuant to another rule. People v. Braunthal, 31 P.3d 167 (Colo. 2001). Prohibition is an appropriate remedy when the trial court has abused its discretion and where an appellate remedy would not be adequate and in this case the supreme court exercised original jurisdiction to address issues of significance not yet examined. City and County of Denver v. District Court, 939 P.2d 1353 (Colo. 1997). Original jurisdiction is proper under this rule, prior to dismissal of the underlying action or appeal, on issue of sanctions. While the court of appeals is not without jurisdiction to determine the issue of propriety of sanctions issued by a settlement conference judge, the appellate remedy under such circumstances would not assist petitioner who is under order to comply or risk contempt. Halaby, McCrea & Cross v. Hoffman, 831 P.2d 902 (Colo. 1992). Original jurisdiction under this rule is proper when appellate review of trial court's evidentiary ruling would not afford adequate relief since jeopardy will have attached and the defendant cannot be retried. People v. District Court of El Paso County, 869 P.2d 1281 (Colo. 1994). Appeal held adequate remedy. The mere fact that a new trial may be necessary to correct an improper denial of a third-party complaint does not in itself render an appeal inadequate as a remedy for the third-party plaintiff. Pub. Serv. Co. v. District Court, 638 P.2d 772 (Colo. 1981). Original writs cannot supersede the ordinary functions of an appeal. People ex rel. City & County of Denver v. District Court, 81 Colo. 163, 255 P. 447 (1927); White v. District Court, 695 P.2d 1133 (Colo. 1984). Original proceedings may not be employed as a substitute for an appeal. Douglas v. Municipal Court, 151 Colo. 358, 377 P.2d 738 (1963); DeLong v. District Court, 151 Colo. 364, 377 P.2d 737 (1963); Coquina Oil Corp. v. District Court, 623 P.2d 40 (Colo. 1981). Prohibition may not be used in lieu of an appeal. Prinster v. District Court, 137 Colo. 393, 325 P.2d 938 (1958); Leonhart v. District Court, 138 Colo. 1, 329 P.2d 781 (1958); Town of Vail v. District Court, 163 Colo. 305, 430 P.2d 477 (1967); First Nat'l Bank v. District Court, 164 Colo. 9, 432 P.2d 1 (1967); Vaughn v. District Court, 192 Colo. 348, 559 P.2d 222 (1977); Lincoln First Bank v. District Court, 628 P.2d 615 (Colo. 1981). Prohibition cannot be converted into, or made to serve the purpose of, an appeal, or writ of review to undo what already has been done. Prinster v. District Court, 137 Colo. 393, 325 P.2d 938 (1958). Original jurisdiction may not be utilized to avoid the requirements of finality of judgments and orders set forth in C.A.R. 1. Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. District Court, 140 Colo. 190, 343 P.2d 535 (1959). Prohibition is preventive, rather than corrective, remedy, and usually issues only to prevent the commission of a future act, rather than to undo an act already performed. People ex rel. Long v. District Court, 28 Colo. 161, 63 P. 321 (1900); Stiger v. District Court, 188 Colo. 407, 535 P.2d 508 (1975). A writ of prohibition is designed to restrain rather than remedy an abuse of jurisdiction. Vaughn v. District Court, 192 Colo. 348, 559 P.2d 222 (1977). The remedy of prohibition is primarily preventive or restraining, not corrective, and only incidentally remedial in the sense of giving relief to the parties. Prinster v. District Court, 137 Colo. 393, 325 P.2d 938 (1958); Leonhart v. District Court, 138 Colo. 1, 329 P.2d 781 (1958). The office of the writ of prohibition is preventive in that it restrains excessive or improper assumption of jurisdiction by a tribunal possessing judicial or quasi-judicial powers. City of Aurora v. Congregation Beth Medrosh Hagodol, 140 Colo. 462, 345 P.2d 385 (1959). Relief in the nature of prohibition is discretionary with the supreme court. People ex rel. L'Abbe v. District Court, 26 Colo. 386, 58 P. 604, 46 L.R.A. 850(1899); People ex rel. Bonfils v. District Court, 29 Colo. 83, 66 P. 1068 (1901); People ex rel. Barnum v. District Court, 74 Colo. 48, 218 P. 912 (1923); People ex rel. Zalinger v. County Court, 77 Colo. 172, 235 P. 370 (1925); Meaker v. District Court, 134 Colo. 151, 300 P.2d 805 (1956); Stull v. District Court, 135 Colo. 86, 308 P.2d 1006 (1957); Leonhart v. District Court, 138 Colo. 1, 329 P.2d 781 (1958); City of Aurora v. Congregation Beth Medrosh Hagodol, 140 Colo. 462, 345 P.2d 385 (1959); Vaughn v. District Court, 192 Colo. 348, 559 P.2d 222 (1977); Coquina Oil Corp. v. District Court, 623 P.2d 40 (Colo. 1981); White v. District Court, 695 P.2d 1133 (Colo. 1984); Halaby, McCrea & Cross v. Hoffman, 831 P.2d 902 (Colo. 1992); People v. District Court, Arapahoe County, 868 P.2d 400 (Colo. 1994); Pearson v. District Court, 18th Jud. Dist., 924 P.2d 512 (Colo. 1996). It is a supervisory power. Prohibition is a power conferred by the constitution by means of which, when necessary, supervisory control may be exercised over inferior tribunals, acting without or in excess of their jurisdiction. People ex rel. Lackey v. District Court, 30 Colo. 123, 69 P. 597 (1902). And prohibition not granted unless the inferior court has no jurisdiction to act. People ex rel. Barnum v. District Court, 74 Colo. 48, 218 P. 912 (1923); People ex rel. Zalinger v. County Court, 77 Colo. 172, 235 P. 370 (1925); People ex rel. City & County of Denver v. District Court, 81 Colo. 163, 255 P. 447 (1927); Stull v. District Court, 135 Colo. 86, 308 P.2d 1006 (1957); Hampton v. District Court, 199 Colo. 104, 605 P.2d 54 (1980). When prohibition proper remedy. Relief in the nature of prohibition is a proper remedy only in those cases where the district court is proceeding without or in excess of its jurisdiction or has abused its discretion in exercising its functions. City of Colo. Springs v. District Court, 184 Colo. 177, 519 P.2d 325 (1974); People v. Gallagher, 194 Colo. 121, 570 P.2d 236 (1977); Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. of Am. v. District Court, 617 P.2d 556 (Colo. 1980); Lincoln First Bank v. District Court, 628 P.2d 615 (Colo. 1981); Marks v. District Court, 643 P.2d 741 (Colo.), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1107 (1982); People v. District Court, 825 P.2d 1000 (Colo. 1992); Beckord v. District Court, 698 P.2d 1323 (Colo. 1985); Halaby, McCrea & Cross v. Hoffman, 831 P.2d 902 (Colo. 1992). Relief in the nature of prohibition is appropriate where the district court is proceeding without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or has abused its discretion. Tyler v. District Court, 193 Colo. 31, 561 P.2d 1260 (1977); Marquez v. District Court, 200 Colo. 55, 613 P.2d 1302 (1980). An aggrieved party may petition the supreme court for relief in the nature of prohibition when an inferior tribunal has allegedly exceeded its jurisdiction. Solliday v. District Court, 135 Colo. 489, 313 P.2d 1000 (1957). An order in the nature of prohibition should be entertained where it is apparent that no judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the court below could be affirmed for want of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Carlson v. District Court, 116 Colo. 330, 180 P.2d 525 (1947); Kellner v. District Court, 127 Colo. 320, 256 P.2d 887 (1953). Relief in the nature of prohibition in an original proceeding is proper where a trial court is proceeding, or threatens to proceed, without jurisdiction. Andrews v. Lull, 139 Colo. 536, 341 P.2d 475 (1959). Although a district court may have jurisdiction of a case, prohibition still may lie upon a clear showing that the court has grossly abused its discretion and that an appeal would not provide an adequate remedy. Western Food Plan, Inc. v. District Court, 198 Colo. 251, 598 P.2d 1038 (1979). Mandamus proper remedy where court has abused its discretion. Relief in the nature of mandamus under this rule is a proper remedy in a case in which a district court has abused its discretion in exercising its functions. Gonzales v. District Court, 198 Colo. 505, 602 P.2d 857 (1979). A writ in the nature of mandamus will issue only upon a showing that the trial court has abused its discretion and that the damage sustained as a result of the abuse of discretion cannot be remedied on appeal. Pub. Serv. Co. v. District Court, 638 P.2d 772 (Colo. 1981). The issuance of a writ to mandate the vacation of the reference order to a master is necessary to protect the rights of the petitioner where the court is proceeding in excess of its power, for to await the final judgment based on the master's report would be too late, any appeal at that point a futile act, the expenditure of both time and money would already have occurred, and there would then be no way to undo what had already been erroneously done. Gelfond v. District Court, 180 Colo. 95, 504 P.2d 673 (1972). Prohibition will not issue when the petitioner has failed to act with reasonable promptness. James v. James, 95 Colo. 1, 32 P.2d 821 (1934). Nor where attention of lower court must be directed to jurisdiction question. Prohibition will not issue where the attention of the inferior tribunal has not been called to its alleged lack of jurisdiction, since one summoned can appear specially in the court or quasi-judicial agency to move that process be quashed as to him. City of Thornton v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 154 Colo. 431, 391 P.2d 374 (1964). The attention of the trial court must be called to any lack of jurisdiction before a writ of prohibition will issue from the supreme court. Town of Vail v. District Court, 163 Colo. 305, 430 P.2d 477 (1967); LeGrange v. District Court, 657 P.2d 454 (Colo. 1983). Nor to prevent court from proceeding to final conclusion. Prohibition will not issue to restrain a trial court having jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter from proceeding to a final conclusion. Prinster v. District Court, 137 Colo. 393, 325 P.2d 938 (1958); Leonhart v. District Court, 138 Colo. 1, 329 P.2d 781 (1958); Town of Vail v. District Court, 163 Colo. 305, 430 P.2d 477 (1967); First Nat'l Bank v. District Court, 164 Colo. 9, 432 P.2d 1 (1967). Nor to restrain court from error in case properly before it. Prohibition may never be used to restrain a trial court from committing error in deciding a question properly before it. Prinster v. District Court, 137 Colo. 393, 325 P.2d 938 (1958); Leonhart v. District Court, 138 Colo. 1, 329 P.2d 781 (1958); Town of Vail v. District Court, 163 Colo. 305, 430 P.2d 477 (1967); First Nat'l Bank v. District Court, 164 Colo. 9, 432 P.2d 1 (1967). If an inferior court has jurisdiction of the subject, a mistaken exercise of that jurisdiction or of its acknowledged powers will not justify a resort to the extraordinary remedy of prohibition; there must be excess of jurisdiction, and not mere error in the exercise of a conceded jurisdiction. Leonhart v. District Court, 138 Colo. 1, 329 P.2d 781 (1958). Mere error, irregularity, or mistake in the proceedings of a court having jurisdiction does not justify a resort to the extraordinary remedy by prohibition. Prinster v. District Court, 137 Colo. 393, 325 P.2d 938 (1958). A writ of prohibition does not correct mere error. Vaughn v. District Court, 192 Colo. 348, 559 P.2d 222 (1977); Alspaugh v. District Court, 190 Colo. 282, 545 P.2d 1362 (1976). The writ of prohibition cannot be sued for appealing cases on the installment plan and it will not be issued on account of irregularities where the trial court had both jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person of a defendant. Bustamante v. District Court, 138 Colo. 97, 329 P.2d 1013 (1958). Questions on the merits of the case may be reviewed only by appeal; the supreme court will not use its constitutional supervisory power to prevent error in a trial court. Toll v. City & County of Denver, 139 Colo. 462, 340 P.2d 862 (1959). And will not issue when lower court may properly and fully determine question. The supreme court will not exercise original jurisdiction when the question may be properly submitted and determined and the rights of the petitioner fully protected and enforced in the lower court. Rogers v. Best, 115 Colo. 245, 171 P.2d 769 (1946); Kemper v. District Court, 131 Colo. 325, 281 P.2d 512 (1955); Medberry v. Patterson, 174 F. Supp. 720 (D. Colo.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 932, 79 S. Ct. 320, 3 L. Ed. 2d 304 (1959). Review limited to questions of jurisdiction and abuse of discretion. Under this rule, the authority of the supreme court extends no further than to determine whether a trial court exceeds its jurisdiction or abuses its discretion. Toll v. City & County of Denver, 139 Colo. 462, 340 P.2d 862 (1959); People v. Martinez, 24 P.3d 629 (Colo. 2001). When a writ of prohibition is presented to the supreme court, its only inquiry is whether the inferior judicial tribunal is exercising a jurisdiction it does not possess, or, having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties, has exceeded its legitimate powers. City of Aurora v. Congregation Beth Medrosh Hagodol, 140 Colo. 462, 345 P.2d 385 (1959); City of Colo. Springs v. District Court, 184 Colo. 177, 519 P.2d 325 (1974). And court may not adjudicate rights of non-parties. Where parties who enjoyed favorable ruling in a trial court are not parties in prohibition proceedings in the supreme court, the court is in no position to adjudicate their rights. Prinster v. District Court, 137 Colo. 393, 325 P.2d 938 (1958). But court may prevent future proceedings or enter proper order. Where an unauthorized act of an inferior tribunal has been performed, and something remains to be done to give full effect to the judgment in a matter beyond the lower court's jurisdiction, prohibition may be granted to prevent such further action and also to undo what has already been done by directing the lower court to set aside its order and enter a proper order. People ex rel. Long v. District Court, 28 Colo. 161, 63 P. 321 (1900). When more than preventive relief available. Ordinarily, relief only lies to prevent the lower court from proceeding further with the cause, but where this would not give the relator the relief to which he is entitled, it may direct that all proceedings had in excess of jurisdiction be quashed and the order entered which should have been. People ex rel. Lackey v. District Court, 30 Colo. 123, 69 P. 597 (1902). Application must show prima facie circumstances justifying jurisdiction. A party seeking to invoke the original jurisdiction of the supreme court under this rule, must be able to show, prima facie at least, circumstances justifying the exercise of such jurisdiction. Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. District Court, 140 Colo. 190, 343 P.2d 535 (1959). And failure to do so is fatal defect. The application to invoke original jurisdiction is fatally defective in that there is no allegation that sets forth the circumstances which rendered it necessary or proper that the supreme court exercise its original jurisdiction. Rogers v. Best, 115 Colo. 245, 171 P.2d 769 (1946); Medberry v. Patterson, 174 F. Supp. 720 (D. Colo.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 932, 79 S. Ct. 320, 3 L. Ed. 2d 304 (1959). Burden is on petitioner. In an original proceeding pursuant to this rule, the burden is on the petitioner to clearly establish that the respondent trial court is proceeding without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or has seriously abused its discretion. Brewer v. District Court, 655 P.2d 819 (Colo. 1982); Miller v. District Court, 737 P.2d 834 (Colo. 1987). Lower court and judge are indispensable parties. In an application to the appellate tribunal for relief against an inferior court, the court and judge thereof are indispensable parties. James v. James, 95 Colo. 1, 32 P.2d 821 (1934). In a proceeding seeking a writ of mandamus, the district court and the district court judge, acting in his capacity as judge, should be named as the appropriate respondents. Wesson v. Bowling, 199 Colo. 30, 604 P.2d 23 (1979). No time limit on filing specified. This rule does not specify any time limit on filing. Application of the doctrine of laches may bar consideration of original proceedings by the supreme court; nevertheless, a three-month delay may not be unreasonable. Nolan v. District Court, 195 Colo. 6, 575 P.2d 9 (1978). This rule tolls statutory speedy trial period. People v. Jamerson, 198 Colo. 92, 596 P.2d 764 (1979); People v. Beyette, 711 P.2d 1263 (Colo. 1986). Although proceeding not technically interlocutory appeal. Section 18-1-405 and Crim. P. 48 exclude, from the computation of the time in which a defendant shall be brought to trial the period of delay caused by an interlocutory appeal, but an original proceeding under this rule is, technically speaking, not an interlocutory appeal. People v. Medina, 40 Colo. App. 490, 583 P.2d 293 (1978). No authority for issuing writs of prohibition against attorney general. Although this rule provides for prohibition against district courts in appropriate circumstances, it expresses no authority for issuing such writs against the attorney general. Western Food Plan, Inc. v. District Court, 198 Colo. 251, 598 P.2d 1038 (1979). No authority to enforce civil subpoenas against out-of-state nonparties. Such enforcement, if any, is left to the states in which the discovery is to take place. Colo. Mills, LLC v. SunOpta Grains & Foods Inc., 2012 CO 4, 269 P.3d 731. Motion by office of attorney regulation counsel (OARC) to dismiss district court complaint brought under C.R.C.P. 106 (a)(4) seeking an order compelling OARC to investigate professional misconduct warrants exercise of supreme court's original jurisdiction. OARC's motion to dismiss challenges the district court's subject matter jurisdiction and therefore plainly affects that court's authority to proceed with the case. Relatedly, judicial economy favors exercise of the supreme court's original jurisdiction to resolve the issue because, if the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, no other issues in the case need be resolved. The supreme court has also exercised original jurisdiction under this rule when a procedural ruling will have significant effect on a party's ability to litigate the merits of the controversy. Chessin v. Office of Attorney Regulation, 2020 CO 9, 458 P.3d 888. Applied in Berger v. People, 123 Colo. 403, 231 P.2d 799, cert. denied, 342 U.S. 837, 77 S. Ct. 62, 96 L. Ed. 633 (1951); Colo. State Bd. of Exam'rs of Architects v. District Court, 126 Colo. 340, 249 P.2d 146 (1952); Caldwell v. District Court, 128 Colo. 498, 266 P.2d 771 (1953); Farrell v. District Court, 135 Colo. 329, 311 P.2d 410 (1957); Garrimore v. Justice Court, 143 Colo. 403, 355 P.2d 116 (1960); Scheer v. District Court, 147 Colo. 265, 363 P.2d 1059 (1961); Colo. State Council of Carpenters v. District Court, 155 Colo. 54, 392 P.2d 601 (1964); Schwader v. District Court, 172 Colo. 474, 474 P.2d 607 (1970); People ex rel. Heckers v. District Court, 170 Colo. 533, 463 P.2d 310 (1970); People ex rel. Dunbar v. District Court, 180 Colo. 107, 502 P.2d 420 (1972); City & County of Denver v. Juvenile Court, 182 Colo. 157, 511 P.2d 898 (1973); People v. Spencer, 185 Colo. 377, 524 P.2d 1084 (1974); Jacobucci v. District Court, 189 Colo. 380, 541 P.2d 667 (1975); City of Louisville v. District Court, 190 Colo. 33, 543 P.2d 67 (1975); Clinic Masters, Inc. v. District Court, 192 Colo. 120, 556 P.2d 473 (1976); Shon v. District Court, 199 Colo. 90, 605 P.2d 472 (1980); Barnes v. District Court, 199 Colo. 310, 607 P.2d 1008 (1980); Barker v. District Court, 199 Colo. 416, 609 P.2d 628 (1980); In re Henne, 620 P.2d 62 (Colo. App. 1980); People v. Jones, 631 P.2d 1132 (Colo. 1981); Sandefer v. District Court, 635 P.2d 547 (Colo. 1981); People v. Clerkin, 638 P.2d 808 (Colo. App. 1981); Cavanaugh v. State, Dept. of Soc. Servs., 644 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1982); Continental Title Co. v. District Court, 645 P.2d 1310 (Colo. 1982); Pleasant v. Tihonovich, 647 P.2d 236 (Colo. 1982); Faris v. Rothenberg, 648 P.2d 1089 (Colo. 1982); People v. Anderson, 649 P.2d 720 (Colo. App. 1982); Greenwell v. Gill, 660 P.2d 1305 (Colo. App. 1982); Pignatiello v. District Court, 659 P.2d 683 (Colo. 1983); People v. Smith, 984 P.2d 50 (Colo. 1999); People v. Villapando, 984 P.2d 51 (Colo. 1999). II. Illustrative Cases. Trial court found proceeding without jurisdiction. Carlson v. District Court, 116 Colo. 330, 180 P.2d 525 (1947); Kellner v. District Court, 127 Colo. 320, 256 P.2d 887 (1953); Warwick v. District Court, 129 Colo. 300, 269 P.2d 704 (1954); Stull v. District Court, 135 Colo. 86, 308 P.2d 1006 (1957). Question of constitutionality is matter to be raised by appeal, and not by a petition for prohibition. Colo. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. District Court, 138 Colo. 227, 331 P.2d 502 (1958). Supreme court's discharge of a rule to show cause improvidently granted has no substantive significance and does not indicate approval or disapproval of trial court ruling, and, thus, trial court erred in using such discharge as a basis for dismissing criminal charges against a defendant. People v. McGraine, 679 P.2d 1084 (Colo. 1984). But prohibition proper to prevent prosecution barred by statute of limitations. An original proceeding in prohibition is proper to prevent a trial judge from proceeding with a prosecution on an indictment which showed on its face that the indictment had not been returned within the time fixed by statute, as a court may not proceed contrary to the inhibitions contained in the statute of limitations. Markiewicz v. Black, 138 Colo. 128, 330 P.2d 539, 75 A.L.R.2d 678 (1958). Where a trial court is without jurisdiction to try defendant under an indictment showing on its face that prosecution is barred by the statute of limitations, prohibition is the proper remedy for relief. Bustamante v. District Court, 138 Colo. 97, 329 P.2d 1013 (1958). Or to prevent double jeopardy. Where it appears that defendants were in jeopardy and that a court is about to place them in jeopardy a second time for the same offense, prohibition is the proper proceeding to protect defendants in their constitutional right against being twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. Markiewicz v. Black, 138 Colo. 128, 330 P.2d 539, 75 A.L.R.2d 678 (1958). This rule is an appropriate method for a defendant to challenge an erroneous ruling on probable cause. Habeas corpus relief is generally not available unless other relief is unavailable. Blevins v. Tihonovich, 728 P.2d 732 (Colo. 1986). This rule provides an appropriate procedural mechanism, absent any other adequate remedy, to mandate compliance by the department of corrections with trial court sentencing orders. People v. Dixon, 133 P.3d 1176 (Colo. 2006). Original proceeding could have been filed to test preliminary hearing finding probable cause. White v. MacFarlane, 713 P.2d 366 (Colo. 1986). Exercise of original jurisdiction proper to prevent confusion among prosecutors and uncertainty of defendants where pre-trial ruling declared death penalty statute to be unconstitutional. People v. Young, 814 P.2d 834 (Colo. 1991). Or to review order granting a motion to compel arbitration. Defendant, who was a non-party to the agreement to arbitrate, could not file an interlocutory appeal from the order compelling arbitration. Absent intervention by the court, defendant would be required to expend significant resources to arbitrate before having an opportunity to appeal, effectively denying the defendant relief. Therefore, exercise of original jurisdiction was proper. N.A. Rugby Union v. US Rugby Football Union, 2019 CO 56, 442 P.3d 859. Or to review a trial court's ruling that a party is a proper defendant because a potentially improper party would otherwise be subject to the burdens of discovery and trial before relief is granted. Raven v. Polis, 2021 CO 8, 479 P.3d 918. Exercise of original jurisdiction proper to resolve question of juvenile court's authority to order department of institutions not to send youths to out-of-state facility. McDonnell v. Juvenile Court, 864 P.2d 565 (Colo. 1993). Exercise of original jurisdiction proper to determine whether a juvenile court has the authority to order a juvenile who has been found incompetent to undergo a reassessment evaluation as part of the restoration review or restoration hearing procedures outlined in §§ 19-2.5-704 to 19-2.5-706 to determine whether the juvenile has been restored to competency. People in Interest of A.C., 2022 CO 49, 517 P.3d 1228. Supreme court had original jurisdiction to determine whether trial court exceeded its jurisdiction or seriously abused its discretion in not allowing petitioner to proceed in forma pauperis. Magistrate's denial of motion did not constitute reversible error or prejudice to petitioner where magistrate determined petitioner's subsequent claims, and denied relief. Hawkinson v. Biddle, 880 P.2d 748 (Colo. 1994). Exercise of jurisdiction under this rule proper to review trial court's ruling denying plaintiffs' request to proceed without filing cost bond since ruling had an obvious impact on the ability to litigate claims. Walcott v. District Ct., 2nd Jud. Dist., 924 P.2d 163 (Colo. 1996). Exercise of jurisdiction proper under this rule, where the trial court abused its discretion in discharging defendant from the department of corrections and where appeal would be inadequate to remedy defendant's immediate and improper release from the department. People v. Miller, 25 P.3d 1230 (Colo. 2000). Exercise of original jurisdiction proper to address the district courts staying of an employee's Wage Claim Act claim against an employer pending conclusion of arbitration proceedings when appellate review of the arbiter's final decision would not have been an adequate remedy because the underlying issue of the right to pursue compensation through the Colorado court system would not be resolved. Lambdin v. District Ct. of Arapahoe Cty., 903 P.2d 1126 (Colo. 1995). Or where court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Prohibition is applicable to restrain a trial court from proceeding with a criminal trial when it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter. Bustamante v. District Court, 138 Colo. 97, 329 P.2d 1013 (1958). Or personal jurisdiction. Prohibition is the proper remedy to invoke in a civil action where a district court is proceeding without jurisdiction of the person of a defendant. Bustamante v. District Court, 138 Colo. 97, 329 P.2d 1013 (1958). Where a court lacked jurisdiction to determine a party's right to custody in a habeas corpus proceeding, prohibition is a proper remedy to challenge a custody order from that court. Lopez v. Smith, 146 Colo. 180, 360 P.2d 967 (1961); Brouwer v. District Court, 169 Colo. 303, 455 P.2d 207 (1969). Where an application is made to a licensing authority for a retail liquor license and the license is duly issued, the district court does not have jurisdiction to reverse the findings of the licensing authority and revoke the license in review proceedings if the licensee is not made a party. The petitioner-licensee, not being a party to the review proceedings, has no remedy by appeal and properly sought relief by invoking the original jurisdiction of the supreme court. Short v. District Court, 147 Colo. 52, 362 P.2d 406 (1961). Writ of mandamus will issue to insure full observance with the rules of civil procedure. In a proper case, a writ of mandamus will issue to insure the full observance of the rules of civil procedure, and, in such a case, it must be shown that the damage to petitioner cannot be cured by appeal and that judicial discretion has been abused. Curtis, Inc. v. District Court, 186 Colo. 226, 526 P.2d 1335 (1974). Pretrial discovery may be proper subject for original writ. Matters relating to pretrial discovery are ordinarily within the trial court's discretion and are reviewable only by appeal rather than in an original proceeding; however, if it is shown that judicial discretion has been grossly abused and that damage to the petitioners could not be cured by appeal, an original writ in the nature of prohibition may issue. Chicago Cutlery Co. v. District Court, 194 Colo. 10, 568 P.2d 464 (1977). When a procedural ruling will have a significant effect on a party's ability to litigate the merits of the controversy and the damage to a party could not be cured on appeal, an original proceeding is an appropriate remedy to challenge a trial court's order relating to matters of pretrial discovery. Kerwin v. District Court 649 P.2d 1086 (Colo. 1982). Although matters of pretrial discovery are ordinarily within the discretion of the trial court, they are not exempted from extraordinary relief under appropriate circumstances. Sanchez v. District Court, 624 P.2d 1314 (Colo. 1981). Although orders relating to pretrial discovery are interlocutory in nature and normally not reviewable in an original proceeding, the supreme court has not hesitated to exercise its original jurisdiction when a discovery order places a party at an unwarranted disadvantage in litigating the merits of his claim. Caldwell v. District Court, 644 P.2d 26 (Colo. 1982). Where the trial court's order both prevented the plaintiff from accessing the sole source of factual information for which she demonstrated substantial need and departed significantly from the court's precedent in mandating that plaintiff waive medical record privileges, the court properly exercised its jurisdiction. Cardenas v. Jerath, 180 P.3d 415 (Colo. 2008). As may be denial of amendment of complaint. Denial of petitioner's motion to amend his complaint was a ruling justifying the supreme court's exercise of original jurisdiction. Varner v. District Court, 618 P.2d 1388 (Colo. 1980). And pretrial rulings on issues involving admissibility of evidence and imposition of sanctions against prosecution in criminal cases are claims which are properly before the supreme court for a decision on the merits in an original proceeding. People v. District Court, 664 P.2d 247 (Colo. 1983); People v. Casias, 59 P.3d 853 (Colo. 2002). Relief was appropriate under this rule where the trial court's ruling barring introduction of DNA evidence would impair the prosecution's ability to present its case and double jeopardy would bar a retrial if the defendant were acquitted. The supreme court held that the trial court erred in refusing to admit the DNA evidence and that exclusion of the evidence was an abuse of discretion. People v. Shreck, 22 P.3d 68 (Colo. 2001). And reviewing an erroneous discovery order that could place an unnecessary burden on the prosecution that is not mandated by the rules. People v. Vlassis, 247 P.3d 196 (Colo. 2011). And psychiatric examination ordered in violation of C.R.C.P. 35(a). Petitioner's allegations that respondent court exceeded its jurisdiction and abused its discretion by ordering a psychiatric examination in violation of C.R.C.P. 35(a) presented a proper case for exercise of the supreme court's original jurisdiction. Post-judgment appeal obviously cannot reverse the possible adverse consequences of a pretrial psychiatric examination of petitioner. Tyler v. District Court, 193 Colo. 31, 561 P.2d 1260 (1977). And denial of intervention of right. In cases in which an order denies the right to intervene, situations may arise (e.g., where intervention is a matter of right) where the determination in the action may bind the intervenors and where the denial can be considered as a final order affecting the rights of the persons seeking to intervene. In such instances an order denying intervention may justify invoking the original jurisdiction of the supreme court to prevent a denial or miscarriage of justice. Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. District Court, 140 Colo. 190, 343 P.2d 535 (1959). And improper consolidation of actions. Contention that district court had no power under § 38-22-111(1) to consolidate one action which was pending with another action which had been dismissed without prejudice, and thus was proceeding without in personam jurisdiction, was a proper matter to be resolved in a proceeding for a writ of mandamus. Columbia Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. District Court, 186 Colo. 212, 526 P.2d 661 (1974). And question of improper venue. The supreme court may consider the question of improper venue on an original writ in view of the importance of determining the question raised and of preventing the delay and expense of a retrial. Jameson v. District Court, 115 Colo. 298, 172 P.2d 449 (1946); Bd. of County Comm'rs v. District Court, 632 P.2d 1017 (Colo. 1981). In an action on contract, it appearing that defendant was entitled to have the case tried in the county of his residence, relief is allowed against the trial in another county. People ex rel. Barnum v. District Court, 74 Colo. 121, 218 P. 1047 (1923). And denial of dismissal for failure to grant speedy trial. Where a trial court has denied his motion for dismissal for failure to grant a speedy trial, a criminal defendant may seek a writ of prohibition. Hampton v. District Court, 199 Colo. 104, 605 P.2d 54 (1980). Relief in the nature of prohibition under this rule is an appropriate remedy when a district court is proceeding without jurisdiction to try a defendant in violation of his right to a speedy trial. Marquez v. District Court, 200 Colo. 55, 613 P.2d 1302 (1980). And protection of judgment lienor. An appeal following a trial on the merits may not be an adequate remedy for a judgment lienor whose priority might be destroyed by the sale of the encumbered property by a judgment creditor whose rights attached subsequent to the default judgment; thus, an original proceeding is proper. Weaver Constr. Co. v. District Court, 190 Colo. 227, 545 P.2d 1042 (1976). And review of order for temporary possession in condemnation proceeding. Because an order for temporary possession in a condemnation proceeding is interlocutory, and review must be by an original proceeding. Larson v. Chase Pipe Line Co., 183 Colo. 76, 514 P.2d 1316 (1973). And whether defendant is entitled to a preliminary hearing, which is a pretrial screening device. A defendant's right to a preliminary hearing is rendered moot after trial, so requiring defendant to raise such a claim on direct appeal in the event of a conviction is not an adequate remedy. People v. Vanness, 2020 CO 18, 458 P.3d 901. And failure to provide transcript of preliminary hearing to indigent. Failure to provide a transcript of a preliminary hearing at the request of an indigent defendant in a criminal case, when the transcript is necessary for an effective defense, is an abuse of discretion by the district court and is subject to review by the supreme court on an original writ. Gonzales v. District Court, 198 Colo. 505, 602 P.2d 857 (1979). And question of reasonableness of bail. The proper remedy to the question of the reasonableness of the amount set as bail is by way of original proceedings in the supreme court. Balltrip v. People, 157 Colo. 108, 401 P.2d 259 (1965). Supreme court has jurisdiction to review trial court's order on attorney fees for a court-appointed attorney as an independent original proceeding, but, if there is an appeal on some aspect of the underlying action, the attorney fees issue may be raised in such appeal without the necessity of bringing the independent original proceeding. Bye v. District Court, 701 P.2d 56 (Colo. 1985). Supreme court has jurisdiction to review controversy over sanctions, because it implicates entirely different legal theory than underlying action, is collateral to the merits of that action, and involves parties which are different than the parties to the underlying action. Halaby, McCrea & Cross v. Hoffman, 831 P.2d 902 (Colo. 1992). But order granting intervention not reviewable on original writ. An order of a trial court granting intervention under C.R.C.P. 24 is not reviewable by the supreme court in an action invoking the court's original jurisdiction under this rule. Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. District Court, 140 Colo. 190, 343 P.2d 535 (1959). Nor application to set aside default judgment. The only proper procedure to secure review of a trial court's order granting or denying an application to set aside a default judgment is by appeal after final judgment. Weaver Constr. Co. v. District Court, 190 Colo. 227, 545 P.2d 1042 (1976). The only proper procedure to secure review of a trial court's order granting an application to set aside a default judgment is by writ of error after final judgment, not prohibition. Stiger v. District Court, 188 Colo. 407, 535 P.2d 508 (1975). And prohibition not usable to limit hearing by regulatory commission. Where the jurisdiction of the public utilities commission was invoked by the utility when it filed its application, the commission scheduled a hearing, and notice was directed to be given to those whom the commission envisioned might be interested, the supreme court certainly cannot enjoin the hearing or direct the scope thereof in order to prevent error, nor can it limit the parties to whom notice should be given; thus, a petition for prohibition is premature. City of Thornton v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 154 Colo. 431, 391 P.2d 374 (1964). Revocation of conditional plea agreement in criminal proceeding by district court, which retains jurisdiction over agreement at least until the express condition has been satisfied, goes beyond the scope of supreme court review cognizable under this rule. White v. District Court, 695 P.2d 1133 (Colo. 1984). Supreme court has no original jurisdiction to issue a writ of prohibition against an independent regulatory commission like the public utilities commission. Intermountain R.E.A. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 723 P.2d 142 (Colo. 1986). Supreme court has jurisdiction to review a defendant's sentence if the trial court's sentence is illegal. People v. District Court, 673 P.2d 991 (Colo. 1983). Supreme court has jurisdiction to review the court of appeals' stay of the Colorado state board of medical examiners' suspension of a doctor's license to practice medicine. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. Court of Appeals, 920 P.2d 807 (Colo. 1996). Interlocutory review granted to address the propriety of the trial court's orders for mediation, where trial court ordered mediation despite petitioner's claims of physical and psychological abuse by husband and appellate review would not prevent the harm petitioner sought to avoid. Pearson v. District Court, 18th Jud. Dist., 924 P.2d 512 (Colo. 1996). Prohibition generally improper where new trial ordered. Relief in the nature of prohibition is not a proper remedy in cases where the trial court orders a new trial, unless the trial court's decision to grant or deny the new trial reflects a clear showing of an abuse of discretion. People in Interest of P.N., 663 P.2d 253 (Colo. 1983). Issuance of injunctive orders without complying with rules of civil procedure. Stull v. District Court, 135 Colo. 86, 308 P.2d 1006 (1957). The court may set aside a lower court order allowing a person or entity to operate without a license when the lower tribunal has abused its discretion or acted outside of its jurisdiction to defeat exercise of the agency's authority delegated to it by the legislature. Due regard for the agency's role in carrying out the legislative design is at the heart of the court's inquiry in this regard. Kourlis v. District Court, El Paso County, 930 P.2d 1329 (Colo. 1997). Rule to show cause issued why Boulder county district court should not grant the petitioners' motion for a change of venue and held that the district court erroneously denied the petitioners' motion for change of venue under C.R.C.P. 98(b)(2). Executive Dir. v. District Ct. for Boulder County, 923 P.2d 885 (Colo. 1996). Rule to show cause made absolute where district court issued case management order that required the trial to be set within 30 days; the date of issuance of the order extended the deadline for setting of trial by 30 days. Becker v. District Ct. for Arapahoe County, 969 P.2d 700 (Colo. 1998). Rule to show cause made absolute where trial court refused plaintiffs' uncontested motions to postpone the deadline for disclosure of expert testimony and to continue the trial. Parties were in agreement to wait for the NTSB's plane crash investigative report instead of hiring expert investigators on short notice. Burchett v. S. Denver Windustrial, 42 P.3d 19 (Colo. 2002). Given the liberal interpretation afforded to procedural rules, district court abused its discretion by dismissing petitioner's motion for transfer as untimely filed under C.R.C.P. 520(b) and appellate remedy would be inadequate. Accordingly, court makes the rule to show cause absolute and directs direct court to grant petitioner's motion for transfer to county court. Semental v. Denver County Court, 978 P.2d 668 (Colo. 1999).
For relief available in the nature of remedial writs in the district court generally, see C.R.C.P. 106; for jurisdiction of supreme court to issue remedial and original writs in general, see § 3 of art. VI, Colo. Const.