Opinion
CV-24-00263-TUC-JGZ (MAA)
07-29-2024
Robert Zuniga, Plaintiff, v. County of Pima, et al., Defendants.
ORDER ON MOTION FOR EMERGENCY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
JENNIFER G. ZIPPS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Robert Zuniga's Motion for Emergency Injunctive Relief. (Doc. 19.) Plaintiff requests the Court issue a temporary restraining order (TRO) to “maintain the status quo as it existed prior to the filing of the federal lawsuit.” (Id. at 2.) For the following reasons, the Court will deny the Plaintiff's motion.
This case has been referred to Magistrate Judge Ambri for all preliminary proceedings. Because Plaintiff requests injunctive relief, the Court withdraws the reference as to this motion only.
I. Background
Plaintiff is employed by the Pima County Sheriff's Department (“PCSD”) as Corrections Lieutenant. He has filed a lawsuit against Pima County, PCSD, Sheriff Chris Nanos, Chief Scott Lowing, and Captain Robert Koumal, asserting causes of action under Title VII for discrimination, retaliation, hostile work environment, and 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violation of his Equal Protection Clause rights. (Doc 1. at 5.)
In his Motion for Emergency Injunctive Relief, Plaintiff alleges that, since his filing of the complaint, the Defendants have retaliated against him by ordering him to reassign “his sergeant” to the jail and replace him with an officer. (Doc. 19 at 1.) Plaintiff disputes that there is a legitimate business purpose for the reassignment. He alleges that his workload has doubled as he is required to do sergeant duties in addition to his own. Plaintiff asserts he continues to suffer from ongoing retaliatory actions which undermine his ability to perform his duties effectively and he faces further harm to his professional reputation and mental well-being. Plaintiff also challenges Pima County Human Resources' assignment of his June 18, 2024 formal complaint of retaliation to the PCSD for investigation, asserting that this is a clear conflict of interest. Plaintiff requests that the Court order: (1) reinstatement of the sergeant to his position under Plaintiff's command and maintain Plaintiff's workload; (2) order an independent investigation of Plaintiff's retaliation complaints; and (3) grant such other relief as the Court deems proper to protect Plaintiff from further retaliatory actions and to ensure a fair and impartial investigation.
II. Temporary Restraining Order
“A preliminary injunction is ‘an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.'” Lopez v. Brewer, 680 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam)). A party seeking injunctive relief under Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure must show that: (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in his favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. Baird v. Bonta, 81 F.4th 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2023).
This is not the type of situation that warrants emergency injunctive relief. Plaintiff's recent allegations of retaliation are not yet part of this lawsuit. The allegations are currently being investigated administratively. In addition, it is possible that the recent retaliation claim could be resolved during that process. There is nothing unusual about an employer investigating an employee's EEO claim. EEO administrative processes are meant to provide an avenue for resolution of such claims within the workplace.
Plaintiff is unlikely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief. Plaintiff remains employed, is receiving pay for his work, and apparently intends to continue in that employment. He has been provided with an officer to assist him. Plaintiff does not explain why that officer cannot do or learn the tasks at issue. In addition, if Plaintiff is successful in pursuing his claims, monetary damages would be adequate to compensate him for any harm caused by Defendants.
“Although in certain circumstances reputational injury can be used to establish the irreparable harm required to issue a preliminary injunction, as with all other forms of irreparable harm, the showing of reputational harm must be concrete and corroborated, not merely speculative.” 11A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2948.1 (3d ed. 2005) (citing Reinhard v. Johnson, 209 F.Supp.3d 207 (D.D.C. 2016)).
Plaintiff does not explain how his professional reputation or mental well-being would be irreparably harmed in absence of injunctive relief. See Jones v. District of Columbia, 177 F.Supp.3d 542 (D.D.C. 2016) (finding terminated school district employees who served as part-time basketball coaches failed to demonstrate that they would have suffered irreparable harm absent injunctive relief requiring the school district to retain them as coaches pending the outcome of their action and concluding the loss of part-time supplemental employment did not constitute irreparable injury and their alleged reputational injuries did not rise to the level of reputational injury that warranted injunctive relief). Plaintiff's case is unlike other cases where irreparable harm to reputation was found. In those cases, the employee was terminated, there was an issue of loss of good will of a business or violation of noncompete agreements.
For the above reasons, the balance of equities does not tip in Plaintiff's favor.
Finally, the public interest does not favor issuance of an injunction. The circumstances at issue are not such that the Court could properly enjoin the PCSD from its fulfilling its statutory obligation to manage its operations and resources such as the work assignment of employees and/or modification of standard procedures for investigation of EEO complaints.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED Plaintiff's Motion for Emergency Injunctive Relief (Doc. 19) is denied.